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INTRODUCTION

Proposals to regulate the provision of medical care by managed
care organizations (MCOs) have dominated the agendas of state legislatures more than any other issue during the 1990s. Nearly every state
has enacted laws designed to protect consumers from the perceived
ill-effects of managed care.' State legislatures have enacted perhaps as
many as 1000 patient protection laws nation wide, 2 and lawmakers are
introducing new legislation at a rate of as many as 1000 bills per year
by some estimates. 3 The most active state, Vermont, alone has passed
more than 100 different managed care regulations. 4 In 1999, every
state has considered new legislation to regulate MCOs.5
1 In a recent study, Families USA, an advocacy organization for health care consumers, surveyed the prevalence of 13 different managed-care-patient protection laws across
the country and found that only South Dakota had failed to enact at least one of the 13
laws. See FAAILius USA FouND., HIT AND MIss: STATE MANAGED CARE LAWs 4 (1998). According to the National Council of State Legislatures, 42 states enacted managed-care-patient protection laws in 1997 alone. See Steve Lewis, Mandated Benefits, HEALTH POL'Y
TRACKING SERVICE

(Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 31, 1997, at

2.
2 See, e.g., Alaln C. Enthoven & SaraJ. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in Regulating Managed Care HEALTr Ae., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 26, 30.
3 See Thomas Bodenheimer, The HMO Backlash-Righteous or Reactionary?, 335 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1601, 1601 (1996) ("In 1996 alone, 1000 pieces of legislation attempting to
regulate or weaken HMOs were introduced in state legislatures .... ."); Milt Freudenheim,
Baby Boomers Force New Rules for H.M.O.'s, N.Y. Timis, Nov. 27, 1997, at Al ("More than
1,000 managed-care bills were introduced in state legislatures [in 1996].").
4 See Bryan Pfeiffer, Vermont Tracks Compliance with Managed CareRegs by UsingMeasurable Standards and Report Cards, ST. HEA.TH WATCH, Aug. 1998, at 1.
5
See Managed CareBills Top State Agendas in 1999; LegislationPending in Every State, 7

Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 49, at 1996 (Dec. 17, 1998) [hereinafter Managed Care] (citing a
survey conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures).
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The federal government has joined the legislation bandwagon as
well, enacting laws that limit the ability of MCOs to exclude coverage
for preexisting medical conditions6 and require them to permit women to remain in hospitals at least forty-eight hours after giving
birth.7 President Clinton proposed comprehensive federal managed
care regulation in 19978 and called for the enactment of a Patients'
Bill of Rights in his 1999 State of the Union address.9 Over the past
several years, Congress has debated a plethora of bills, sponsored by
Republicans as well as Democrats,10 that would legislate more comprehensive consumer protection from MCOs."1 In late 1999, the Senate
6 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
The law provides that group health insurers may impose a preexisting-condition exclusion

only if
(1) the exclusion relates to a condition... for which medical advice, diagnosis, care or treatment was recommended or received within the 6-month
period ending on the enrollment date; (2) such exclusion period extends
for a period of not more than 12 months... ; and (3) the period of exclusion is reduced by the aggregate periods of creditable coverage ....
§701(1)-(3), 110 Stat. at 1939-40.
7 See Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-204,
110 Stat. 2935 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). The
law provides that group health insurance plans may not restrict postpartum hospital stays
for a mother or a newborn to less than 48 hours in the case of a vaginal delivery and 96
hours in the case ofa Ceasarean section delivery. See§ 711(a) (1), 110 Stat. at 2936; see also
Eugene Declercq & Diana Simmes, The Politics of "Drive-ThroughDeliveries": Putting Early
PostpartumDischargeon the Legislative Agenda, 75 Mi_.LBANK Q. 175, 176 (1997) (noting that
President Clinton signed the bill into law in September 1996).
8 See Robert Pear, Clinton Plans New Health Care Fight, N.Y. TiuES, Nov. 24, 1997, at
A18; Robert Pear, Panel of Experts Urges Broadening of Patient Rights, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 23,
1997, atAl. The President based his proposal on the recommendations of his presidential
advisory commission, whose report is available online. See President's Advisory Comm'n on
Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Indus., Quality First: BetterHealth Care
for All Americans (last modified July 8, 1998) <http://vw.hcqualitycommission.gov>.
9 See, e.g., Jennifer Combs & David Nather, Health CareProposalsHelp Form Backbone of
Clinton Domestic Agenda, Speech Reveals, 8 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 100-01 (Jan. 21,
1999).
10 See, e.g., Romesh Ratnesar, Bad Medicine, NEw REPUBLIC, July 7, 1997, at 10 (noting
that Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato and Republican Congressman Charlie Norwood
introduced the Patient Access to Responsible Care Act and "castigat[ed] private enterprise
in tones that would make Ralph Nader proud").
11 See, e.g., Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 6, H.R1 358, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients'
Bill of Rights Act, S. 240, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, S. 300, 106th
Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 326, 106th Cong. (1999); Promoting Responsible Managed Care Act, S. 374, 106th Cong. (1999); Access to Quality Care Act, H.R. 216,
106th Cong. (1999); Patient Protection Act, H.R. 448, 106th Cong. (1999); Managed Care
Reform Act, H.R. 719, 106th Cong. (1999); Comprehensive Managed Health Care Reform
Act, H.R. 1133, 106th Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Act, H.R. 3605, 105th Cong.
(1998); Patients' Bill of Rights Act, S. 1890, 105th Cong. (1998); Health Care Quality,
Education, Security, and Trust Act, S. 1712, 105th Cong. (1998); Comprehensive Managed
Health Care Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 2905, 105th Cong.; Managed Care Bill of Rights for
Consumers Act of 1997, H.R1 2606, 105th Cong.; Patient Access to Responsible Care Act of
1997, H.R. 1415, 105th Cong.; Patient and Health Care Provider Protection Act of 1997,
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and the House of Representatives passed competing versions of a Patients' Bill of Rights (although it remains uncertain whether a com12
promise between the bills will become law).
Despite this flurry of activity, and the continued increase in public support for managed care regulation 13 that has accompanied it,
the legal academy has engaged in no real debate over the general
efficacy of what is alternatively known as "patient-protection" or "mandated-benefits" legislation. This Article seeks to spur such a debate.
The 1980s witnessed a revolution in the provision of health care
services in the United States. Reeling from exploding health care
costs and the resulting rise in premiums, 14 employers, who pay over
eighty percent of the dollars spent on private health insurance, 15
sought to control their costs.'

6

Insurers, who typically paid for virtu-

ally all costs that any insured incurred under the care of a licensed
physician (a system known as fee-for-service medicine17), responded
by clamping down on the cost of medical care itself. The result was
H.R. 1191, 105th Cong.; Health Insurance Bill of Rights Act of 1997, S. 373, 105th Cong.;
Patient Protection Act of 1997, S. 346, 105th Cong.
12 Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 2723, 106th
Cong. (1999); Patients' Bill of Rights Plus Act, S. 1344, 106th Cong. (1999).
13 A poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, a partisan research group, from
January 14 to 17, 1999, found that 69% of Americans believe health care reform should be

a top policy priority, up from 62% in 1998 and 56% in 1997. See Pew Research Ctr. for
People & Press, PublicSatisfied with State of Nation, Clinton Accomplishments Outweigh Failures
(visited Aug. 25, 1999) <http://www.people-press.org/jan99rpt.htm>.
14 Between 1966 and 1993, national health expenditures increased at an average rate
of 11.7% per year. See Katharine R. Levit et al., National Health Spending Trends in 1996,
HEALTH ArF.,Jan.-Feb. 1998. Rising costs were particularly drastic in the latter part of that
period. See, e.g., WALTER A. ZELMAN & ROBERT A. BERENSON, THE MANAGED CARE BLUES
AND HoW TO CuRE THEM 1 (1998) (noting that 15% to 20% annual increases in health care
costs were common in the latter half of the 1980s). During the second half of the 1980s,
unequaled technological advances in health care caused the costs of care to rise much
more rapidly than in previous decades. See Patricia M. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefieldfor
Managed Care?, 26J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 503 (1997) ("[A] major stimulus to managed care is
the continued increase in absolute cost of health care. Rising health costs are driven
largely by technological advances.").
15 See Levit et al., supra note 14, at 35, 46 exhibit 6. A different study found that by
January 1996 over 71% of individuals who received health benefits through their employers were enrolled with MCOs. See Milt Freudenheim, Survey Finds Health Costs Rose in '95,
N.Y. Timxs, Jan. 30, 1996, at DI.
16 See FAMiLIES USA FOUND., supra note 1, at 1 (noting that "purchasers of health
coverage have turned to managed care in response to health care costs that were spiraling
out of control"); CathieJo Martin, Markets, Medicare, and MakingDo: Business StrategiesAfter
NationalHealth Care Reform, 22J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 557, 564 (1997) (noting that one
cause of the rise of managed care was that "corporate America was becoming more desperate about the price of health").
17 Fee-for-service medicine entails doctors setting their own fees, charging for discrete
procedures instead of for the time spent with a patient, and receiving reimbursement for
the full amount of the bill from an insurance agency. The fee-for-service system is considered traditional insurance and creates an incentive for doctors to provide excessive treat-
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the rise to prominence of "managed care,"'18 a variety of organizational arrangements for providing and financing medical care in
which the financing entity plays an active role in monitoring and controlling the amount and types of services that physicians provide to
patients. By 1995, nearly 75% of Americans with employer-provided
private insurance, and more in some part of the country, 19 received
their medical care from MCOs. 20 MCOs have also begun to capture a

portion of the market for government-financed health care-Medicaid 2 ' and Medicare.2 2 Although it is not clear whether the trend will
be sustainable in the long run, 23 the market penetration of managed
care has reduced health care inflation in recent years. 24
ment because they earn more with each procedure performed. See MARK A. HALL & IRA
MARK ELLMAN, HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHics IN A NUTSHELL 11-12 (1990).
18 For a detailed description of the various types of managed care organizations, including HMOs, PPOs, IPAs, and POSs, see generally Jonathan P. Weiner & Gregory de
Lissovoy, Razing a Tower ofBabel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health InsurancePlans, 18
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 75 (1993).
19 See Henry T. Greely, Direct FinancialIncentives in Managed Care: Unanswered Questions,
6 HEALTH MATx 53, 54 (1996) (describing the market penetration of managed care in
California).
20
See Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: InsuranceTrends in the
1990s, H.ALTH AFF.,Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 125, 134.
21
At the end of 1995, approximately one third of Medicaid recipients received health
care from an MCO. See Marsha Gold, Markets and Public Programs:Insightsfrom Oregon and
Tennessee, 22J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 633, 634 (1997).
22
By 1995, approximately 10% of Medicare recipients were enrolled in MCOs, a majority of whom live in Florida and California. SeeJonathan B. Oberlander, Managed Care
and MedicareReform, 22J. HE.ATH POL., POL'Y & L. 595, 598-99 (1997).
23
According to one recent estimate, while 90% of HMOs were profitable in 1994,
only 35% were profitable in 1996. See Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical
Necessity Determinations: The Need for a New Legal Structure 6 HEALTH MATrIux 3, 38 (1996)
(concluding that "[m]any health care economists believe that the savings achieved by
[MCOs] are not sustainable on a long-term basis"); Levit et al., supra note 14, at 47 (suggesting that cost increases may be on the horizon); Martin, supranote 16, at 573 (reporting
some analysts' belief that declining health care costs represent a one-time savings from
initial shifts from fee-for-service plans to MCOs and that concentration in the managed
care industry could spur price increases).
24
Increases in national health care spending between 1993 and 1996 averaged just
5% per year, with growth slowing each successive year during that period. See Levit et al.,
supra note 14, at 36. During that period, the percentage of GDP spent on health care
remained constant at 13.6%. See id. at 37; see also Enthoven & Singer, supra note 2, at 27
("The 1997 California Public Employees Retirement System ...premiums are about the
same in dollars as they were in 1992 for essentially the same standard benefit package, and,
inflation-adjusted, they are down about 13%."); Lynn Etheredge et al.,
What Is Driving
Health System Change?, HEA.TH Arr., Wmter 1996, at 93, 94 (discussing a "Department of
Labor study indicat[ing] that employer health benefit spending rose only 0.1% from June
1995 to June 1996"); Jensen et al.,
supra note 20, at 125 (noting that in 1995, percentage
increases of health insurance premiums were below the rate of inflation "for the first time
in memory"). Although many factors have contributed to the decline in medical care inflation, commentators nearly always identify the exploding growth of managed care in the
1990s as one of the leading causes. See Levit et al., supranote 14, at 37. But seeJensen et al.,
supra note 20, at 134 (recognizing the possibility that the slowdown in health insurance
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By the early 1990s, the majority of policy analysts25 and elected
leaders 26 agreed that the nation was spending far too much on medical care 27 and that a solution to the spending problem was necessary.
On the other hand, consumers were understandably concerned that
efforts to rein in the costs of health care could easily result in a reduction in health care quality. 28 The leading response to these twin con-

cerns, which leading academics 29 advocated and which President
Clinton's proposed Health Security Act 0 more or less embodied, was
dubbed "managed competition."1 Managed competition could simultaneously control costs and assure a high quality of care by permitting profit-maximizing health care entities to compete for the business
of individual Americans within regulatory boundaries designed to correct for imperfections in the market for medical care.
Commentators have debated at length the merits of managed
competition. 3 2 Whatever its merits, most observers agree that the
inflation in the mid-1990s is due to cyclical profits in the health insurance industry rather
than to the rise of managed care).
25
See Henry J. Aaron & William B. Schwartz, Managed Competition:Little Cost Containment Without Budget Limits, HE.ALTH Air., Supp. 1993, at 204; Stuart H. Altman & Alan B.
Cohen, The Need for a National Global Budget, HEALTH Air., Supp. 1993, at 194; Alain C.
Enthoven, The History and Principlesof Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF., Supp. 1993, at 24;
Paul Starr & Walter A. Zelman, A Bridge to Compromise: Competition Under a Budget, HEALTH
Air., Supp. 1993, at 7. But seeJoseph P. Newhouse, An Iconoclastic Triew of Health Cost Containment, HEALT AFF., Supp. 1993, at 152, 153 (arguing that "the rhetoric about the urgency for cost containment may well be overstated").
26
See, e.g., 138 CONG. REc. S17,793 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1992) (statement of Sen. Cohen
on health care reform) ("The problem is not simply that we are spending too much. It is
that we are not getting a sufficient return on our investment."); 137 CoNG. REc. S15,119
(daily ed. Oct. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Mitchell on health care reform) ("We are
already spending too much money on health care.").
27
See Christine Gorman, Playingthe HMO Game TIME, July 13, 1998, at 22, 26 (reporting that health care consumed 12.3% of GDP in 1993, up from 9.3% in 1983).
28 For a list of some of the most common consumer complaints, see David A. Hyman,
Consumer Protection in a Managed Care World: Should Consumers Call 9117, 43 ViLL. L. REv.
409, 413-16 (1998).
29
See, e.g., Enthoven, supra note 25, at 28-29; Jonathan E. Fielding & Thomas Rice,
Can Managed Competition Solve the Problems of Market Failure?,HEALTH Air., Supp. 1993, at
216; Alan L. Hillman et al., SafeguardingQuality in Managed Competition, HEALTH Air., Supp.
1993, at 110; Starr & Zelman, supra note 25, at 8.
80
H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993). For a description of the principles underlying the
Health Security Act, see Paul Starr, The Framework of Health Care Reform, 329 NEv ENG. J.
MED. 1666 (1993).
31
For a brief description of the principles of managed competition, see Enthoven,
supra note 25, at 29 (stating that "[managed care] uses rules for competition.., to reward
with more subscribers and revenue those health plans that do the best job of improving
quality, cutting cost, and satisfying patients"). For an early enunciation of the principles,
see Alain C. Enthoven, Consumer-ChoiceHealth Plan (pts. 1 & 2), 298 NEv ENG. J. MED. 650,
709 (1978).
32 See Craig Salins, Editorial, "Cure" Is to Broaden Medicare SE.ATrLE TIMES, May 19,
1995, at B7; Paul Starr, Look Who's Talking Health CareReform Now, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 3, 1995,
Magazine, at 42-43; Single-Payerand Clinton Health Care Reform Plans Cited as Best for Senior
Citizens, Bus. WiRE, Dec. 21, 1993, available in Westlaw.
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political failure of the Health Security Act in 1993 all but eliminated
any possibility that the federal government would enact a comprehensive approach to health care reform any time in the near future.
Since the Health Security Act's demise, ad hoc attempts to regulate
particular aspects of the provision of health care services by MCOs
have proliferated at a staggering rate. In the last four years alone,
nearly all states have enacted legislation3 3 that in some way dictates
one or more of the following: the kinds of coverage MCOs must provide to patients,3 4 the extent to which MCOs may intervene in the
treatment decisions of their employed or independently contracted
physicians, 35 and the methods they may use to compensate their
36
providers.
The regulatory requirements to which managed care providers
are subject generally elicit one of two responses from academic commentators. Opponents of regulation-often economists or lawyers
with an inclination towards economic reasoning-typically argue that
the free market will more efficiently allocate resources among health
37
care and other consumer goods than will government mandates.
Mandating a forty-eight hour postpartum hospital stay, to select one
current example, inevitably increases the cost of providing health care
and will eventually drive up the price of private health insurance. The
efficiency argument posits that consumers who wish to spend their
money on such services are free to do so in the marketplace, and will
do so if they value the service more than its provision costs. But, the
argument continues, government mandates should not prevent consumers from spending their marginal dollars on other goods and services if they so desire. The implicit basis for the anti-regulation
argument is that medical care is "worth" what consumers are willing to
38
pay for it-neither more nor less.

In contrast, supporters of extensive regulation in the health insurance industry generally dismiss the underlying premise of their opSee supra note 1.
See id Thirty-one states and the District of Columbia require health plans to use
the "prudent layperson standard" when determining coverage for most emergency care, 15
states require plans to permit access to out-of-network providers when the plan's network is
inadequate, 12 states allow enrollees to obtain standing referrals to specialists, 10 states
allow specialists to serve as primary care providers, and 14 states require plans to allow
some patients to see the same provider for a specified number of days when their doctor
leaves the plan. See FAzmiEs USA FouND., supra note 1, at 23-24.
35
See FAMmIUs USA FouND., supra note 1, at 25.
33
34

36

See id.

37 See infra Part I.C.
38 See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 14, at 508 ("To decide whether a particular procedure
is worth performing requires comparing the value of the expected health outcomes to
costs. Valuation of medical services ultimately depends on consumer preferences for alternative outcomes, including tolerance for risk and discomfort, preferences for health care
versus other goods, and so forth.").
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ponents' argument. They see health care-at least a certain amount
of it-as a merit good rather than a normal consumer good, the provision of which should not be limited to those who are able to pay for
9
medical care and who see the wisdom in doing So.3
In this Article, I take a different approach to the issue of health
care mandates by challenging the opponents of mandates on their
own terms. I accept arguendo the efficiency premise: that health care
is a consumer good that must compete with other goods for society's
scarce resources, and that it should be provided only to the extent
that people prefer it to alternative goods that they could purchase
with the same dollars. A plausible paternalist justification for mandated benefits exists in some circumstances, 40 but I will not rely on it
for purposes of this Article. Although I accept the efficiency premise,
I reject the conclusion drawn by the opponents of regulation that an
unregulated market necessarily most closely approximates efficiency.
Instead, I argue that managed-care patient-protection legislation can
enhance efficiency under certain circumstances. This thesis rests on
two pillars: game theory and behavioral decision theory-the former
drawn from economics, the latter from cognitive psychology.
Part I of this Article provides context by describing the rise of
managed care, the epidemic of patient protection laws enacted from
coast to coast throughout the 1990s, and the standard free-market argument that these laws impede the efficient allocation of social resources. Part II, relying on a nonmathematical game theoretic model,
examines the incentives that profit-maximizing MCOs have to provide
a less-than-efficient level of insurance coverage to their enrollees. Relying on empirical evidence that consumers have cognitive limitations
39

See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL: OUR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO HEALTH

CARE? 1-2 (1997) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL] (classifying as "widely accepted" in
health care debates the assumption "that health care is a 'right' that should be made available to all Americans... by virtue of their participation in society"); MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONs 32 (1997) (arguing that "[o]ur country values minimally
decent health care as a basic social entitlement"); Richard A. Epstein, Why Is Health Care
Special?, 40 U. KAN. L. REv. 307, 307 (1992) [hereinafter Epstein, Why?] (noting "widespread agreement... that health care is 'special' . . . [and] that the special nature of
health care calls for the intervention of government into the operation of the market");
Clark C. Havighurst, ProspectiveSelf-Deniak Can Consumers Contract Today to Accept Health Care
Rationing Tomorrow?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1755, 1798 (1992) ("The pervasive assumption in
public and private conceptions of medical care is that it could never be a consumer good
....
Instead, health care is generally thought of as a 'merit good'-that is, as something
that should be distributed equitably, not simply according to ability to pay."); David A.
Hyman, Drive-Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer Protection" Just What the Doctor Ordered? 43 (Sept. 24, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("The conventional wisdom on regulating managed care is to privilege quality and discount or entirely
ignore cost.").
40
See, e.g., Thomas Rice, Can Markets Give Us the Health System We Want?, 22J. HEALTH
POL., POL'Y & L. 383, 405 (1997) (questioning whether in the health care arena, consumers are the best judges of their own interests).
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that cause them to make decisions in only a "boundedly rational"
manner, Part IH examines the ways in which even informed consumers are likely to fail to make individual health insurance purchasing
decisions in a way that promotes efficiency. The strategic interests of
MCOs and the cognitive limitations of health insurance consumers
are likely to result in the underprovision of some health care benefits.
Once the failures of the free market to guarantee the efficient
level of health care are identified, the question of which types of intervention will most likely promote the efficient allocation of social resources remains. Part IV contends that policymakers can use
regulatory mandates to solve the collective-action problem that leads
to the market's underprovision of health care. This strategy is currently more feasible than competing proposals that would attempt to
facilitate a more efficient market for health insurance by providing
more information to health care consumers.
If benefits mandates can enhance efficiency and are superior to
other policy options in some circumstances, the next important question is which branch of government should issue mandates. Part V
addresses this issue with a comparative institutional analysis of courts,
legislatures, and specially-appointed expert commissions as potential
sources of managed care regulations. To date, legislatures have
promulgated the vast majority of benefits mandates, although judicial
doctrines that courts rely on when adjudicating disputes about health
insurance coverage can have a similar effect. I conclude that legislatures are better positioned institutionally than courts to promulgate
mandates in most instances, but that expert administrative bodies are
more likely than either legislatures or courts to create efficient health
care mandates.
A brief note concerning what this Article does not argue is in order as well. I do not contend that any particular benefits mandate is
efficient. The proper analysis of any individual regulation would require a fact-specific inquiry comparing the imperfections inherent in
a given market with those of the regulatory decision-making process.
This Article's much more modest goal is to demonstrate that government mandates are a useful tool in the arsenals of lawmakers who are
concerned with ensuring that our society devotes the efficient level of
resources to health care.
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I
Tm CuRRENT STATE

A.

OF MANDATED HEALTH CARE BENEFITS

From Fee-for-Service Medicine to Managed Care
1. Fee-for-Service Medicine

Until the 1980s, most Americans received private health insurance on a fee-for-service basis. 41 Under the fee-for-service system, the
patient (or, more likely, her employer) paid a monthly fee to her insurance company for comprehensive coverage of all medical care she
might require. The insurance company, in turn, paid the physician of
the patient's choice for each service or treatment the physician provided and questioned the cost or necessity of the treatment in only the
most egregious circumstances.
This regime created two types of incentives that tended to lead to
the provision of more than the efficient amount of medical carewith "efficiency" understood to mean that the marginal cost of the
care provided to an individual is equivalent to the marginal benefit of
that care. Both incentives fall into the category of "moral hazard"
problems. 42 First, because the patient faces no marginal cost for consuming medical treatment (or perhaps a relatively modest marginal
cost in the form of a copayment), she has an incentive to consume any
service or treatment that might provide even a very small benefit, regardless of its cost.43 Second, because the physician is paid only when
she provides services or treatment, she also has an incentive to ignore
costs and to provide, at a minimum,44 treatment with any potential
benefit to the patient. 4 5 In the world of fee-for-service medicine,
then, the patient and physician each have an incentive to consume
medical care of any marginal benefit without regard to the marginal
46
cost of the care.
See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supranote 14, at 1-3.
42 For a detailed description of moral hazard in the health insurance context, see
PAUL L. JosKow, CONTROLLING HosPITAL CosTs 20-31 (1981).
43 See Danzon, supra note 14, at 495-96; Rice, supra note 40, at 412-13. Studies have
demonstrated that people who have to pay for some portion of their marginal health care
costs out of pocket use far fewer resources than those who can obtain care at no marginal
cost. See, e.g., THE EFFEcr OF COINSURANCE ON THE HEALTH OF ADULTS 1-2 (Robert H.
Brook et al. eds., 1984).
44 A physician actually has a financial incentive to provide useless or even detrimental
care, as long as she can do so without losing the patient to a competitor. For the purposes
of this Article, however, it is sufficient to assume that physicians' professional norms will
constrain them to provide only beneficial care.
45 See, e.g., HALL, supra note 39, at 181; Danzon, supra note 14, at 496; Donald W.
Moran, FederalRegulation of Managed Care: An Impulse in Search of a Theory?, HEALTH AFF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 7, 11.
46
Cf CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHoicEs 93 (1995) ("The insurance-induced divorce of consumption decisions from the obligation to pay undoubtedly justifies
concern that increased spending on health care does not truly reflect the preferences of
consumers as to how their money should be spent."). One study from the early 1990s
41
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As medical technology became vastly more sophisticated and expensive in the 1960s and 1970s, the annual costs of the fee-for-service
system predictably skyrocketed. Health care spending, which consumed only 5.1% of the nation's GDP in 1960, consumed 8.9% in
1980, and 12.2% in 1990. 47 During the inflationary years of the 1970s,

employers transferred the rising costs of health insurance to employees in the form of smaller increases in salaries-an effect that employees could not easily perceive. 48 In the low-inflation 1980s, however,
rising costs of health insurance led to wage stagnation for many employees, which increased the level of discontent with the fee-for-service system. 49
2.

The Rise of Managed Care

Any alternative to fee-for-service medicine can potentially reduce
the inefficient overutilization of medical care in one of three ways: (1)
rationing the amount of care provided, (2) offering the health care
provider an incentive to equate the marginal benefit of care with its
marginal cost, or (3) giving the patient an incentive to equate the
marginal benefit of care with its marginal cost. The first two approaches essentially seek to reduce the supply of medical care, while
the third attempts to reduce the demand for care.
A demand-side approach to the problem would require increased
health insurance deductibles and copayments, thereby placing a significant financial obligation for medical care directly on consumers of
medical services. The policy of creating "medical savings accounts"
(MSAs) embodies this concept.50 Proponents of MSAs would alter the
tax code to permit consumers to save money for future medical expenses on a tax-free basis (or at least at favorable rates) if they
purchase health insurance policies with very high deductibles. The
high deductible theoretically ensures that medical expenditures for all
but the very sickest 51 come out of the patient's pocket, providing him
estimated that moral-hazard-induced overuse of health care resources represented between 9% and 28% of all U.S. health care resources. See Roger Feldman & Bryan Dowd, A

New Estimate of the Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance,81 AM. ECON. REv. 297 (1991).
47 See Levit et al., supra note 14, at 38 exhibit 2.
48
See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 14, at 17-18.
49 See id. ("Only as the relationship between stagnant wages and rising premiums grew
more evident and more threatening to employer-employee relationships did employer
concerns about rising contributions for health care coverage become a force to be reckoned with.").
50
See generally HALL, supra note 39, at 26-28 (describing the concept of the medical
savings account); Gail A.Jensen & RobertJ. Morlock, Why MedicalSavings Accounts Deserve a
Closer Look, J. Am. HE.ALTH POL'Y, May-June 1994, at 14 (same).
51
In 1987, for example, the sickest 1% of Americans accounted for 30% of health
care spending, while the healthiest 50% of Americans consumed only 3% of health care
resources. See Marc L. Berk & Alan C. Monheit, The Concentration ofHealth Expenditures: An
Update, HE.ALTH Are., Winter 1992, at 145, 146.
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with the incentive to equate the marginal costs and benefits of care.5 2
To date, the MSA approach to reining in health care costs consists
only of a small pilot program within the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).53 Consequently, MSAs have
altered the incentives of relatively few consumers, 54 although this
could change in the future.5 5 MCOs tend to reduce (rather than increase) deductible and copayment levels as a method of marketing
comprehensive service and encouraging customers to seek preventive
care. 56 The tax code encourages this strategy by providing an incentive for employers, rather than for employees, to pay for medical care
costs.

57

Supply-side strategies, on the other hand, underlie the various approaches to medical care provision that have come to dominate the
health care system under the collective moniker of "managed care."
MCOs attempt to remedy the moral hazard problem of fee-for-service
medicine in one of two ways or a combination of both.58 First, MCOs
indirectly seek to restrict the utilization of resources by providing their
physicians with financial incentives to furnish less, rather than more,
care. 59 Many MCOs compensate their primary care physicians
52 An experiment that the RAND Corporation conducted in the early 1980s demonstrates that forcing patients to pay more out of pocket reduces health care expenditures.
See Emmett B. Keeler &John E. Rolph, How Cost SharingReduced MedicalSpending of Participants in the Health Insurance Experiment 249 JAMA 2220 (1983) (reporting results from a
RAND study).
53 Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 301, 110 Stat. 1936, 2041-42 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.) (defining medical savings accounts as
trusts "created or organized in the United States exclusively for the purpose of paying the
qualified medical expenses of the account holder," and exempting them from taxation).
54 According to the United States General Accounting Office, only 22,051 self-employed individuals and employees of small businesses opened medical savings accounts
between January and June of 1997. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL SAVINGS
AccouNTs: FINDINGS FROM INSURER SURVEY 5 (1997).

55 HIPAA implemented a four-year demonstration program for MSAs, limiting participation to self-employed individuals and small business employees and capping enrollment
at 725,000 accounts. See U.S. GEN. AccOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 54, at 3. Current Republican proposals pending in Congress would eliminate HIPAA's cap on the number of
MSAs, in theory making them available to a fiar greater number of Americans. See Quality
Care for the Uninsured Act of 1999, H.R. 2990, 106th Cong. (passed by the House of
Representatives on Oct. 6, 1999).
56 See Rice, supra note 40, at 416 (observing that "what is perhaps most noteworthy
about the HMO approach to cost containment is that copayments are ower than in fee-forservice medicine").
57 See HAVIGHURST, supra note 46, at 138 (speculating that high deductibles might be
ubiquitous in the absence of their tax disadvantage).
58 One can classify these responses more generally as "internalizing incentives for improving performance" of agents or as "external monitoring" of agents, where the agents
are the physicians providing care. HALL, supra note 39, at 183 (emphasis omitted).
59 See generally Danzon, supra note 14, at 498-99 (describing MCO strategies that involve restricting the networks of providers and sharing insurance risk with providers);
Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 27-30 (same).
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through capitation payments-a physician receives a fixed amount of
money per month for caring for a patient, regardless of the resources
that patient requires.6 0 Others use the related strategy of fee withholds. Under this arrangement, the MCO withholds part of the physician's payment for providing treatment and pays it at the end of the
year only if the physician meets resource-usage targets. 61 Even the
dwindling number of MCOs that pay physicians on a fee-for-service
basis are particular about which physicians they will hire or contract
with for services. 6 2 This screening process creates the implicit threat
that the MCO will "deselect," or fire, a physician for providing too
much care and hurting the MCO's bottom line. 63 The threat can be

particularly potent in areas with an oversupply of physicians or where
64
MCOs dominate the health care market.
Second, MCOs attempt to control the supply of medical care directly by scrutinizing the care physicians provide. The most popular
technique of this kind, utilization review, requires the patient or physician to obtain the MCO's approval either before treatment, or, in
some cases, after treatment but before the MCO pays for it.65 MCOs
argue that, by refusing to authorize services with little or no likely benefit and expensive treatments for which there are equally beneficial
alternatives, they can significantly rein in the cost of medical care
without substantially reducing the quality of care. If a patient seeks
treatment that fails to meet the MCO's guidelines, the MCO will deny
coverage, leaving the patient with the option of going without the
treatment or financing it out of pocket. To varying degrees, MCOs
stress that a doctor's recommendation of a certain treatment does not
obligate the MCO to pay for it, even when the MCO selects the physi60 See, e.g., Hirshfeld & Thomason, supranote 23, at 28-29. Whether the physician is
financially responsible for the cost of referrals to other health care providers, such as specialists or hospital care, varies across MCOs. See id. at 29-30. Similarly, MCOs vary as to
whether the physician has stop-loss protection, which limits the amount of the physician's

liability for exceptionally expensive care. See CarolJ. Simon & David W. Emmons, Physician
Earningsat Risk: An Examination of Capitated Contracts, HEALTH Arr., May-June 1997, at 120,
124-25. A recent study indicates that most physicians compensated on a capitation basis
have little or no protection against the large losses a patient may cause. See id.
61 See, e.g., Hirshfeld & Thomason, supranote 23, at 28.
62
One pair of authors identifies the selection of a limited number of health care
providers as contractors as "the feature that most defines managed care." ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 14, at 69.
63
See, e.g, Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 28; Robert Kuttner, Must Good
HMOs Go Bad? (pt. 1), 338 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1558, 1558-59 (1998).
64
See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supranote 23, at 28.
65
See Danzon, supra note 14, at 498; Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 26;
Arnold Milstein, Managing Utilization Management: A Purchaser'sWew, HEA.TH Are., MayJune 1997, at 87, 87. Closely related direct cost-containment strategies include case management, through which the MCO decides whether patients are seriously ill, and requirements that physicians in the MCO's network follow MCO-designed practice guidelines. See
Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 27.
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cian. 66 In what can be understood as a severe form of utilization review, MCOs often refuse ex ante to provide entire categories of
services that they believe have a low benefit-to-cost ratio (e.g., autologous bone marrow transplants as treatment for some forms of cancer)
or are difficult to control ex post through the utilization review process (e.g., mental health care).
The extent to which (or even whether) aggressive utilization review
reduces the quality of care that MCOs provide is a matter of substantial dispute, but consumers have reason to be concerned. A recent
study in the Journal of the American Medical Association shows that, according to one set of utilization review guidelines, eighty percent of
tube insertions to treat a middle ear infection would have been
judged unwarranted, although a panel of physician experts judged
67
only thirty-one percent of the insertions unwarranted.
Whether an MCO relies more on direct utilization review than on
indirect utilization review through financial incentives tends to depend on the MCO's internal structure. 68 Health maintenance organizations (HMOs), the type of MCOs that most closely integrate the
financing and provision of care, tend to compensate their providers
with capitation payments or fee withholding programs (or, for a "staff
model" HMO, in which the HMO employs the physicians, with salaries).69 Consequently, HMOs tend to rely relatively less on direct utilization review and the threat of deselection than do preferred provider
organizations (PPOs), which typically have broader, more loosely controlled networks of physicians. 70 All MCOs use some combination of
direct and indirect methods to control the quantity and cost of medical care that physicians provide to patients. In doing so, MCOs have
been able to provide health care services at a lower cost than fee-forservice plans, 71 although the extent of the actual cost savings created
by managed care is the subject of some debate.
66 See HAViGHURSr, supra note 46, at 127 (reviewing a series of health plan contracts
with this and similar disclaimers).
67 See Lawrence C. Kleinman et al., Adherence to PrescribedExplicit CriteriaDuring Utilization Review, 278 JAMA 497 (1997).
68 For a useful primer on the different types of MCOs and their precise defining characteristics, see generally Weiner & de Lissovoy, supra note 18, at 75.
69 See, e.g., Marsha R. Gold et al., A National Survey of the Arrangements Managed-Care
PlansMake with Physicians, 333 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1678, 1680-81, 1681 tbl.3 (showing that
the majority of HMOs surveyed compensated their physicians primarily with capitation payments or salary, and that almost all HMO physicians compensated on a fee-for-service basis
subject to risk-sharing arrangements, such as fee withholding).
70
See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 30; see also HAVIGHURST, supranote 46,
at 143 (finding that less-integrated MCOs, like PPOs, are more likely to employ independent utilization-review companies to control directly utilization of services).
71 See, e.g., ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 14, at 120 (estimating that employers and
employees today would be paying between 10% and 50% more for health insurance if the
fee-for-service system had persisted); Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed CarePlan
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B. The Mandated-Benefits Backlash
Nearly all commentators agree that the fee-for-service approach
to health care provides incentives for inefficient overutilization of
medical care 72 and that the rise of managed care has apparently
slowed the growth of health insurance costs.7 3 But many observers
believe that the rise of managed care has shifted, or at least threatens
to shift, the balance too far in the other direction. 74 Most critics of
managed care focus on the costs of MCO attempts to reduce the
amount of medical care supplied, rather than on the balance between
the costs and benefits of managed care. 75 In doing so, the criticisms
often deny the relevance of economic efficiency to the provision of
medical care. Critics sometimes explicitly argue that high-quality
health care is a "right" to which all Americans are entitled regardless
of its cost.7 6 Often, the denial of the value of economic efficiency is

implicit when, for example, critics fail even to consider whether medical care is underprovided or overprovided relative to its social value in
the brave new world of managed care. 77 This approach to evaluating
the reforms of managed care is firmly rooted in the medical profesPerformance Since 1980, 271JAMA 1512, 1514-15, 1517 (concluding from an analysis of multiple studies that "HMOs provide care at lower cost than do indemnity plans," mostly because of their ability to reduce the length and incidence of hospital stays and to discourage
the use of costly treatments with less expensive alternatives).
72
See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text. But see Irwin M. Stelzer, What HealthCare Crisis?, COMMrENTARY, Feb. 1994, at 19, 19-24 (arguing that criticisms of the American
health care system are misplaced).
73 See supraPart I.A.2.
74
Even those commentators who support managed care generally concede that the
new system of medical care may cause MCOs and their physicians to provide too little care.
See, e.g., Danzon, supra note 14, at 499. A recent survey of physicians reinforces this fear.

Nearly 25% of surveyed physicians whose patient base consisted of managed care enrollees
reported at least some dissatisfaction with their ability to make the right medical care decisions for their patients; in contrast, only 14% of doctors with no managed care patients
reported dissatisfaction on this score. See Karen Davis & Cathy Schoen, Assuring Quality,
Information, and Choice in Managed Care, 35 INQUIRY 104, 104 (1998) (reporting findings of
the 1997 Commonwealth Fund Survey of Physicians' Experiences with Managed Care).
75
See, e.g., Walter A. Zehnan, ConsumerProtection in Managed Care:Findingthe Balance,
H.ALTH ArF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 158, 159 (observing that fixed capitation payments from
MCOs to physicians are "[p]articularly alarming" to consumers because "[s]uch arrangements encourage the perception that the incentive to reduce costs... is being transferred
from the distant insurance company.., to the physician's office").
76
See, e.g., EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL, supra note 39, at 1-2 (describing the widely-accepted view of health care as a right); Alice Herb, Market Model Failsfor Health Care, NEvsGAzETTE (Champaign, Ill.), Aug. 9, 1998, at B3 (arguing that market approaches to health
care are inappropriate because "[mianaged care should be about taking care of people"
and asserting that "[gioing to the doctor is not the same as going to a car dealer").
77
See, e.g., Debra E. Kuper, Comment, Newborns' and Mothers'HealthProtectionAct: Putting the Brakes on Drive-Through Deliveries,80 MARQ. L. Rxv. 667 (1997) (arguing in favor of
postpartum hospital stay mandates without any significant discussion of the costs of these
mandates); Zelman, supra note 75, at 160 (arguing that "the anti-managed care critique
tends to implicitly or explicitly idealize a now fading fee-for-service system in which ...
costs rose out of control").
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sion's view of medical care: that the value of care is a scientific issue
rather than an economic one, and that the provision of medical care
78
should not be based on its value relative to other consumer goods.
These criticisms have fueled the mid-1990s movement advocating
the regulation of MCOs, which has become a cottage industry in virtually every state since the failure of President Clinton's proposal for
global reform of the health care system in 1993. The specific features
of managed care regulatory legislation vary from state to state, but the
types of regulation can be divided into two categories. The first category comprises laws that govern the relationship between MCOs and
health care providers. Specifically, these laws govern how MCOs may
select, deselect, compensate, and control the physicians that they employ directly or contract with to provide medical care.
The most popular form of MCO-provider legislation is a restriction on so-called "gag clauses"-contractual provisions that prohibit
physicians from criticizing the MCO or its utilization decisions to patients. According to a recent study, forty-five states and the District of
Columbia have enacted laws that prohibit or limit the enforceability of
such terms. 79 Legislation designed to limit selective contracting between MCOs and health care providers has also been popular. At
least fourteen states have enacted comprehensive "any willing provider" laws, which require that MCOs admit into their networks all
qualified health care providers who are willing to accept the MCO's
terms and conditions.8 0 At least seven states have enacted comprehensive "freedom-of-choice" laws, which require MCOs to reimburse
customers for services received from providers who are not members
of the MCO's network.8 ' Many states have enacted legislation that
limits the extent to which MCOs can hold physicians financially liable
for a patient's utilization of resources or fail to renew a physician's
contract based solely on the utilization of resources by that physician's
2
patients.8
The second, and by far the larger, category of legislation comprises laws that regulate the relationship between MCOs and health
78 See, e.g., HAViGHURST, supranote 46, at 112-13 (describing the tenets of the "professional paradigm of medicine"); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE 5 (1982) (pointing to the medical profession's "cultural authority, economic
power, and political influence" to explain the wide acceptance of this view).
79
See FAMIUES USA FOUND., supra note 1, at 25. Congress is currently considering

similar legislation. See Patient Right to Know Act, H.R. 586, 105th Cong. (1997) (banning
gag clauses from managed-care-provider contracts).
80 See Jill A. Marsteller et al., The Resurgence of Selective ContractingRestrictions, 22 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1133, 1138-41, 1147, 1148 tbl.1 (1997).
81 See id. at 1138-42, 1147, 1148 tbl.1.
82 See FAMILIES USA FouND., supra note 1, at 25 (reporting that 19 states have enacted
legislation prohibiting plans from providing physicians with financial incentives to reduce
or deny care).

1999]

MANAGED CARE REGULATION

care consumers. These laws, which I call "mandated-benefits" laws,
are the primary focus of this Article. Some mandated-benefits laws
concern whom MCOs must accept as customers, in an effort to prevent MCOs from discriminating against individuals who they fear will
require more than their pro rata share of medical care. Most states
have enacted legislation to limit the scope of preexisting-condition exclusions for new customers and to require MCOs to renew coverage
for all of their customers who meet their payment obligations regard83
less of their health status.
The majority of mandated-benefits laws specify benefits or coverages that MCOs doing business in ajurisdiction must provide to all of
their customers. Most states have enacted laws requiring MCOs to
permit forty-eight hour postpartum hospital stays,8 4 and many have
enacted similar minimum-stay requirements for mastectomy patients. 85 In addition, many states require MCOs either to give female
patients access to an obstetrician-gynecologist ("OB-GYN") without a
referral from a primary care physician or to permit OB-GYNs to serve
as primary care physicians. 8 6 A smaller number require MCOs either
to allow specialists to serve as primary care physicians for patients with
chronic illnesses8 7 or to permit "standing" referrals to specialists in
88
such cases.
83 Twenty-eight states have enacted legislation to limit the scope of MCOs' preexisting-condition exclusions for new patients in the individual insurance market while all 50
have done so in the small group market. See Steve Lewis, Individual & Small Group Reform,
HEALTH POL'Y TRACKING SERVICE (Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Wash., D.C.),
Dec. 31, 1997. Thirty-eight states have enacted legislation to guarantee renewal in the
individual insurance market while 49 have done so in the small group market. See id.; see
also, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 176J, § 5 (Law. Co-op. 1998) (providing that "[p]reexisting
conditions shall not exclude coverage for a period beyond six months following the individual's effective date of coverage," and limiting the amount of time a carrier can "look
back" to consider a condition as preexisting to six months).
84 Since 1995, 41 states have mandated coverage for extended postpartum hospital
stays. See Molly Stauffer, Inpatient CareAfter Childbirth, HEALTH POL'Y TRACKING SERVICE (National Conference of State Legislatures, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 31, 1997. Colorado, Hawaii,
Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have not mandated such coverage; Hawaii and Mississippi lawmakers, however, introduced bills in 1997.
See id.
85 Fourteen states have enacted legislation mandating minimum-stay requirements
for mastectomy patients: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Maine, Montana, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
and Texas. See Molly Stauffer, Mastectomies, HEALTH POL'Y TRACKING SERVICE (Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 31, 1997. New York was the first to enact
such legislation, requiring every health insurance policy that provides inpatient hospital
care to include inpatient hospital coverage for those who undergo a mastectomy or lymph
node dissection for a length to be determined appropriate by the attending physician. See
N.Y. INs. LAW § 4303 (McKinney, WESTLAW through L. 1999, ch. 6-13).
86 See FAMILIES USA FOUND., supra note 1, at 25 (citing 30 states).
87 See id. (citing 10 states).
88 See id. (citing 12 states). For an example, see CAL. H..LTH & SAFET' CODE
§ 1374.16 (West, WESTLAW through end of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.).
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Some states require MCOs to provide coverage for mental health
care or substance abuse rehabilitation, prenatal care, or outpatient
surgery. Fewer require coverage for chiropractic treatment or hospice
care. At least ten states now mandate that private insurers offer invitro fertilization as part of their standard plans. 89 Others require
MCOs that cover prescription drugs to pay for prescription contraceptives90 or for prescription drugs that are not part of the MCOs "formulary" (approved list of drugs) when the closest formulary drug is
ineffective or causes adverse side effects in the patient. 91
Some states specify circumstances under which MCOs must cover
mammograms for young women, 92 autologous bone marrow transplants for cancer patients, 93 or participation in clinical trials. 94 At

least thirty-one states have enacted legislation requiring MCOs to pay
for emergency room visits for nonemergencies when symptoms would
have caused a reasonable person to seek emergency care. 95 Some
states require MCOs to provide some level of reimbursement for care
a patient obtains outside of the MCO's network, 9 6 and others require
MCOs to permit patients to continue to see their providers (with full
coverage) for a specified transition period after the MCO terminates a
provider from its network. 97 Recently, states have begun to mandate
that patients who have had treatment denied by MCO utilization re89 See Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF7 Issues and Options, 22 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 1215, 1215 (1997).
90
See Fmuxs USA FouND., supra note 1, at 10-12.
91
See id. at 24 (citing 8 states).
92 Seven states-Alabama, Illinois, Maine, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, and Rhode Island-enacted laws in 1997 that mandated patient access to mammography. SeeALA. CODE
§ 27-50-4 (WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg. Sess.); 55 ILL. Comn,. STAT. ANN. 5/5-1069
(West, WESTLAW through P.A. 91-6, apv. 5/28/1999); ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2320A (West, WESTLAW through end of 1997 2d Sp. Sess.); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 33-22-132
(WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. Sess.); OHIo Rv. CODE ANN. § 1751.62 (Anderson,
WESTLAW through 1999 portion of 123d GA, Files 1 to 36, apv. 6/24/1999); OR. REv.
STAT. § 743.727 (WESTLAW through end of 1997 Reg. Sess. and 1998 Cumulative Supp.);

R-I. GEN. LAws § 27-50-12 (WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg. Sess.).
93 Six states-Arizona, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Tennessee, and Virginia-enacted laws that mandate patient access to autologous bone marrow transplants
specifically. SeeAmiz. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2907 (West, WESTLAW through end of 1998 2d
Reg. Sess. and the 6th Sp. Sess.); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1200 (West, WESTLAW through
end of 1998 2d Reg. Sess.); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-c (WESTLAW through end of
1998 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6f (West, WESTLAW through L 1999, c. 61);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-2504 (WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg. Sess.); VA. CODE ANN.

§ 38.2-3418.1:1 (Michie, WESTLAW through end of 1999 Reg. Sess.).
94 See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.1 (WESTLAW through 1999 Gen. Assembly); MD.
CODE ANN., INS. § 15-827 (WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg. Sess.); R-I. GEN. LAws § 2741-41.2 (WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg. Sess.).
95 See FasmiS USA FouND., supra note 1, at 23.
96

See Marsteller et al., supra note 80, at 1139.
See FaMmis USA FOUND., supranote 1, at 24 (citing 14 states). For an example of a
state law that mandates continuation coverage, see CAl.. HEmTH & SAETY CODE § 1366.23
97

(West, WESTLAW through end of 1997-98 Reg. Sess. and 1st Ex. Sess.).
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viewers be permitted to appeal the decision to an independent or government body that would have the power to order the MCO to fund
the treatment. 98 Although this list covers the most prevalent and publicized mandated-benefits laws, it is far from complete. 99 A recent survey indicates that, in 1999, at least thirty-nine states planned to
consider new legislation mandating specific minimum benefits
levels.10 0
A widely known, but not widely understood, fact is that state managed care legislation protects only a minority of Americans enrolled in
MCOs because of the preemptive effects of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).101 In an effort to free multistate employers from inconsistent state regulations, ERISA preempts all state
laws that "relate to" benefits that employers provide as part of qualifying employee benefit plans. 10 2 At the same time, ERISA does not pre10 3
empt any state law that "regulates insurance."
The United States Supreme Court has attempted to chart a
course between these two somewhat conflicting principles by ruling
that ERISA protects health care benefits from state regulation if they
are "self-funded" by the employer, but not if a third-party provider
pays for them. 10 4 In other words, if an employer purchases health
insurance policies for its employees, that insurance coverage is subject
to state regulation, but if an employer pays all of its employees' medical care costs, the medical coverage is exempt from state regulation.
Although only the largest employers could shoulder the risks of uninsured employee illnesses, even small employers can achieve "selffunded" status by paying the full costs of employee medical care (usually paying MCOs to provide the care) and concurrently purchasing
"stop-loss" insurance for costs that they incur above a certain level.
98 See FALuuas USA FouND., supra note 1, at 25 (citing 14 states). For examples of
such state laws, see MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. I. § 19-1305.2 (WESTLAW through end
of 1998 Reg. Sess.); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LA.W § 4904 (McKinney, WESTLAW through L. 1999,
chs. 6-13); and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089(f) (WESTLAW through end of 1997 Adj. Sess.).
99 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., INs. § 15-818 (WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg. Sess.)
(mandating coverage for cleft lip and cleft palate treatments); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 354.207
(West, WESTLAW through end of 1998 2d Reg. Sess.) (requiring MCOs to pay for second
opinions for patients diagnosed with serious conditions).
100
See Managed Care, supra note 5, at 1996.
101 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
102 Id. § 1144(a); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990) ("The preemption clause is conspicuous for its breadth. It establishes as an area of exclusive federal
concern that subject of every state law that 'relate[s] to' an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA." (alteration in original)).
103 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A).
104
See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B) ("[A]n employee
benefit plan . .. shall [not] be deemed . .. to be engaged in the business of insurance
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The loophole in the system is that no federal standard exists for
what constitutes the purchase of primary insurance-making employer-provided insurance subject to state insurance regulation-on
the one hand, and what constitutes the purchase of "stop-loss" coverage by a "self-insured" employer on the other. The result is that,
rather than purchasing insurance for their employees (which would
be subject to state benefit mandates), employers can achieve selffunded status without incurring substantially greater risk by paying
employees' health care costs directly and purchasing stop-loss coverage that attaches at very low levels of loss. 1 0 5 Consequently, the hundreds of state-implemented managed care protections do not affect
individuals whose employers adopt this strategy. 10 6
The effect of ERISA preemption on benefit mandates is, therefore, quite significant today, but will likely become less so in the near
future. With polls showing that up to three quarters of Americans
favor increased regulation of MCOs, 10 7 the federal government is

demonstrating an increasing interest in enacting mandated-benefits
108
laws.
In 1996, Congress enacted HIPAA, which placed strict limitations
on the extent to which MCOs can exclude preexisting conditions
from coverage and choose not to renew the policies of customers who

105
SeeAmerican Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997) (determining
that ERISA preempted an attempt by the Maryland legislature to set a minimum threshold
at which it would not consider a seif-funded employer's stop-loss insurance policy to be the
purchase of insurance and thereby subject to state regulation).
106
The extent to which ERISA protects from state legislative and judicial oversight
utilization-review decisions by MCOs that administer self-funded health benefits plans remains somewhat unclear. A utilization reviewer's decision that the health plan never covers a certain type of benefit is dearly preempted. However, ERISA might not preempt a
utilization reviewer's decision that the patient's medical circumstances do not warrant coverage for a particular type of treatment, because the decision concerns the quality, rather
than the quantity, of care provided. See, e.g., Long v. Great W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 957
P.2d 823, 832 (Wyo. 1998); see also DOL Opposes MalpracticePreemption; Legislative Response
Appears Unclear, 6 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 503 (Apr. 3, 1997) (reporting that the
U.S. Department of Labor supports this distinction).
107 A Wall StreetJournal-NBC News poll conducted in July 1998 showed that 79% of
Americans favored new laws to regulate managed care. See Robert Keatley, A Special Weekly
Reportfrom the Wall Street Journal's CapitalBureau, WALL ST. J., July 31, 1998, at Al. Meanwhile, a 1998 Washington Post-ABC News poll showed that 60% of Americans favored
"tougher government regulation of managed care programs." Terry M. Neal & Caroline
Daniel, In Kenosha, Most Voters Have an HMO Story, WASH. POST, July 19, 1998, at A7. A 1998
Henry J. Kaiser Foundation-Harvard University survey found that 78% of Americans favored a "patient protection law in general" to protect consumers of managed care,
although that number declined to 40% if insurance premiums would rise by $200 per year
or more as a result. Clinton Callsfor Patients'Rights Bill; Public Anxiety About Health Care
Grows, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, at 1499 (Sept. 24, 1998).
108 ERISA does not preempt federal legislation, which would consequently affect all
Americans enrolled in MCOs.
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become ill.109 In 1997, Congress followed the lead of most states and
enacted a mandatory minimum postpartum hospital stay of forty-eight
hours for natural births and ninety-six hours for Caesarean-section
births. 110 In 1998 and 1999, Democrats and Republicans in both
houses of Congress championed different versions of a patients' bill of
rights."' If enacted into law, any of the competing proposals would
mandate a host of new health care benefits for MCO customers. Such
a bill of rights would likely include guaranteed coverage for visits to
emergency rooms and the right to some level of reimbursement for
visits to out-of-network physicians." 2 Separate proposals that Congress is currently considering include a mandatory minimum hospital
stay following mastectomies" 3 and mandatory coverage of prescrip4
tion contraceptives."
C.

The Case for Freedom of Contract

Academic opposition to government regulation of MCOs is
spearheaded by analysts who believe that private contracting between
MCOs and customers, unimpeded by government regulation, provides the most promising avenue for rationalizing the amount of resources the United States devotes to medical care. In a recent article,
Patricia Danzon succinctly stated the basic free-market argument:
In the managed care marketplace, if plans compete on price,
choice, and quality, they have incentives to cover services that yield
expected health benefits that are worth their costs to consumers.
Patients who want comprehensive coverage can choose high premium plans.
...

Consumers self-select to different types of health plan [sic],

based on their preferences for cost, coverage, copayment, prompt
access to new technologies, restrictions on choice, and so forth.
109

See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

191, §§ 701, 703, 110 Stat. 1936, 193945, 1946.
110 See 26 U.S.C. § 9811 (Supp. III 1997).
111 Seesupranote 11.
112 For examples of bills discussing coverage of visits to emergency rooms, see S. 2330,
§ 721, H.R. 4250, § 1001; S. 1891, § 101; and S. 644, § 2771(B). For bills discussing some
coverage for visits to out-of-network providers, see S. 2330, § 725; S. 1891, § 105; and S.
644, § 2772. For bills discussing access to specialty care, see H.R. 4250, § 1001 and S. 1891,
§ 104.
113 See Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of 1997, S. 249, 105th Cong.; Breast
Cancer Patient Protection Act of 1997, S. 143, 105th Cong. President Clinton actually
called for the enactment of such a bill in his 1997 State of the Union Address. See President
Clinton's Message to Congress on the State of the Union, N.Y. TiMrs, Feb. 5, 1997, at A20.
114 See Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act of 1997, S.
766, 105th Cong.
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Thus consumers' choices among health plans reflect their preferences and willingness-to-pay ....115
From this perspective, the market for health care in the era of
managed care allocates the appropriate amount of resources-more
or less-to health care.'1 6 If MCOs systematically provide reduced
benefits and services at relatively low cost, then consumers must prefer

such a package. 117 The popularity of managed care means that
"[c] onsumers have voted with their feet for cheaper (more restrictive)
health care coverage, and their ex post complaints about the same do
18
not change that fact."
Mandating benefits, on the other hand, effectively forces consumers to pay for insurance that they do not want or to go without any
coverage at all.119 The alignment of consumer preferences and the
features of their managed care plans is imperfect, of course, because
there can never be a sufficiently diverse menu of plans to suit the
tastes of every eccentric individual. Nevertheless, the variety of
choices that the market provides to consumers allows each individual

to select a plan that is approximately utility-maximizing.

20

If groups

of consumers have preferences that are not served by the products
offered by MCOs, entrepreneurial competitors can be counted on to
introduce new products to the benefit of those consumers.' 2 ' Accord115 Danzon, supra note 14, at 509, 511.
116 See id. at 492 ("The growing market share of various types of managed care plans is
compelling evidence that a significant fraction of consumers are willing to forgo some
choice in return for the lower premium and lower out-of-pocket payments that managed
care can offer."). Danzon also notes that "[t]he fact that consumers increasingly select
plans that employ capitation and [utilization review] controls indicates that consumers are
willing to accept such techniques for controlling overuse of insured services, in preference
to either higher premiums or higher copayments." Id. at 511.
117 See EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL, supra note 39, at 429; cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CH. LEGAL F. 207, 215 (" 'Better' terms (as buyers see
things) support higher prices, and sellers have as much reason to offer the terms consumers prefer (that is, the terms that consumers find cost-justified) as to offer any other ingredient of their products."); Hyman, supra note 28, at 437 ("Policy sellers must weigh
whether broadening coverage . . . [is] worth doing if [it] price[s] the policy out of the
market-or result[s] in a shift in the nature of coverage from that which is most appealing
to the covered pool as a whole.").
118 Hyman, supra note 28, at 447.
119
See, e.g., HAiL, supra note 39, at 22 (calling state law mandates an important source
of inefficiency in the insurance system). Hall notes that "[e] conomists explain that it usually makes no sense to mandate or encourage insurance that many consumers are unvilling to buy." Id. at 24.
120
Cf Don Bellante & Philip K. Porter, A Subjectivist Economic Analysis of GovernmentMandatedEmployee Benefits, 13 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657, 661 (1990) (stating a similar
argument for the approximate efficiency of employee-benefit packages that employers
offer).
121 See Moran, supra note 45, at 14 ("Based on our experience in most other markets,
we might expect competing health plans to view consumer dissatisfaction as a business
opportunity to be exploited with new products and programs aimed directly at the concerns of disgruntled buyers."); cf.Rice, supra note 40, at 401 (explaining that economic
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ing to free-market advocates, legislatively mandated benefits can only
122
decrease social utility and are therefore unwarranted.
One need not be so sanguine about the present efficiency of the
market, however, to oppose regulation of the health care industry.
Clark Havighurst has provided the most thorough and thoughtful argument in favor of unencumbered private contracting for medical
care. 123 Havighurst believes that, notwithstanding the cost-containment strategies of MCOs, the United States continues to inefficiently
overallocate resources to medical care. 124 The primary reason for this
overallocation (other than the tax subsidy accompanying employerprovided health coverage125 ), Havighurst contends, is that the available selection of health care plans consists only of homogenous, high26
cost, "Cadillac" options.'
Why do MCOs fail to offer low-cost, low-service health insurance
packages when a significant portion of the population wishes to spend
less of its income on medical care? According to Havighurst, they are
hamstrung by (1) vague contracts with patients and (2) courts that
prevent MCOs from denying very expensive and only marginally beneficial care by holding MCOs that do deny such care liable for breach
of contract and their physicians liable for malpractice. 2 7 To this
theory predicts supply will adjust in reaction to consumer demand). Two other authors
make a similar argument
[I]t is the disequilibrium that prevails in markets that creates the discrepancies... that give rise to opportunities for gains from trade.... Competition is the process that brings forth the discovery of potential gains from
trade, and the entrepreneur is the prime catalyst in this discovery process.
The entrepreneur's alertness to previously unexploited opportunities is the
essence of the process of value production.
Bellante & Porter, supranote 120, at 663.
122
See EPsTEIN, MORTAL PERIL, supra note 39, at 431.
123 See HAviWHURST, supranote 46, passim Clark C. Havighurst, Contract Failurein the
Marketfor Health Services, 29 WAKE FORFsr L. kEv. 47, passim (1994); Havighurst, supra note

39, passim; Clark C. Havighurst, "PuttingPatients
First": Promiseor Smoke Screen?, HEALTH ArF.,
Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 123.
124
See HAVirHURST, supra note 46, at 1, 147.
125 See HALL, supra note 39, at 20 ("Economists convincingly point to the tax laws as the
main culprit for excessive levels of health insurance."); HAVIGHURST, supra note 46, at 10003 (explaining that the preferential tax treatment of employer-sponsored health plans provides employees with the incentive to overconsume medical care relative to other goods).
126
See HAVmHURsr, supra note 46, at 104. He notes:
There is at least some factual support, however, for the hypothesis that the
U.S. health care system offers only a kind of Hobson's choice, requiring
consumers either to purchase some version of a health care Cadillac or to
take their chances with the safety net that more or less exists for those without health insurance.
Id.
127
See id. at 145, 321-22. Havighurst explains that "payers do not yet have clear contractual authority from consumers to withhold financing... where beneficial care must be
forgone if consumers' resources are to be saved for more advantageous uses." Id. at 145.
He adds that "providers [in MCOs] face possible legal liability if they depart from the costly
practice standards customary in the insured-fee-for-service sector." Id. at 148. Additionally,
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point, it might be added that MCOs are increasingly hamstrung by the
new benefit mandates, which effectively prohibit MCOs from offering
more restricted insurance plans at lower prices. 128 Havighurst would
rationalize the provision of health care services by encouraging competing health plans to offer substantively different types and levels of
medical care, and by permitting consumers to choose the level at
which the expected marginal benefit of the care they receive most
129
closely approximates the marginal cost of the plan.
Several critical assumptions undergird the claim that the unregulated market can produce an efficient amount of health care. First,
the claim assumes that MCOs engage in some meaningful form of
competition for patients. The validity of this assumption undoubtedly
varies across different regions of the country, but the assumption
probably holds true in many locations,'8 0 so I will accept it arguendo
for the purpose of this Article.
Second, the claim assumes away possible market distortions arising out of the principal-agent relationship between health care consumers and the employers that make many of the purchasing
decisions for them. Most privately-insured Americans receive health
care coverage through their employers.' 8 ' For virtually all of these
consumers, choice is limited to the plans the employers choose to offer. Nearly half of these consumers have only one plan offered by
Havighurst asserts that "without better, enforceable contracts expressly authorizing aggressive economizing in pursuit of efficiency in the no man's land of benefit-cost trade-offs,
health plans could undertake such economizing only at their (and their providers') legal
peril." Id. at 152.
128 See id. at 32 (describing the limiting impact mandated benefits have on private
contracting choices).
129
See id. at 2 ("[C]onsumer choices must be consequential, not inconsequential, and
... freedom of contract is necessary to make them so."); see also HALL, supra note 39, at 24
(describing consumer contracts for medical care that would be provided "only where both
need and potential benefit are compelling or demonstrably clear" as a "measured way" to
limit insurance).
130 A recent report found that in California, for example, most areas of the state were
home to between five and ten HMOs in 1998. SeeJohn Bertko & Sandra Hunt, Case Study:
The Health Insurance Plan of California,35 INQUIRY 148, 148 (1998). The prevalence of
mergers in the managed care industry, however, may make the assumption of significant
competition less tenable in more locations in the future. See Trish Riley, The Role of States in
Accountabilityfor Quality, HEALTH Arr., May-June 1997, at 41, 42 (arguing that mergers restrict consumer choice). One study estimates that perhaps as many as 37% of Americans
live in areas where fewer than three HMOs are likely to be efficient. See Richard Kronick et
al., The Marketplace in Health Care Reform: The DemographicLimitationsof Managed Competition,
328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 148, 150 (1993). A recent report finds that "frenetic merger and
acquisition activity" has reduced the number of "dominant HMO competitors" in Boston
and Minneapolis-St. Paul each to three. Michael H. Bailit, Ominous Signs and Portents: A
Purchaser'sView of Health Care Market Trends, HEALTH Arr., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 85, 86.
131 According to one study conducted in 1996, 90.3% of privately insured Americans
received their health care coverage from their employer. See Melinda L. Schriver & GraceMarie Arnett, UninsuredRates Rise Dramaticallyin States with StrictestHealth InsuranceRegulations, HERITAGE FouND. BACKGROUNDER, Aug. 11, 1998, at 1, 7 tbl.2.
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their employers, 132 effectively leaving them with no choice at all. For
the market to operate efficiently, employers must select health care
plans that their employees would select on their own, at least most of
the time. If employers select less-expensive, more limited health plans
than employees would choose themselves if they had complete
purchasing autonomy but had to pay the full cost of the coverage, the
market might currently provide an inefficiently low level of coverage-one that benefits mandates could remedy.
Employers that act as health insurance purchasers most likely are
not perfect agents for their employees, acting without any taint of self
interest. 3 3 But the extent to which the interests of employers affect
the scope of health care benefits that the market provides is far from
clear. Approximately half of the employees who receive health care
coverage through their employers do have a choice between two or
more plans,' 3 4 and 85% of workers in firms of 200 or more employees
have such a choice. 135 Consequently, in most cases health plans must
design benefits packages to appeal to consumers, not just to purchasing intermediaries.

1 36

In addition, even employers who make health insurance purchase
decisions for their employees have a strong incentive to select products employees themselves would choose. Employers compete with
one another to hire and retain employees. Presumably, after determining how many dollars they are willing to expend on an employee,
employers maximize their interests by providing the combination of
salary and benefits (including health insurance) that maximizes the
132
See Etheredge et al., supra note 24, at 94 (asserting that 48% of employees who
receive health insurance through their employers have only a single plan available).
133 Substantial survey evidence exists which suggests that employers are extremely sensitive to price when choosing among health plans. See, e.g., ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra
note 14, at 139-40 (reviewing several surveys). This evidence alone, of course, does not
prove that employers universally fail to make the trade-offs between price and quality that
their employees would desire.
134 See Etheredge et al., supra note 24, at 94 (noting that only 48% of employees have a
single option); Stephen L. Isaacs, Consumers' Information Needs: Results of a NationalSurvey,
HEALTH ArF., Winter 1996, at 31, 40 n.2 (citing a survey that showed that 45% of employees
had at least two health plan options in 1994); Jensen et al., supra note 20, at 127 (finding
that in 1995, 62% of insured employees had at least two health plan options).
135 See Kelly A. Hunt et al., PayingMore Twice: When Employers SubsidizeHigher-Cost Health
Plans, HEALTH Asr., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 150, 153 (reporting that only 15% of employees in
large firms had only one health care plan option).
136 Among small employers-those most likely to offer only a single health plan to
their employees-the trend appears to be toward participation in larger insurance
purchasing cooperatives that offer participating employees a variety of health insurance
options from which to choose. See, e.g., Elizabeth W. Hoy et al., A Guide to FacilitatingConsumer Choice, HEALTH AFr., Winter 1996, at 9, 17 (describing the operation of the Health
Insurance Plan of California (HIPC), a government-organized purchasing cooperative that
offers 25 managed care plans to its participants, although not all are available state-wide).
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employee's utility. 13 7 If an employer provides a health plan with more

coverage than is optimal for its employees, it will suffer a competitive
disadvantage relative to competitors that offer less (and presumably
38
cheaper) health care coverage and a consequently greater salary.'
In contrast, if an employer provides a health plan with suboptimal
coverage, it could improve its competitive position by providing more
extensive (and presumably more expensive) coverage and a correspondingly lower salary.139
Because of the uncertainty regarding the extent to which employers seek to satisfy their own interests-rather than those of the employees they represent-when making health insurance purchasing
decisions, I will accept arguendo as well, for purposes of this Article,
the assumption of free-market advocates that employers attempt to
purchase the same level of insurance benefits for their employees that
the employees would choose to purchase on their own.
Third, the free-market claim implicitly assumes that (a) consumers possess perfect information about their consumption choices and
40
(b) are able to process that information flawlessly and costlessly.'
Parts II and III of this Article will contest these assumptions, and thus
challenge the conventional economic wisdom that an unregulated
health insurance market will lead to an efficient allocation of resources between health care and competing goods. These Parts explain not only the fundamental flaws in these assumptions regarding
the market for health insurance, but also the consequence of the failure of these assumptions: the allocation of too few resources to health
care. Part IV then considers the likely efficacy of possible efficiencyenhancing interventions in the market.

137

See Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of MandatedBenefits, 79 Am. ECON.

REv. 177, 178 (1989)

(noting that, in a competitive equilibrium, employers will provide

health care benefits by reducing an employee's salary if the value of the benefit to the
employee exceeds the cost of the benefit to the employer).
138 For example, one small employer explained that he stopped providing health insurance for his employees because, although the employer paid 50% of the cost of coverage, employees complained that they would rather go without care than have half the cost
deducted from their paychecks. See Robert Pear, Government Lags in Steps to Widen Health
Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, at Al. Moreover, a recent study has shown that over the
last decade, more employees are declining employer-provided health insurance. See Philip
F. Cooper & Barbara Steinberg Schone, More Offers, Fewer Takersfor Employment-BasedHealth
Insurance: 1987 and 1996, HEALTH Axr., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 142, 144 (suggesting that some
employers are offering more coverage than what their employees want).
139 Cf Etheredge et al., supra note 24, at 94 (noting that while the desire to control
costs has led employers away from traditional fee-for-service insurance, the desire to please
workers is driving employers away from closed-panel HMOs and toward MCOs with more
provider flexibility).
140 See Claude S. Colantoni et al., Imperfect Consumers and Welfare Comparisons ofPolicies
ConcerningInformation and Regulation, 7 BELLJ. ECON. 602, 602-03 (1976).
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II
INCOmIPLETE CoNTRAcrs AND STRATEGIC INCENTIVES

A.

Health Benefits as Search, Experience, or Credence Goods

It is possible to classify all health care benefits as "search," "experience," or "credence" goods 4 1-a distinction that will bear on the
analysis of the conditions under which the free market can reliably
provide an efficient level of benefits. Search goods are those which
consumers can evaluate at a reasonable cost prior to purchase; experience goods require purchase and use before consumers can assess
their characteristics; and credence goods are those whose quality cannot be assessed by the ordinary consumer even after use. 142 For example, articles of clothing tend to be search goods; customers inspect
and try them on before purchasing them. Canned tuna fish, on the
other hand, is an experience good; consumers normally compare
brands of tuna fish by purchasing and consuming them. 143 Legal representation is a credence good for all but the most sophisticated consumers; even after trial, a client usually has a difficult time assessing
the quality of his representation.
Health care benefits can be described as search goods only if consumers can learn precisely whether a given MCO does or does not
provide benefits in question before making their enrollment decisions. Most benefits mandates concern such benefits. For example,
before selecting a health care plan, a consumer can investigate and
learn with certainty whether a particular MCO permits women to see
an OB-GYN without prior referral from a primary care physician.
Many health care benefits, however, are experience goods, because it is quite difficult or even impossible for an MCO to specify at
the time of enrollment what benefits it will or will not provide in the
case of innumerable contingencies. The treatment that an MCO will
provide to treat a certain type of cancer, for example, is an experience
good because the precise treatment any patient receives will almost
certainly depend on a variety of factors. These factors might include
the presentation of the disease in the particular patient and the state
of research on cancer treatments at the time of diagnosis. Consider,
for example, the story of one woman who was told by five of the six
HMOs she contacted that they could not predict in advance whether
she would be able to continue her current breast cancer treatment if
141

See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 passim

(1970) (describing and contrasting search and experience goods); Alan Schwartz & Louis
L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 658 & n.69, 659 (1979) (describing search, experience,
and credence goods).
142 See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 141, at 658 & n.69, 659.
143 See Nelson, supra note 141, at 312 (providing this example).
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she enrolled in their plans.'4 It would be unduly costly, and perhaps
impossible, for an MCO to specify ex ante what treatment it will provide in every possible set of circumstances that a cancer patient might
face. Consequently, regardless of how diligently a health care consumer might investigate and compare health plan options before enrolling, she most likely could not learn whether, given a particular
contingency, an MCO would provide her with a specific treatment
benefit until she experienced that condition while under the MCO's
care.
This analysis is further complicated by the fact that most patients
who would like to know the circumstances under which an MCO
would provide a certain benefit are not interested in the specific benefit as such. Presumably, the information customers really desire is the
extent to which the MCO provides its patients with the most beneficial
care regardless of cost, and, conversely, the extent to which the MCO
limits costly, but only marginally beneficial, care. To the extent a consumer wishes to learn the MCO's algorithm for making these costquality trade offs, an MCO's treatment for, say, cancer might be a
credence rather than an experience good. Even after receiving the
treatment, the patient might have no way to assess adequately its
quality.
The distinction among search, experience, and credence benefits
impacts any analysis of the efficiency of mandated benefits legislation.
This Part argues that MCOs have a strategic incentive to provide an
inefficiently low level of experience and credence benefits, because
consumers must select an MCO prior to learning the true quality of
the benefits provided and because MCOs are not likely to be concerned with losing customers who later learn that they provide lowquality benefits. Thus, this Part, standing alone, suggests that mandates might be appropriate for benefits that are experience or
credence goods. It does not, however, demonstrate any failure by the
free market to provide the efficient level of search benefits-benefits
about which consumers can receive full information before enrolling
in an MCO.
Part III expands the scope of the analysis. It contends that consumers are likely to behave in a "boundedly rational" manner when
making health care purchasing decisions. If this characterization of
consumer behavior is true, MCOs might provide an inefficiently low
level of all benefits-even benefits that are search goods-suggesting
that mandates for all types of benefits might be efficient under some
conditions.
144

See Susan C. Rosenfeld, So You Want toJoin an H.M.0. ? Good Luck, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug.

9, 1994, at A23.
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The Problem of Incomplete Contracts

All but the simplest contracts are "obligationally incomplete": the
terms of the contract do not specify the obligations of each party
under every set of contingent facts. 145 This malady, endemic to private contracting, is especially severe in the context of consumer medical insurance contracts. When a consumer selects a plan, she enters
into a contract that fully enumerates her obligations (usually consisting of the payment of a premium, either individually, or through her
employer), but that fails to fully specify the plan's obligations. The
complexity of health care dictates this situation.
With the exception of preventive care measures, virtually all services that the health plan might promise to provide the customer are
contingent on future events, most of which are unlikely to occur for
any given customer. A given course of medical treatment is necessarily specific to the particular illness or injury in question, and the precise type of treatment is also contingent on the patient's specific
symptoms and condition. Consequently, the MCO can specify in a
contract with a consumer which broad categories of treatment it is
promising to provide (or to pay a physician to provide) -i.e., whether
dental benefits or prescription drugs are covered-but it is both physically impractical and theoretically impossible for the MCO to specify
fully what treatments it will provide. It is physically impractical because the MCO could not reasonably print the number of permutations in a contract. 146 It is theoretically impossible because the fast
pace of change in medical technology and knowledge can mean that
treatments considered appropriate for a set of symptoms on the date
the customer enrolls with the MCO might not be appropriate when
the customer later develops those symptoms.
Consider, for example, a patient who wishes to know whether her
MCO will pay for an expensive magnetic-resonance-imaging (MRI)
scan to rule out the presence of a brain tumor if she complains to her
physician of headaches. Because the answer would most likely depend
on the type, severity, and frequency of pain, as well as the age, medical, and family history of the patient, it would be impractical for the
145 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the Optimal
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE LJ. 729, 730 (1992) ("Legal scholars use the term 'incomplete contracting' to refer to contracts in which the obligations are not fully specified....
A contract that failed to specify the seller's obligations in the event of a flood... would
thus be obligationally incomplete.").
146
Cf Susan D. Goold, Allocating Health Care: Cost-Utility Analysis, Informed Democratic
Decision Making or the Veil of Ignorance?,21 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 69, 74-75 (1996)
("The arguments against relying solely on prior consent to actual rationing policies are
primarily practical. The amount of information needed by consumers would be extremely
large if we were to claim that they are truly informed about all potential situations when
care might be withheld.").

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1

MCO to specify ex ante, by contract, the circumstances under which it
would authorize the procedure. Alternatively, consider the actual
case of a patient whose colon cancer was not discovered in a timely
fashion because, when she complained to her doctor of abdominal
and pelvic pain and rectal bleeding, the doctor ordered an ultrasound
exam, which failed to detect the cancer, but failed to order a bariumenema x-ray, which would have detected the cancer.1 4 7 Because the
propriety of a particular diagnostic test depends on an intense factual
inquiry into the patient's precise condition, it would be unrealistic for
the patient to hope that she would be able to determine whether her
MCO would approve the test by referring to her insurance contract or
enrollment materials. Consider also a woman whose MCO agreed to
pay for part-time home-nursing care, but not hospitalization during
her high-risk pregnancy.1 48 Her fetus went into distress and died
while the nurse was absent.1 49 No MCO could have possibly specified
ex ante whether it would or would not approve hospitalization in that
precise factual situation.
As a result, rather than attempting the impossible task of specifying ex ante what treatments they will provide under what conditions,
MCOs rely on vague promises that they will provide all "medically necessary" or "reasonable and necessary" treatments. 50 Such overbroad
terms can perhaps provide guidance in divining contractual obligations in extreme circumstances. For example, they might support an
MCO's denial of a particular treatment when the treatment would not
provide any medical benefit or would provide no more benefit than a
less expensive treatment. But they provide virtually no guidance as to
the MCO's obligations in the more common cases in which a particular treatment offers some marginal benefit but at a high marginal
cost.15

Has an MCO that contracts to provide all "medically neces-

sary" treatment promised to pay for an MRI scan that will be instrumental in detecting a brain tumor one time in a million? What if the
scan would detect a tumor one time in ten thousand? The problem
147
See Greely, supra note 19, at 75-76 (describing the story of this patient, Joyce
Ching); David R. Olmos, CuttingMedical Costs-or Corners2, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at Al
(same); Michael Parrish, It Could Happen to You, HEALTH, May-June 1996, at 115 (same).
148
See Corcoran v. United HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1322-24 (5th Cir. 1992).
149
See id.
150 See Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 4 (describing how coverage decisions
often influence medical decisions).
151 In the real world, few situations exist in which medical science is precise enough to
determine exactly which treatments will provide no benefit whatsoever to the patient.
When an MCO determines that a treatment is unnecessary, it is usually making an implicit
cost-benefit determination. See id. at 22-23 ("[M]edical decisions involve a substantial
amount of uncertainty about what will help and what may actually harm a patient. When
health plans make or influence necessity determinations, they are engaged in making
value judgments that weigh the interests of the individual against the group.").
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for consumers is that they do not and will not know the answers to
these questions until they seek treatment for a specific set of
symptoms.'

52

Just as MCOs usually promise to provide care that is medically
necessary, they typically exclude coverage for treatments that are "experimental." 153 Like medically necessary treatments, the definition of
experimental treatment is subject to differing interpretations and is
difficult to define ex ante.1 54 A study of insurance company responses
to patient requests between 1989 and 1992 for coverage for autologous bone marrow transplants to treat breast cancer illustrates the
wide variance in health insurance plans' understanding of the term
"experimental."1 55 The plans approved approximately three quarters
of the 533 requests studied and denied the other one quarter, usually
on the basis of the plan's determination that the treatment was experimental. 15 6 Notably, the requested and denied claims did not appear
to differ in terms of the patients' clinical characteristics or the con57
tractual language at issue.'
The problem of severe and asymmetrical contractual incompleteness in contracts between MCOs and consumers-no doubt an unavoidable result of the enterprise's complexity-creates a powerful
incentive for profit-maximizing MCOs to provide an inefficiently low
amount and quality of care. An analytical framework borrowed from
game theory-what I will call the "managed care game"-can help
illustrate why this is true.
C.

The Managed Care Game
1.

Two Players, One Decision

Assume, for the first step of the analysis, a game with two players,
each of whom must make a single decision. The players are a consumer who wishes to purchase insurance that will cover the costs of
treatment of a possible future ailment or condition ("Condition X"),
and an MCO that markets a health plan that provides care for this
condition. The consumer has two choices: he may (1) choose
152 Cf.id. at 25 ("Each plan has substantial latitude for how it defines necessity, and
different plans proceed in varying ways.").
153 See Mark A. Hall et al., Judicial Protection of Managed Care Consumers: An Empirical

Study ofInsurane CoverageDisputes, 26 SETON HALL L. Rxv. 1055, 1056 (1996).
154 See Havighurst, supranote 39, at 1769 ("Almost by definition, an experimental procedure cannot be precisely identified in advance for the purpose of unambiguously excluding it from the contract.").
155 See William P. Peters & Mark C. Rogers, Variation in App-oval by InsuranceCompanies
of CoverageforAutologous Bone Marrow Transplantationfor Breast Cancer,330 NEw ENG.J. MED.
473, 473 (1994).
156 See id. at 474.
157 See id,at 475.
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"MCO"-enroll in the MCO's health plan-for which he must pay a
fixed monthly premium, or (2) choose "not-MCO"-take his business
to a competing plan. The MCO likewise faces two choices: it may (1)
choose to provide "expensive" care for Condition X or (2) provide
"cheap" care for the same condition. For example, if Condition X is
pregnancy, "expensive" care might involve providing a new mother
with a forty-eight hour postpartum hospital stay, and "cheap" care
might require the mother's discharge from the hospital within twentyfour hours after delivery. If Condition X is instead a form of cancer,
"expensive" care might include coverage for an autologous bone marrow transplant when other treatments have proven unsuccessful,
whereas "cheap" care might exclude this benefit.
Each player in the managed care game-customer and MCOreceives a payoff, representing its gains or losses from the relationship. This payoff depends on both players' strategy choices. If the
customer selects "not-MCO," each player receives a neutral payoff of
zero dollars; each player neither gains nor loses from the relationship
because no relationship is consummated. If the customer chooses
"MCO" and the MCO chooses "expensive" care, both parties enjoy a
gain from the transaction. The MCO incurs a relatively high expected
cost-it may or may not ever have to provide the service to this patient-by promising the expensive benefit, but it still earns a net expected profit from the customer's enrollment. If the customer ever
develops the necessary condition, he receives the expensive benefit he
desires. If the customer chooses "MCO" and the MCO chooses
"cheap" care, the customer loses from the transaction because the
MCO provides a lower level of care. Although "cheap" care is likely to
be better for the customer than no care, the payoff is negative because
of the opportunity cost: the customer who joins an MCO that provides
cheap care loses the opportunity to join another MCO. The MCO,
however, receives a large windfall in this situation. It captures the customer's monthly premium without having to bear the cost of providing the expensive care and is therefore better off than it would have
been had it chosen to provide expensive care.
Figure I shows the various choices and payoffs of the game in
what is known in the language of game theory as the "normal form"
depiction of the game. 158 The customer's strategy choices are displayed along the left side of the matrix, the MCO's strategy choices
are displayed along the top of the matrix, and the payoffs of the customer and the MCO are displayed for each of the four possible combinations of strategies. To summarize the payoffs of the game, the MCO
maximizes its income if the customer chooses "MCO" while it chooses
158

For an introduction to the concept of a normal-form game, see generally DOUGLAS

G. BAiRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 6-49 (1994).
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to provide "cheap" benefits; the customer maximizes his utility if he
chooses "MCO" and the MCO chooses "expensive" benefits.
FIGURE 1

MCO

Expensive Care

Cheap Care

MCO

+, 0

-, +

not-MCO

0,0

0,0

CUSTOMER

Payoffs: Customer, MCO
If the players in the managed care game select their strategies
simultaneously or without knowledge of each other's strategy choice,
and both players behave rationally (that is, maximize their payoffs),
we can predict that the MCO would choose to provide "cheap" care
and that the customer would choose "not-MCO." This result occurs
because the customer should realize that if he selects "MCO," the
MCO is better off selecting "cheap" coverage (++ vs. +), and that if he
selects "not-MCO," the MCO is indifferent between its two choices (0
vs. 0). Given these possible payoffs, the MCO should select "cheap"
coverage. 159 Knowing that the MCO will best serve its interests by providing "cheap" coverage, the customer will best serve her interests by
selecting "not-MCO," because her resulting payoff of zero is preferable to the negative payoff that she would receive if she were to select
"MCO."
2.

Sequential Choice

Replacing the assumption that the players make their choices simultaneously with the assumption that they make their choices sequentially makes the game more realistic. In the real world, either the
MCO or the customer must reveal a strategy first, and that party cannot alter its strategy based on the other party's choice. There are two
159
In game-theory terms, selecting cheap coverage is a weakly dominant strategy for
the MCO, meaning that its payofffrom selecting cheap coverage will be equal to or greater
than its payoff from selecting expensive coverage, no matter which strategy the customer
chooses.
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possible sequences of events. In the first, the MCO communicates to
potential customers the level of care that it will provide customers who
contract Condition X. If the customer then chooses to enroll in the
plan, the MCO's representation becomes part of the contract between
the two parties. If the customer contracts Condition X and the MCO
does not provide at least the represented level of care, the customer
has an enforceable claim against the MCO for breach of contract. Figure 2 depicts this version of the managed care game, along with the
two players' payoffs, in its "extensive form."
FIGURE

2

(1) MCO selects strategy

(cheap)

(expensive)
(2) Customer selects

(not-MCO)

(MCO)

(not-MCO)

(MCO)

(0, 0)

(-, ++)

(0, 0)

(+, +)

Payoffs: (Customer, MCO)
This depiction of the game in its extensive form allows us to predict the results through a process known as "backwards induction," by
which we determine the two parties' incentives by examining the diagram from the bottom up. 160 If the MCO were to select "cheap" care,
the customer would select "not-MCO" because her resulting zero payoff would be higher than the negative payoff she would receive by
selecting "MCO." If the MCO were to select "expensive" care, the customer would be better off selecting "MCO" than "not-MCO." Knowing that the customer's incentive is contingent upon its strategy
choice, the MCO has the incentive to choose "expensive" care. By
doing so, the MCO would receive a positive payoff (because the cus160 For a more extensive game-theory discussion of the extensive form of games and
the solution concept of backwards induction, see generally BAiRD ET AL., supranote 158, at
50-57.
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tomer would then choose "MCO") rather than the zero payoff it
would receive by selecting "cheap" care (because the customer would
choose "not-MCO"). Even a greedy MCO would lack the incentive to
select "cheap" care.
In the alternative version of the sequential game, the MCO does
not make an enforceable commitment to provide "cheap" or "expensive" care prior to the customer making his strategy choice. Instead,
the customer must first decide whether to enroll in the MCO, and the
MCO subsequently chooses its strategy. Figure 3 depicts this version
of the game.
3
(1) Customer selects strategy
FIGuRE

(not-MCO)

(MCO)
(2) MCO selects

(cheap)

(expensive)

(cheap)

(expensive)

(-, ++)

(+, +)

(0, 0)

(0, 0)

Payoffs: (Customer, MCO)
The use of backwards induction demonstrates that changing the
order of play changes the players' incentives considerably. If the customer were to choose "not-MCO," both parties would receive a zero
payoff regardless of which strategy the MCO were to choose. If the
customer were to select "MCO," the MCO could then maximize its
payoff by choosing "cheap" care. Appreciating this result, the customer's incentive is to choose "not-MCO," because he is better off with
a zero payoff than the negative payoff he would receive if he were to
choose "MCO."
An important conclusion that can be drawn by examining both
versions of the managed care game is that both parties are better off if
the MCO chooses first; that is, if the MCO commits to provide a specified level of care before the customer decides whether to enroll in the
MCO's plan. If the MCO selects first, both parties will receive a posi-

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1

tive payoff; if the customer must select first, both players will receive a
zero payoff. This, in turn, leads to the prediction that the MCO will
legally commit to providing expensive care if it is able to do so. If the
choices of "expensive" and "cheap" care represent search goods, the
MCO can specify its choice before the customer decides whether to
enroll with the MCO. However, if "expensive" care and "cheap" care
represent benefits that are experience or credence goods, the MCO
will be unable to make a legally enforceable choice of "cheap" or "expensive" care for Condition X prior to the time when the customer
must decide whether to enroll in the MCO's health plan.
Consider the two possibilities. Dental care is a search good; prior
to enrollment, the consumer can learn whether the MCO's health
plan includes it. Consequently, customers will demand that, prior to
enrollment, MCOs reveal whether dental care is or is not a covered
benefit. An MCO that refuses to reveal this information would find
very few takers for its services. In contrast, the precise benefit the
MCO will provide in the case of a severe headache is an experience
good; fully specifying such a benefit ex ante is impractical because the
benefit depends upon a number of variables including, but not limited to, the location of the pain, the associated symptoms, and the
patient's age and prior medical history. The MCO may recommend
an aspirin to treat the headache, or it may conduct an expensive MRI
scan to search for a tumor. But before the consumer enrolls in the
MCO's health plan and contracts symptoms, the MCO will promise
vaguely to provide "medically necessary" care. Because in this situation
it would be impractical, if not outright impossible, for the MCO to
commit credibly to provide either "cheap" or "expensive" care before
the customer chooses "MCO" or "not-MCO," both parties are locked
into a suboptimal, zero-zero payoff structure.
3.

Competing MCOs

Thus far, we have assumed that the managed care game consists
of two players, each making one strategy choice. In the real world, a
customer who chooses "not-MCO" must then play the same game with
another MCO, and then another, until she finally selects an MCO.
This pattern illustrates a problem: the customer's optimal strategy is
to select "not-MCO" for every health plan in her array of options because each MCO will have the incentive to choose "cheap" care if the
customer first commits to enrolling in its plan. If we add the assumption that the customer prefers "cheap" coverage to no coverage at
all-a plausible assumption for most consumers-then the customer
finds herself in a no-win situation. She must select some MCO,
although she knows that the plan she selects will choose to provide
"cheap" coverage for Condition X. In other words, although selecting
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"not-MCO" in a single play of the game results in a neutral zero-dollar
payoff to the customer, selecting "not-MCO" in every play of the game
results in a payoff that is more negative than the payoff she receives if
she chooses "MCO," and the MCO subsequently chooses "cheap"
care.
When the benefit in question is an experience or credence good,
then, the customer's unavoidable fate is to receive "cheap" care. The
cloud, however, does have a silver lining: because customers know that
they are destined to receive "cheap" care, the insurance premium the
MCO charges will reflect the cost of that cheap care. Recall that
although the game assumes competition among MCOs and the customer must ultimately select an MCO that will provide "cheap" care,
she can choose any of the competitors. Thus, each MCO will have to
price the "cheap" benefits package at the marginal cost of providing
the package. The bad news for customers is that they will be able to
purchase only "cheap" care. The good news for customers is that they
will be able to purchase it at a relatively low price.
4. Assessing the Outcome of the Managed Care Game
Is the inevitable outcome of the managed care game more efficient than if the MCO were to provide "expensive" care at a price that
reflected the additional cost of such care? The answer hinges upon
whether the marginal benefit to customers of "expensive" care, discounted by the probability that they will develop Condition X, exceeds the marginal cost of the MCO's provision of coverage for that
condition. In other words, the question is whether customers would
be willing to pay the marginal cost of "expensive" coverage or would
instead prefer to accept lesser coverage in exchange for having the
marginal premium dollars not spent on "expensive" care available for
other goods and services.
Clearly, in a first-best world, customers could satisfy their individual preferences by choosing between paying a higher insurance premium for "expensive" care or a lower premium for "cheap" care. If
customers have heterogeneous preferences, the existence of more options ensures that more customers will have a choice that comes close
to maximizing utility. 16 1 But, as the managed care game suggests, if
individually rational customers and MCOs operate in an unregulated
market under the assumptions provided, the result will not be a menu
of options for consumers. In the free market, all customers will be
forced to accept "cheap" care for Condition X at a "cheap"-care price.
161
Cf. Bellante & Porter, supra note 120, at 661 ("An approximation of the ideal, utility-maximizing package [of wage and job characteristics] is obtained for each worker...
when he chooses among the variety of packages supplied by employers.").
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The government can alter this result by mandating that MCOs
provide "expensive" care for Condition X. Although specifying highly
contingent benefits ex ante will create the same problems for legislative bodies that MCOs face, courts can conceivably enforce "expensive" care mandates ex post. 1 62 Mandates will enhance efficiency if

the majority of customers value the "expensive" benefit more than its
marginal cost. Of course, if the majority of customers prefer the
"cheap" benefit at the lower price, mandating the "expensive" benefit
would force customers to pay for something they would rather not
have, and thus would be inefficient.
D.

Customary Constraints on Strategic Underperformance

The preceding description of the managed care game can be
generalized to any contracting situation in which the buyer of goods
or services has no way of judging the quality of the seller's product
before purchasing it, and the seller has no method of credibly guaranteeing the product's quality. This situation can be described alternatively as a "lemons" problem: 163 in the market for goods in which
consumers cannot tell high from low quality prior to purchasing, the
presence of low-quality goods will tend to drive high-quality goods out
of the market, regardless of whether or not there are customers will64
ing to pay a high price for high quality.
Circumstances in which sellers provide experience goods are relatively common, and common experience suggests that these scenarios
do not always cause all sellers to offer low-quality products at low
prices. This leads to the question: what critical aspect or aspects of the
"real world" has the managed care game, as this Article has described
it, failed to capture? The answer is that the description of the game
assumes only a single period of play.
When a seller or a buyer are repeat players in a given market, it is
possible that different incentives will hold sway and the parties will not
behave in the way that the single-iteration model predicts. Specifically, in many interactions with payoff structures similar to those of
the managed care game, sellers have two countervailing incentives not
to provide low-quality service at a low price if customers are willing to
pay the marginal cost of higher quality service. First, in many markets,
customers are repeat purchasers. In these situations, sellers can improve their future income stream by satisfying customers so that they
will return. Second, even if customers are not likely to be repeat purchasers, the seller can build a reputation for quality by demonstrating
162 This Article discusses this approach in greater detail infra Part V.A.
163 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 QJ. ECON. 488 (1970).
164
See id. at 495.
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high quality to customers who value it. This reputation can pass from
current customers to future customers. Once the seller establishes
such a reputation it can serve as a bonding mechanism that permits
the seller to credibly commit to providing a high-quality product or
service. This bonding may occur even if customers cannot judge the
quality of the product or service prior to purchase, and even if the
1 65
seller cannot credibly warrant a specific level of quality.
Either together or separately, these incentives can outweigh a
seller's incentive to provide low quality in the current transaction and
can lead to the provision of high-quality goods and services if customers value high quality at its marginal cost. When these incentives operate effectively, the unregulated market can provide buyers with a
choice between high-quality/high-price sellers on the one hand, and
low-quality/low-price sellers on the other. This choice permits each
individual buyer to allocate the efficient amount of resources to the
product. From an efficiency standpoint, such a menu of options is
superior to a government mandate of high quality. Mandating high
quality permits those buyers who would prefer to pay for high quality
to allocate their resources more efficiently, but it forces buyers who
would prefer to save money and purchase a low-quality product to in166
efficiently allocate too many resources to the product.
Consequently, the defensibility of this Article's thesis that mandated health care benefits can enhance efficiency relative to the free
market turns on the complete or near absence of incentives to cultivate repeat business and build a reputation for quality in the managed
care market. The remainder of this Part argues that these incentives
do not exist for two reasons. First, the unusual nature of the product
which MCOs sell distorts sellers' usual incentive to cultivate repeat
business. Second, the complexity of the product substantially reduces
the incentive to expend resources to cultivate a reputation for high
quality in the managed care field.
1. Relational Contracting and Repeat Business
In the typical contract between a buyer and a seller, the seller
seeks to develop a reputation with the buyer that will lead to repeat
patronage. Soliciting new customers is difficult and expensive work;
generally, businesses with superior performance records are those
that are able to rely on repeat business for a large percentage of their
165
Cf. id. at 499-500 (explaining that firms can counteract the lemons problem by
developing brand names that both indicate quality and give consumers a means of retaliation if purchases do not meet their expectations).
166
Mandated benefits can also lead to an underallocation of resources by buyers who
prefer a low-quality, low-price option if those buyers prefer not to purchase the product at
all, rather than pay the marginal cost for the mandated high-quality option.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1

sales.1 67 Put another way, a long-term view of relationships with customers often prevents sellers from maximizing the profits they could
garner from a single transaction.
MCOs, like most sellers, rely on repeat customers. In the current
competitive health care market, MCOs spend large amounts of money
to recruit new customers, who are usually committed to the MCO for
only one year at a time. In most instances, the customer has the option of re-enrolling with her MCO or switching to a competitor every
year.168 An MCO can hope to be profitable only if it is able to retain
most of its customers beyond their initial enrollment tenn.
But MCOs differ from most sellers in two important respects.
First, in many cases, even consumers who experience the treatment
quality their MCOs provide will not be able to adequately assess its
quality; in other words, medical treatment is often a credence good
rather than an experience good. 169 For a consumer to determine
whether a treatment received was "expensive" or "cheap," she must be
able to compare that treatment to an alternative. 7 0 Few consumers
are knowledgeable and sophisticated enough to know, on their own,
what treatment they could have received, but did not.171 Some consumers will obtain information about the quality of care they received;
perhaps their physician or a different physician will inform them ex
ante that a better quality treatment is available but that the MCO will
not approve it, or perhaps an attorney will inform them ex post that
better options were available. These situations, however, are almost
certainly exceptions, that prove the rule. When medical care is a
credence good, the MCO's risk of losing consumers by providing
"cheap" care is minimal.
Second, and more importantly, even if every customer could assess the quality of any treatment received, MCOs still would lack an
incentive to provide more expensive care. Although most sellers of
goods and services desire repeat patronage from all of their customers, MCOs would prefer not to retain a portion of their customers

167 See generally FREDERICK F. REICHHELD, THE LoYALry EFFEcr (1996) (analyzing the
success of companies that focus on customer loyalty and describing their business
strategies).

168

See HALL, supra note 39, at 247 (noting that "the convention of annual open enroll-

ment" gives customers the opportunity to switch from one MCO to another if they decide

their enrollment decision was a mistake).
169 See Rice, supranote 40, at 413-15 (reviewing evidence of consumer behavior in the
health insurance context and concluding that "consumers do not seem to be able to evaluate the usefulness of medical services").
170 Cf. id. at 407 (noting the difficulty that health care consumers have in predicting
the results of choices alternative to the one they actually made).
171

See id.
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from one year to the next.172 In any given year, the sickest approximately two percent of Americans consume approximately forty-one
percent of the nation's health care resources, 173 and just ten percent
of the population uses seventy percent of all health care provided. 7 4
Because of this reality, an MCO that is able to avoid enrolling the
sickest portion of the population stands to be extremely profitable.
There is widespread belief that MCO marketing practices are consciously designed to attract the healthier members of the population
and to discourage the less healthy from enrolling. 175 Because customers who are sick and consume a large amount of resources in one year
are more likely than average to be heavy consumers in future years, a
profit-maximizing MCO will want to retain its healthy customers and
76
convince its unhealthy customers to go elsewhere.'
Consequently, MCOs lack an incentive to provide expensive care
for Condition X in order to retain customers, because the customers
whom the MCO will impress with its devotion to quality are precisely
the customers the MCO does not want. Conversely, customers who
experience low-quality care from an MCO are likely to look elsewhere
for care in the future, to the extent that they are so able. In most
markets, defections would be bad for business; but in the peculiar
market for health insurance, defections by customers most likely to
defect are usually good for business.
See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supranote 14, at 109-10 ("[R]ather than giving its highest
172
user the red-carpet treatment, a health plan may have no problem when its highest user
walks out the exit door and enrolls somewhere else. When plan ethics are borderline and
economic pressures severe, they may even help them find that door.").
173 See Berk & Monheit, supra note 51, at 147 (reporting that the sickest 2% of the
population in 1987 accounted for 41% of health care expenditures); Etheredge et al.,
supra note 24, at 96 (asserting, in 1996, that "10% of the population uses 70% of health
care.).
174
See Etheredge et al., supra note 24, at 96.
175
See ZEUMAN & BERENSON, supra note 14, at 157 ("[M]any marketing strategists will
advise most plans to project a reputation for good quality-but not too good."). For example, one author has noted that Medicare managed care plans that promote exercise programs are probably more interested in attracting customers who are in good health (and
thus find exercise programs attractive) than in fostering fitness. See Kutter, supranote 63,
at 1559. Another set of experts states matter-of-factly that MCO "[m]arketing strategies
are usually designed primarily to attract good risks and to avoid patients on whom a plan
would lose money" and rhetorically asks "[w]hy do health plan ads show happy, healthy
babies[.]" Etheredge et al., supra note 24, at 96; see alsoJoseph P. Newhouse, Risk Adjustment: Where Are We Now?, 35 INQUIRY 122, 122-23 (1998) (describing the incentives of health
plans to "market their services so as not to appeal to bad risks").
176
If the customer is an individual insurance purchaser, the MCO might mitigate
some of the costs associated with a heavy user of resources by charging that customers a
higher-than-average, experience-rated premium; if the customer is a member of an insurance group, the MCO may be able to charge the group an experience-rated premium to
compensate for the customer's heavy use of services. Even so, it is usually impossible for
health insurers to make a profit on their sickest customers simply because charging rates
high enough to cover the tens of thousands of dollars of care that tbese customers consume is impractical.
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It is not always true, of course, that an MCO would wish customers who actually experience the quality of care it provides to choose
not to renew their coverage. Depending on the nature of Condition
X, its development might not be correlated with a patient consuming
a higher-than-average amount of medical care in future years. For example, MCOs have no incentive to skimp on treatment for common
ear infections or stomach viruses because the customers who seek
treatment for these maladies are probably no more likely than average
to be high resource users overall. In some cases, the opposite might
be true: the need for certain treatments might be correlated with low
overall resource use. For example, sports-related injuries might be
correlated with low future resource use because they are generally suffered by young people in good health. 177 The need for infant care
might be correlated with low future resource use because, on average,
young families tend to be fairly healthy. It follows that an MCO might
have a strong desire to retain customers that require these services
and might even have an incentive to choose expensive care for those
conditions. Therefore, MCOs might find it advantageous to provide
expensive sports medicine and infant care, but these examples are almost certainly the exceptions that prove the general rule.
2.

ReputationalEffects

To summarize, there are two unique features of the market for
health insurance that are highly relevant to this discussion: (1) the
seller does not wish to retain some of its customers, and (2) in most
cases, these unwanted customers are the only ones who will have become informed about the quality of the MCO's services after contracting. Consequently, sellers' usual desire for repeat business will
not motivate an MCO to provide high-quality care, even if most of its
customers would prefer high quality and would be willing to back up
that preference with premium dollars. But even though an MCO may
not wish to retain its sickest customers, it will want to retain healthy
customers and recruit new ones. Thus, the MCO should be concerned with building a reputation for providing services that customers value. If, in fact, customers want high-quality care, reputational
concerns should cause MCOs to provide high-quality services.
Clearly, MCOs do care about their reputation among their customers at some level. In recent years, many MCOs have polled customers about their satisfaction with MCO service for the purposes of
publicizing favorable results and upgrading service if results are unfa177

Cf Hyman, supranote 39, at 7 (noting that "individuals in their 20s and 30s require

more sports medicine than those in their 50s").
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vorable.178 But it is telling to look at the methods with which MCOs
that have taken such steps seek to measure their reputation for quality. The indicia of quality are usually limited to items that the ordinary customer, rather than the high-cost customer alone, is likely to
have experienced179-for example, time waiting for an appointment
and ease of processing claim forms. 180 Why do MCOs fail to exhibit as
much concern with their reputation among their customers for providing high-quality care to the very sick as with their reputation for
quality in more pedestrian areas of service?
There is no clear answer to this question, but the following three
hypotheses, all of which are based on imperfect information in the
market for MCO services, are the most convincing. First, because
most customers who receive care for any Condition X are medically
unsophisticated and unlikely to be competent to evaluate the quality
of the care they receive, the reputational costs of providing low-quality
service likely will be less severe for MCOs than for other sellers of
goods and services.
Second, only the small percentage of MCO customers that suffer
a serious illness or injury learn about the level of care the MCO provides. Therefore, even if members of this limited cohort are able to
recognize the quality of care, any reputational costs associated with
providing low-quality service will be more limited than if most or all
customers discovered the MCO's level of quality. If this cohort communicates its knowledge of the MCO's low quality primarily to others
who are likely to be heavy resource consumers and thus undesirable to
the MCO, the limited development of a reputation for providing low18
quality service could, perversely, inure to the benefit of the MCO. '
In other words, if the seriously ill communicate their grievances primarily to others who are undesirable health insurance risks-a plausible, though not obviously correct, assumption-an MCO's reputation
for low quality among its heaviest service users will not damage its bottom line.
178 See, e.g., U.S. News and World Report, The HMO Roll (Oct. 5, 1998) <http://
www.usnews.com/usnews/nycu/health/hehmohon.htm>.
179 See, e.g., Avery Comarow, U.S. News and World Report, Behind the HMO Rankings

(Oct. 5, 1998) <http://wwnv.usnews.com/usnews/nycu/health/hohmobeh.htm> (measuring prevention, access to care for adults and children, member satisfaction, and physician
credentials).
180

Cf ZELMAN & BERENSON, supranote 14, at 112 (noting that consumers maybe suspi-

cious of satisfaction surveys, which MCOs frequently cite, because only the small percentage of consumers who become seriously ill in a given year "have had a chance to see their
plan really put to the test").
181 See Thomas L. Greaney, How Many LibertariansDoes It Take to Fix the Health Care
System, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 1825, 1833 (1998) (book review) (noting that in the world of
health care, "perversely, having a good reputation for quality can lead to unfavorable
selection").
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Finally, even if an MCO were to develop a reputation for low
quality in the broader community, that reputation would be damaging
only to the extent that consumers are able to differentiate the reputations of competing MCOs. If consumers believe, correctly or incorrectly, that little quality differentiation exists among MCOs, a
reputation for low quality likely will lead to general complaints among
the public about managed care. 8 2 These complaints perhaps could
lead to the increase in mandated-benefits legislation that we hLve witnessed this decade, but they would not leave the particular MCO at a
competitive disadvantage.
III
BOUNDED RAIONALITY AND CoMPLEx CHOICES

A.

The Optimization Model

The previous Part demonstrates how, under a set of plausible assumptions, MCOs operating in an unregulated market will provide an
inefficiently low quality of benefits that can be classified as experience
or credence goods. The managed care game, however, has a different
equilibrium for benefits that are search goods. Recall that the experience good-credence good problem results from the inability of an
MCO to specify what level of benefit it will provide a consumer before
the consumer chooses whether to enroll with the MCO. For search
goods, the sequence of moves in the managed care game is reversed,
and the likely outcome changes.
Assuming again that consumers prefer "expensive" to "cheap"
care for Condition X, backwards induction suggests that if the MCO
chooses "cheap" care, the consumer will choose "not-MCO" in order
to achieve the neutral payoff of zero rather than a negative payoff. If
the MCO chooses "expensive" care, the consumer will select "MCO"
in order to receive a positive payoff. Knowing this, the MCO will realize it cannot achieve the outcome of "++" it would receive if it were to

select "cheap" care while the consumer chooses "MCO." Consequently, the MCO should select "expensive" care to salvage a positive
outcome rather than a zero payoff. In this version of the managed
care game, the sole equilibrium is "expensive" care with "MCO.".
The managed care game, then, suggests that the market will provide the efficient level of benefits that can be adequately specified
prior to contracting. When consumers are willing to pay the marginal
cost of broader or more costly services, MCOs will have an incentive to
182
See ZELMAN & BERENSON, supra note 14, at 127 (observing that in the current world
of managed care, "[t]he anecdote about one HMO denying a patient access to an appro-

priate but expensive procedure becomes an indictment of managed care in general, not an
indictment of one managed care plan").
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provide them; conversely, when consumers prefer to spend their dollars elsewhere, MCOs will have an incentive not to provide marginally
more expensive care.
This efficient outcome depends, like the predictions of most economic models, on the assumption that consumers are ruthless optimizers-that they carefully compare the detailed descriptions and
fine print of health insurance plans, that they make complicated trade
offs between price and services, 18 3 and that they reward (with enrollment) the MCO that tailors its offerings to their preferences and punish (by selecting a competing plan) those that fail to do so. 18 4 As an
example of how this assumption is necessary to guarantee the efficient
allocation of resources to medical care, consider the following
examples:
(1) Consumers prefer that their health plan provide coverage
for Condition X, and they are willing to pay the marginal actuarial
cost of this coverage. Local MCOs, A, B, and C, offer identical coverage except that A and B provide coverage for Condition X (and
charge a marginally higher price) while C does not. Consumers
who optimally allocate their resources will avoid C, forcing it to add
coverage of Condition X to its plan to attract customers. If consumers make suboptimal resource allocation decisions, however, it is
possible that C can prosper without adding the efficient coverage.
(2) As in the first example, consumers are willing to pay the
cost of coverage for Condition X. A variety of differences exists,
however, in the services (and prices) A, B, and C offer, one of which
is that C does not offer coverage for Condition X. Many consumers
who optimally allocate their resources might select C, despite the
fact that it inefficiently fails to cover Condition X, because they
much prefer the rest of Cs benefits package to A's and B's packages. On the other hand, some marginal consumers, who just
barely prefer the remainder of C's benefits package to A's and B's
packages, will choose A or B because the benefit of coverage for
Condition X is more valuable to them than the other marginal differences among A, B, and C. Although C might attract some consumers when it does not provide coverage for Condition X, it will be
more successful if it adds this coverage (and its marginal price) to
its benefits package. If consumers are unable to perfectly compare
A's and B's benefits to C's benefits, however, C might not need to
provide coverage for Condition X to maximize its profits.
183 For a detailed example of how consumers make complicated trade offs between
price and services, see David M. Eddy, Connecting Value and Costs, 264JAMA 1737, 1737-38
(1990) (calculating the value to an individual, healthy consumer of a drug that would
reduce the risk of death from myocardial infarction).
184 Consumers' market choices accurately reflect their preferences. See generally PA.
Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer's Behaviour,EcoNOuMcA, Feb. 1938, at 61
(describing the theory of consumer behavior in decision making).
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The "consumer-as-optimizer" model assumes, most importantly,
that consumers adopt strategies for choosing among several options,
each with multiple attributes, that are both nonselective and compensatory.18 5 A strategy is nonselective when consumers evaluate the information available for all attributes of each alternative before making
a choice among alternatives; 86 a strategy is compensatory when the
decision maker trades off desirable attributes of one option against
desirable attributes of other options, taking into account the marginal
18 7
benefit of each attribute.
If MCO A offers coverages X and Z, but not Y, and MCO B offers
coverage Y, but not coverages Xand Z, a compensatory strategy would
require the consumer to determine whether the value of coverage Yis
more or less than the value of coverages X and Z combined. Notice
that compensatory decision making requires the consumer to do
more than ordinally rank the various coverages in terms of relative
value; it requires her to convert different attributes into a common
currency for comparison. If a consumer knows only that she prefers
coverage Y to coverage X and coverage X to coverage Z, she cannot
use a compensatory strategy for choosing among MCOs because she
cannot evaluate whether X and Z combined are preferable to Yalone.
To be certain that she makes the optimal decision, she must place all
three coverages on the same value scale. If she values Y at $100 (or
100 utils), X at $75 (or 75 utils), and Z at $50 (or 50 utils), MCO A
would be her optimal choice because X+ Z> Y If she values Xat only
$25 and Z at only $10, however, MCO B would be her optimal choice
because Y> X+ Z
The classic example of compensatory and nonselective choice
strategies found in the decision-theory literature is called "weighted
adding." 8 8 Using this strategy, an actor assigns an "importance
185
See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,LAW AND ECONOMICS 17 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining that rational-choice theory underlying the economic analysis of law assumes that

an individual's preferences can be completely ordered, meaning that the individual "is not
allowed to say, 'I can't compare them'").
186 SeeJames R. Bettman et al., Constructive Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER
RES. 187, 189 (1998) (describing selective strategies and, by implication, nonselective
strategies).
187
See JOHN W. PAYNE ET AL., THE ADAPTIVE DECISION MAKER 29 (1993) (distinguishing
between compensatory and noncompensatory strategies); David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL.L. REv. 277, 282
(1986) ("[A] choice strategy is called compensatory because it permits good scores on
some attributes to compensate for bad scores on others."); Barbara E. Kahn &Jonathan
Baron, An Exploratory Study of Choice Rules Favoredfor High-Stakes Decisions, 4 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 305, 306 (1995) (describing compensatory models); Peter Wright, Consumer
Choice Strategies: Simplifying vs. Optimizing, 12 J. MARKETING RES. 60, 60-61 (1975) (defining
compensatory and noncompensatory decision strategies).
188 See Bettman et al.,
supra note 186, at 190. This general approach is known by a
number of different names. See, e.g., RALPH L. KEENEY & HoWARD RAIFFA, DECISIONS WITH
MULTIPLE OBJEcrrvEs: PREFERENCES AND VALUE TRADEOFFS 282-353 (1976)

(discussing
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weight" to each attribute on which he evaluates alternatives and a subjective value for how each alternative fares on each attribute. He then
gives each alternative an overall score by multiplying each attribute's
importance weight by its subjective-value score and summing the results. 18 9 The weighted-adding approach, when executed precisely,
permits the actor to choose the decision option that maximizes his
utility-sometimes referred to as maximizing the accuracy of the
choice. 190 For this reason, weighted adding is often assumed to be a
normative method of analyzing choices.' 9 '
The consumer-as-optimizer model, along with its implicit assumption that consumers make purchasing decisions using a weighted-adding strategy or an approach that leads to the same result, is firmly
established dogma in the law-and-economics literature because it (1)
is simple, (2) tends to approximate reality in many instances, and (3)
provides a better general model of human behavior than any other
single theory. But these virtues, while significant, do not demonstrate
that the assumption is true or even useful in every legal application.
In the market for health care, the assumption seems highly implausible. Common experience suggests that consumers select their health
insurance plan in a less rigorous way; they do not conduct a thorough
compensatory analysis that takes into account and values every attribute of each available plan. 19 2 Unfortunately, little hard data exist on
how, analytically, consumers make decisions about purchasing health
insurance. There is, however, extensive research on the subject of
how consumers choose among alternatives with multiple attributes in
other contexts. This evidence, coupled with some basic assumptions
about the context of health insurance decision making, permits the
development of a theory of consumer choice among managed care
plans.
I will argue that the consumer-as-optimizer model of decision
making is implausible in the context of health insurance and that a
"multi-attribute utility analysis"); PAYNE Er AL., supra note 187, at 24 (discussing the
"weighted additive rule").
189
See Bettman et al., supra note 186, at 190.
190 See id at 195 ("The accuracy of a decision strategy can be defined by using the
weighted adding model. .. ").

See PAYtE ET AL., supra note 187, at 24.
A recent article puts the basic intuition this way:
Even with the optimal price and performance information, consumers find
it difficult to weigh the relative costs and benefits of a large number of
plans. If this comparison also involves many differences in service coverage
and cost sharing, consumers are much less likely to make rational choices.
The number of variables may simply be too great to be manageable.
Hoy et al., supra note 136, at 10; see also, e.g.,John K. Iglehart, Role of the Consumer, HEALTH
AFF., Winter 1996, at 7, 7 ("[B]ecause most people are healthy most of the time, very few of
us are prepared to invest the time necessary to become highly knowledgeable
191
192

consumers.").
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model of "boundedly rational" consumer choice is descriptively far
more realistic. The important implication of this model, I then argue,
is that if health care consumers are less-than-perfect optimizers, the
dynamics of an unregulated market for medical insurance are likely to
result in the inefficient underprovision of benefits by MCOs. If the
assumptions and reasoning are correct, government mandates of benefits-even of benefits that are search goods-have the potential to
enhance the efficiency of society's allocation of resources to medical
care.
B.

Models of Boundedly Rational Decision Making
1.

TheoreticalAlternatives to the Optimization Model

In the 1950s, Herbert Simon argued that the optimization model
based on the "global rationality of man" was an implausible descriptive model of most human decision-making contexts, especially those
that require individuals to compare many options or options with
93 Rather than optimizing, Simon
many features.'
argued, individuals
"satisfice"'194 in many situations: they develop aspirations and select
decision options that meet them, without regard to whether another
"better" decision choice might theoretically exist.195 Simon believed
that limitations on individuals' cognitive ability to process large and
complicated data sets bound their capacity to make so-called "rational" decisions, such that boundedly rational behavior is an unavoid96
able aspect of the human condition.
Others have built on Simon's descriptive insight by arguing that
satisficing results not from immutable cognitive limitations, but from
costs associated with information acquisition or processing that outweigh the benefits of making an optimal decision. 197 From this perspective, satisficing can be globally rational (and thus desirable)
behavior, even if it leads to suboptimal decisions in individual circumstances. For the purposes of our examination of mandated health
care benefits, the important questions are whether consumers satisfice
rather than optimize when purchasing health insurance, and, if they
193

Herbert A. Simon, A BehavioralModel of RationalChoice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99, 99 (1955).

194 The term "satisfice" has two somewhat different meanings. This Article uses the
term in its more general sense to mean that decision makers discontinue their analysis
short of identifying the optimal choice when they have identified a choice that is "good
enough," rather than as the label of a very specific decision-making strategy. See Bettman
et al.,
supranote 186, at 190 (describing how a decision maker processes a problem using a
satisficing heuristic).
195 See Simon, supranote 193, at 103-04; Herbert A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment 63 PsYcHoL. REv. .129 (1956); see alsoJames G. March, Bounded Rationality,Ambiguity, and theEngineeringof Choice, 9 BELLJ. ECON. 587, 590 (1978) (describing
the pioneering work of Simon in establishing the concept of bounded rationality).
196 See Simon, supra note 193, at 99-101.
197 See, e.g., Grether et al., supra note 187, at 279.
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satisfice, what consequences ensue for the efficient provision of
health care by the market. Why consumers satisfice, and whether it is
desirable for them as individuals to do so, is unimportant.
If the weighted-adding model of decision making is nonselective
and compensatory, and thus consistent with the optimization hypothesis, lexicographic decision making is weighted adding's polar opposite. A lexicographic strategy calls for the consumer to select the
option with the highest ranking on the most important attribute. 198
For example, a consumer who believes that the number of participating physicians is the most important MCO attribute would employ lexicographic decision making by selecting the MCO with the largest
number of participating physicians, regardless of its other attributes.
This decision-making strategy is highly selective in that it requires the
consumer to consider only information concerning the most important attribute, allowing her to ignore all other information. 199 This
strategy is also noncompensatory in that it does not require the consumer to trade off the number of participating physicians against
other desirable attributes, such as price, maternity benefits, or mental
health coverage.
One can view the weighted-adding and lexicographic approaches
200
as opposing endpoints on a spectrum of decision-making strategies.
The weighted-adding approach, which leads to optimal, utility-maximizing decisions, requires large amounts of information about options and complex processing of that information, but it maximizes
the accuracy of decisions. In contrast, the lexicographic approach requires minimal information about options and allows for simple
processing, 20 1 thereby minimizing cognitive effort. Between these
endpoints lie a large number of decision-making strategies that require less information and cognitive effort than weighted adding, but
that offer greater accuracy than a strict lexicographic approach.
For example, 20 2 the strict lexicographic approach might be relaxed somewhat. Under one variation of the approach, sometimes re198
See PAYN ET AL.., supra note 187, at 26; Bettman, et al., supra note 186, at 190;
Wright, supra note 187, at 61. If two or more choices have the same score or value for the
most important attribute, the lexicographic strategy requires the decision maker to choose
the one with the highest score on the second most important attribute. See PAYNE ET AL.,
supra note 187, at 26; Amos Tversky, Elimination by Aspects: A Theory of Choice, 79 PsycuoL
Rxv. 281, 285 (1972).
199 See Tversky, supra note 198, at 285.
200 See infra Figure 4.
201 Cf Bettman et al., supra note 186, at 190 (suggesting that attribute-based processing
is easier than alternative-based processing).
202
For a more complete list of decision approaches that fall between weighted adding
and lexicographic choice on the scale presented in Figure 4, see PAYNE Er AL., supranote
187, at 22-29.
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FiGURE 4

High Accuracy & Effort
*-

Low Accuracy & Effort

--- - -------------------------

Weighted Adding

Lexicographic

ferred to as "elimination by aspects" (EBA),203 the decision maker
ranks potential attributes in order of importance. She then determines how all alternatives score on the most important attribute, but
rather than choosing the alternative with the highest score, she eliminates from consideration those alternatives that fall below a minimum, satisfactory value. If only one alternative remains under
consideration, she selects that alternative. In this case, the strategy
has the same result as the strict lexicographic approach. If multiple
alternatives remain, she repeats the process by considering the second
20 4
most important alternative, and so on until she makes a selection.
Notice that this approach is less selective than the lexicographic approach (although it is still relatively selective) because it often requires the decision maker to analyze alternatives on the basis of
multiple attributes. Like the lexicographic approach, EBA is noncompensatory; the decision maker need not attempt to balance the virtues
of a choice that is desirable on an important attribute against the virtues of a choice that is desirable on two or more less important
attributes.
Alternatively, health care purchasers could incorporate from the
weighted-adding approach some elements of compensatory decision
making while remaining selective in the amount of data they process. 20 5 Such an approach can be called "modified weighted adding."
For example, consumers might make trade offs among desirable features of health insurance plans, rather than relying on a strict hierarchy of plan attributes, but limit their compensatory decision making
to attributes that rank relatively high in importance or salience. This
approach is consistent with empirical data that suggest that even ex-

203 See Bettman et al., supra note 186, at 190. This conception of EBA is slightly different than Amos Tversky's original conception of the strategy, which posited that decision
makers randomly selected based on probabilities dependent on the relative importance of
the attributes the order in which they considered the aspects under the theory. See Tversky, supra note 198, at 285.
204 See generally PAYNE Er AL, supranote 187, at 27; Bettman et al., supra note 186, at
190.
205
Cf PAYNE ET AL., supra note 187, at 28-29 (observing that individuals often use combinations of decision-making strategies rather than a single pure strategy).

1999]

MANAGED CARE REGULATION

pert decision makers have difficulty using more than half a dozen or
20 6
so pieces of information when evaluating alternatives.
Consider a consumer who determines that the most important
attribute of an MCO is that the MCO's group of participating providers includes her current physician, but that the price of premiums, the
location of participating hospitals close to her home, and the extent
of maternity benefits also are very important. She might consider a
plan that does not include her current physician if it offered a significantly lower price and significantly better maternity benefits than all
of the plans that included her physician. Other benefits competing
plans offer, however, would not enter into her calculus under this decision-making model.
2.

Decision Making and Health Care Choices

It is difficult to predict exactly which of a nearly infinite number
of strategies consumers will adopt in a particular situation; decisionmaking approaches are highly dependent on the structure of the
problem at hand.2 0 7 Some evidence suggests that, as a general rule,
most nonexpert decision makers are not likely to use compensatory
and nonselective decision-making strategies. 208 A number of features
of the choice between competing managed care options suggests that
health care consumers are particularly unlikely to adopt decision-making strategies that are fully compensatory and nonselective. The context suggests it is highly likely that consumers will use decision-making
strategies that will provide (to varying degrees) MCOs with the incentive to underprovide some benefits relative to the efficient level.
a. Complexity
As Figure 4 suggests, decision-making approaches that are most
accurate require a great deal of cognitive effort. Conversely, decision
206 See Ruth H. Phelps &James Shanteau, Livestock Judges: How Much InfornationCan an
Expert Use?, 21 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. PERFORMANCE 209, 209-10 (1978) (citing
studies). But see id. at 211-13 (presenting evidence that livestock judges were able to balance more attributes when evaluating the quality of hogs).
207 See PAYNE ET AL., supra note 187, at 6; Bettman et al., supra note 186, at 187-88.
208 In one interesting study, Barbara E. Kahn and Jonathan Baron asked subjects a
series of questions about how they would choose a cancer treatment. See Kahn & Baron,
supra note 187, at 308. The experimenters asked subjects to state the most important factor and to answer whether they should base their decision on that factor alone; the experimenters then provided them with a list of factors to rank in order of importance. See id. at
311. Approximately one third of the subjects said they likely would make their decision
based only on the most important factor-effectively adopting a strict lexicographic approach. See id. at 312. In a sister study, only about one-fourth of the subjects identified a
compensatory strategy as the way they would approach the problem. See id at 313; cf
PAYNE ET AL., supra note 187, at 25 (asserting that "while people sometimes make decisions
in ways consistent with procedures like [weighted adding], more often people appear to
make decisions using simpler choice processes").
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makers can minimize this effort by adopting simpler approaches that
are not as accurate. From one perspective, then, selecting a decisionmaking strategy can be seen as choosing a balance between maximizing accuracy and minimizing effort. 20 9 Actors often use strategies ap21 0
proximating weighted-adding when they face simple decisions.
When choices become more complex, however, decision makers often
place relatively more emphasis on the goal of reducing cognitive effort2 l ' and relatively less emphasis on the goal of achieving accuracy,

thus becoming more likely to employ selective or noncompensatory
21 2
decision-making strategies.
Evidence from social science research suggests that consumers
facing choices, each of which have a large number of attributes, tend
to adopt selective decision-making approaches.2 1 3 The literature on
the problem of information overload suggests that the ability of consumers to make choices that are utility maximizing given the options
actually decreases as the amount of information available increases beyond a certain point-probably somewhere between five and ten at214
tributes per alternative.
In one study, for example, the ability of subjects to select a house
that was closest to their ideal house (judged on the basis of information previously provided by each subject) from among five alternatives
was constant when the number of attributes used to describe each
209 See, e.g., PAYNE r AL., supranote 187, at 11 ("[W]e believe that accuracy and effort
are the primary determinants of contingent strategy use."); Bettman et al., supra note 186,
at 192-93 (observing that decision makers must compromise between the desire to achieve
accuracy and the desire to minimize cognitive effort); Wright, supra note 187, at 62 ("Con-

sumers may often have to compromise between optimizing eventual consumption benefits
and reducing the strains of decision making.").
210 See Kahn & Baron, supra note 187, at 306, 314 (citing sources).
211
In one set of experiments, in which experimenters asked subjects to evaluate a
range of decision problems of varying complexity in terms of the number of alternatives or
attributes that they had to consider, greater complexity led to increased response times in
evaluating options and increased subjective judgments of the amount of effort involved in
the task. See PAYNE ET AL., supra note 187, at 85-86.

212 See, e.g., id. at 34 ("In general, as decisions become more complex, people will tend
to use simplifying heuristics."); Ellen C. Garbarino & Julie A. Edell, Cognitive Effort, Affect,
and Choice, 24J. CONSUMER REs. 147, 148 (1997) ("As environments require more cognitive
effort to process information fully, decision makers often switch to decision strategies or
heuristics that are easier to implement[,] but these heuristics frequently result in less accurate decisions, biased responses, and preference reversals.... [P] eople are willing to forgo
some benefits to conserve cognitive effort."); cf Wright, supra note 187, at 65 (finding in
one survey that decision makers found that the strain associated with compensatory decision-making strategies increased as the amount of information facing the decision maker
increased).
213 See Bettman et al., supra note 186, at 200 ("Increases in the number of attributes
generally lead[ ] to increased selectivity, but not strategy changes."); see also PAYNE ET AL,
supranote 187, at 36-37 (noting that the evidence is mixed, with studies contradicting each
other).
214 See Naresh K Malhotra, Information Load and ConsumerDecision Making, 8 J. CoNSUMER REs. 419, 427-28 (1982) (citing empirical studies).
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house increased from five to ten, but decreased significantly as the
215
number of attributes per alternative increased to fifteen or more.
Presumably, the reason for this counterintuitive finding is that, as
complexity increases, actors respond to the increasing demands on
their cognitive capacity by shifting away from compensatory and nonselective decision-making strategies to selective and noncompensatory
2 16
approaches.
Choices can be complex because of the number of alternatives or
the number of attributes that each alternative possesses.2 1 7 For most
insured Americans, selecting a health plan is not made particularly
difficult by the number of alternatives, because most consumers
purchase coverage through an employer that limits the choice set.
But the decision is made extremely complex by the number of attributes associated with each alternative. The difficulty that nonexpert
decision makers are likely to have in understanding and evaluating
information concerning these attributes further exacerbates the complexity that the sheer number of attributes at issue in health insurance
2 18
choices creates.
The number of attributes associated with managed care plans
likely causes consumers to simplify the decision task 219 by either (1)
selectively analyzing a limited number of important or highly salient
attributes in a compensatory, cost-benefit framework 220 or (2) adopting cognitively simpler, noncompensatory decision-making strategies. 22 1 Even those who are experts at comparing health insurance
plans appear prone to such simplification. In a survey of health insur215
See id. at 421, 422 & tbl.l, 423; see also Stanley F. Biggs et al., The Effects of Task Size
and Similarity on the Decision Behavior of Bank Loan Officers, 31 MGMT. Sc;. 970, 970 (1985)
(noting that bank loan officers adopt noncompensatory strategies as the number of loan
application attributes increases).
216 See, e.g., JAMES R. BErrMAN, AN INFoRMATIoN PROCESSING THEORY OF CONSUMER
CHOIcE 221 (1979); Malhotra, supra note 214, at 427; Wright, supra note 187, at 62.
217 See Bettman et al., supra note 186, at 189.
218 See Kahn & Baron, supra note 187, at 306 n.1 (noting that complexity increases not
only with the increase in the number of attributes or alternatives, but also with the difficulty of processing the relevant information). If the complexity of the problem exceeds
the cognitive capacity of the decision maker, the adoption of a decision strategy that requires less effort than the weighted-adding approach becomes a matter of necessity rather
than a matter of choice.
219
In a series of computer simulations, Payne, Bettman, and Johnson tried to evaluate
how close various low-effort decision-making approaches approximated the accuracy of a

weighted-adding approach. See PAYNE ET AL., supra note 187, at 123-44. Although the ex-

perimenters found that simpler approaches approximated the more cognitively difficult
weighted-adding method in some situations, those simpler approaches did not fare well as
the number of attributes per alternative in choice problem increased. See id. at 137.
220
See Bettman et al., supranote 186, at 199 (noting that increases in number of attributes increase consumer selectivity in processing).
221
Cf Susan Edgman-Levitan & Paul D. Cleary, What Infomation Do Consumers Want
and Need?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at 42, 53 ("It is not clear, however, how much information consumers want or can interpret.... The task of integrating and synthesizing...
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ance purchasers for large corporations, fifty percent said that considering all the relevant variables when making purchasing decisions was
difficult, and twelve percent reported that they made purchasing decisions based on only a single variable!2 2 2 Only twenty percent of the
survey respondents reported making cost-quality trade offs in a system223
atic way that might approach weighted-adding.
The problem of complexity is closely related to-and perhaps
even subsumes-the problem of time pressure. Research indicates
that when actors must make choices under time constraints, they are
more likely to adopt selective or noncompensatory decision-making
strategies, or both, which, of course, require less cognitive effort to
process.

224

In one set of experiments, researchers concluded that de-

cision makers responded to time pressure first by trying to work faster,
then by focusing on a more selective subset of relevant information,
and finally by switching from more complicated to simpler decisionmaking strategies. 225 While the choice among managed care plans is
not formally time constrained, the time-consuming nature of attempting to understand and digest the detailed information that competing
plans provide may cause consumers to react as if formal time limits
appeared inadequate for processing a given amount of information.
That is, they are likely to process information more selectively and to
adopt simpler, though less accurate, decision-making strategies in an
effort to reduce the time needed to complete the analysis.
b. Emotion-Laden Trade Offs
Decision theorists refer to choices as "emotion laden" when they
force actors to choose among conflicting values or goals. 22 6 For exam-

ple, a choice between an inexpensive car without airbags and antilock
brakes and an expensive car with these devices is emotion laden because it forces the consumer to choose between cost and safety. Because it is impossible to have both, this decision is likely to give rise to
negative emotions. A choice between a car with a sun roof and another with a stereo, in contrast, might not be emotion laden.
Although the trade off might be difficult to make, it is unlikely to
information across multiple health plans[ ] would be onerous, even for a sophisticated
health services researcher.").
222 SeeJudith H. Hibbard et al., Choosinga Health Plan:Do LargeEmployers Use the Data7,
HEALTH Asl., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 172, 177.
223 See id.
224 See PAYEw ET A., supra note 187, at 39; Bettman et al., supranote 186, at 200; Kahn
& Baron, supra note 187, at 326 (citing studies finding that people under stress tend to use
simpler decision rules and are more likely to exclude less important attributes from
consideration).
225 See PAYNE Er AL., supra note 187, at 166.
226 See Bettman et al., supra note 186, at 196.
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invoke a conflict of values. 2 27 When decisions are emotion laden, consumers have an incentive not only to maximize accuracy and to minimize cognitive effort, but also to avoid or to minimize the negative
228
emotional consequences of making the decision.
Research indicates that a primary way in which consumers attempt to avoid such negative affect is to adopt selective or noncompensatory decision-making strategies, which enable them to avoid the
explicit trade offs that a compensatory, nonselective approach requires. 229 Adopting a "choose-the-cheapest-car" strategy can help a
consumer to avoid the emotional consequences associated with determining whether to pay an additional $500 for a car with an airbag.
The desire to avoid explicit trade offs can be heightened when a
strong social norm militates against commodifying one or more of the
features at issue.23 0 For example, if individuals believe that sacrificing
environmental quality for money or comfort is wrong, they will be less
likely to use a compensatory strategy to determine whether to
purchase a car that is cheap and luxurious or one that is expensive
and uncomfortable but emits less carbon monoxide.
Against this backdrop, choices concerning health care are likely
to be particularly emotion laden for many consumers. Selecting
health care coverage often requires trading off cost against safety and
protection (i.e., the the extent of coverage) and cost against convenience (i.e., the quantity and location of participating physicians and
hospitals). The sense among consumers that good health for themselves and their family is not something that they should barter is
likely to exacerbate the negative affect associated with these trade offs.
Consequently, it is likely that consumers will tend toward selective and
non-compensatory decision-making strategies to minimize or to avoid
the emotional consequences of such choices.
c. Ease of ProcessingInformation
When actors face complex problems, their need to adopt
boundedly rational decision-making strategies depends in part on
whether the relevant information is presented in a way that lends itself
to compensatory and nonselective evaluation. In such situations, the
227 Cf Jane Beattie &Jonathan Baron, Investigating the Effect of Stimulus Range on Attribute Weight 17 J. EXPERimENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 571, 571

(1991) (observing that trading lives saved for dollars otherwise spent on highway maintenance may seem more difficult than trading a bigger apartment for a correspondingly
lower rent).
228 See Bettman et al., supra note 186, at 205-06.
229 See id.; cf. PAYNE Er AL., supra note 187, at 30 (noting that "compensatory rules
confront conflict, whereas noncompensatory rules

avoid

it").

230 See Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, ProductionTheory, and Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CGk. L. REv. 669, 692 (1979) (noting that individuals seek to withdraw "spheres
of activity from the realm of marginalism and calculation").
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choice of a decision-making approach might depend highly upon
2 31
which comparisons the presentation renders salient.
A simple experiment using consumer goods far less complex than
health care-canned dog food, facial tissues, and dishwashing liquid-nicely illustrates the impact that problem display can have on
choices. When experimenters posted signs in grocery stores listing
the unit price of each brand option for each of the three items, a
higher percentage of customers purchased the cheapest (per-unit)
brands than when no posted sign appeared and shoppers had to go to
more trouble to make the price comparison.2 32 When price comparisons were easy to make, many shoppers' decisions turned on price;
when price comparisons were difficult, more shoppers based their decisions on other product attributes-presumably ones that were relatively easier to compare. 23 3 In situations in which consumer choices
depend on information presentation, it follows that many (if not
most) consumers do not employ decision-making techniques that are
compensatory and that make use of all relevant information.
When consumers encounter information describing competing
MCOs, it is unlikely that the information presentation lends itself to
relatively easy compensatory analysis. No industry-recognized standard method of information presentation exists. Even when they attempt to present their employees with charts comparing competing
MCO packages, employers have difficulty depicting subtle variations
in benefit and service levels in a way that facilitates easy comparisons.
The area in which information comparisons are most likely to be tractable is price; that is, monthly payments, copayments, and deductibles
are probably the most readily comparable attributes for most health
care consumers. If the hypothesis that price attributes are easier to
compare than nonprice attributes is correct, then consumers are
likely to adopt noncompensatory choice strategies based on price, to
the exclusion of benefits and services.
C. Bounded Rationality and the Efficiency of Markets
The failure of health care consumers to optimize when they
choose among available MCO options greatly undermines the ability
of the unregulated market to provide the efficient level of medical
care. Boundedly rational consumer choice, like the inability of MCOs
to fully specify contractual obligations, can cause the free market to
provide less than the optimally efficient amount of care. If consumers
who make purchasing decisions fail to reward an MCO for providing
231

232

See PAY
Er A., supra note 187, at 50; Bettman et al., supranote 186, at 193.
SeeJ. Edward Russo, The Value of Unit Price lnformation, 14J. MARENG Rrs. 193,

196-97 (1977).
233

See id.
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marginally higher quality of care than its rivals, the MCO might lack a
market-driven incentive to expend resources to provide that higher
quality.
To understand the problem, consider the impact on an MCO's
market incentives if consumers use any of the variants of selective or
noncompensatory decision-making approaches described above. If
consumers adopt a strict lexicographic approach to selecting a health
plan, MCOs will have an incentive to be concerned with quality only
with regard to plan attributes that a significant number of consumers
rank as the most important. If coverage for chiropractic care, for example, were cheap to provide and highly desired by consumers, yet no
consumers ranked it as the most important attribute of a managed
care plan, the market would not punish MCOs that failed to provide
this coverage.
In fact, the opposite is likely to be true if we make one additional
assumption: that price attributes probably are very important to many
consumers. A body of empirical evidence establishing that consumers
234
are very price sensitive in health insurance purchasing decisions,
along with widespread anecdotal evidence that consumer choices
among competing health care plans turn largely on price 235 and that
2 36
plans rarely choose to compete on the basis of nonprice variables,
makes this assumption highly plausible.2 3 7 If an employer pays the
234
See, e.g., Etheredge et al., supra note 24, at 98 ("The evidence shows that individuals
tend to select lower-price plans from employers' multiple-choice offerings and that even
small premium differences can drive enrollment shifts among health plans.");Jensen et al.,
supra note 20, at 130 ("Workers have been shown to be highly price-sensitive in their decisions regarding plan choice. Where required contributions differ greatly across plans,
workers tend to choose lower-cost plans-that is, those that require them to contribute
less."); see alsoMichael Chernew & Dennis P. Scanlon, Health PlanReport Cards and Insurance
Choice, 35 INQuirY 9, 10 (1998) (concluding that "nearly all existing studies have found
'price' to have a statistically significant negative effect on the probability of enrolling in a
health plan").
235
See, e.g., Bailit, supra note 130, at 86 ("[P]urchasers and consumers seldom buy
because of quality of care. Instead, purchasing decisions are based on cost, network size,
and administrative convenience."); Hirshfeld & Thomason, supra note 23, at 32 ("During
recent years, increasing costs have made premium levels a very important factor in patient
selection of health plans."); Iglehart, supra note 192, at 7 ("Most [consumers] seem to base
their decisions on cost, regardless of the benefit package offered .... .").
236 See, e.g., HALL, supra note 39, at 252 ("Very little differentiation exists [among insurance offerings) in the particulars of coverage beyond how much the patient must pay out
of pocket."); Greaney, supra note 181, at 183 ("[T]hough there has been vigorous competition among plans based on price and nonprice variables (for example, choice of physician, style of care, and breadth of network), there is very little evidence of rivalry based on
outcomes or quality of care indicators."). But see Robert H. Miller, Competitionin the Health
System: Good News and Bad News, HJ.mTH Arr., Summer 1996, at 107, 117 (reporting that
"purchasers have begun to pay greater attention to quality of care").
237
When employers offer employees a choice of health plans and pay the full premium cost for their chosen plan, the price of the plan is far less likely to concern the end
consumers. An increasing number of employers that offer multiple plans, however, is
either paying only a fixed percentage of the premium cost or requiring that the employee
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full cost of an employee's health insurance or requires the same employee contribution regardless of which plan the employee selects, the
employee will, of course, have little incentive to consider price when
making the enrollment decision. Very few employees, however, find
themselves in this position. 23 8 For the vast majority, selecting a more
expensive plan from a set of employer-provided options means making a larger contribution to their coverage each month.2 3 9 Assuming
that price is the most important MCO attribute to a sizeable number
of consumers, MCOs that offered a desirable coverage and consequently, increased the price of their plan by even a small amount,
would find themselves at a competitive disadvantage in a world of lexicographic choice.
Consumers' use of EBA, or a similar decision-making strategy,
could create incentives for MCOs to provide an inefficiently low level
of coverage for two reasons. First, the EBA approach suggests that
MCOs would have an incentive to provide benefits that consumers
value so long as those benefits are among the most important or salient health plan attributes to many consumers. Nonetheless, MCOs
are likely to underprovide any benefits that are not among the most
important plan attributes, and are thus unlikely to be considered in
an EBA analysis, as long as many consumers consider price among the
2 40
most important attributes.
Second, even for benefits that are very important or highly salient
to consumers, MCOs would have an incentive to provide only the minimal benefit level necessary to prevent its plan from being eliminated
when consumers evaluate that attribute. For example, suppose that
many consumers rank mental health care benefits high on their list of
health plan attributes but believe that a plan's provision of such benefits is minimally satisfactory if it provides at least some coverage for
outpatient counseling services. Market incentives would cause MCOs
to provide only that minimal level of coverage, even if more expanded
coverage would be efficient. Consumers using EBA do not reward
pay the full marginal cost of plans that cost more than the basic offering. See, e.g., Hoy et
al., supra note 136, at 13-14 (describing Xerox's health benefits plan, which provides employees with an incentive to choose efficient HMOs by forcing them to pay any difference
in cost between the plan they choose and the "low-cost plan").
238 SeeJensen et al., supra note 20, at 131 (finding that only 7.7% of employers pay
employees' full premium cost and only 3.7% require the same employee contribution regardless of plan selection).
239 See id. at 130-31. The most common practice for employers is to provide the same
monthly contribution to an employee's health insurance regardless of plan selection,
meaning that the employee pays the full marginal cost of a more expensive plan; the second most common practice for employers is to provide the same percentage subsidy,
meaning that employees pay more when they select a more expensive plan, but less than
the full marginal cost of their decision. See id.
240 The reasoning I use here is the same as in the example of lexicographic choice.
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MCOs for providing more than the minimum satisfactory benefit
level, and MCOs can use their resources to provide other benefits
(one of which could be "low price") in an effort to keep consumers
from eliminating their plans from consideration because they fall
short in another area.
If consumers follow a modified weighted-adding approach rather
than EBA, MCOs would have a market incentive to provide the efficient level-rather than just the minimum acceptable level-of benefits that are important or salient enough to make their way into
consumers' analysis. Even under this approach, however, MCOs
would have an incentive to provide an inefficiently low level of benefits that are not highly salient to many consumers.
In a world in which consumers are relentless optimizers rather
than boundedly rational decision makers, the failure of buyers to reward with their patronage sellers that provide high quality service is
evidence that buyers do not value the marginal quality at its marginal
cost. In such a world, sellers must provide lower-quality, lower-price
services to compete for buyers in the market. In so doing, sellers also
provide the efficient level of quality. In the market for managed care,
however, the failure of buyers to select only the sellers of high-quality
service is not necessarily evidence of a lack of willingness to pay for
quality. Even customers who would be willing to pay the marginal cost
of higher-cost services if asked to evaluate individually the value of
each feature of an MCO's benefit package might not reward that high
quality when an MCO offers it as part of a large and complex bundle
of services.
D.

Mitigating the Bounded-Rationality Problem
1.

The Sophisticated-PurchaserConstraint

This is not the end of the story. As economists rightly point out,
observing that consumers as a class are not relentless, rational maximizers does not alone undermine the free market's claim to efficiency. Defenders of the rational-maximizer assumption respond to
the inevitable charge that the assumption is too optimistic to capture
the nuances of actual behavior with the claim that the market will
operate as if the assumption were true even when evidence demon24
strates that it is false. '
241

See, e.g., GEORGEJ. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 6 (3d ed. 1966). Stigler suggests:
When we assume that consumers, acting with mathematical consistency, maximize utility,... it is not proper to complain that men are much
more complicated and diverse than that. So they are, but if this assumption
yields a theory of behavior which agrees tolerably well with the facts, it must
be used until a better theory comes along.
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Demonstrating that if even a sizable minority of consumers are
rational maximizers with a sophisticated understanding of their
purchase options, market competition will cause all sellers to behave
as if every consumer is an informed, rational maximizer may substantiate this claim. 242 To compete for the business of sophisticated, opti-

mizing consumers, sellers will have to offer the combination of price
and service that these consumers prefer. MCOs generally do not negotiate benefits packages with individual consumers-at least not in
the group insurance market; instead MCOs offer the same package at
the same price to all members of a group. A desire to compete for the
business of sophisticated consumers thus requires MCOs to offer the
same benefits package to all consumers. Under this set of assumptions, the fact that some or even many consumers are not rational
maximizers should not affect the product that MCOs offer.
2.

Adverse Selection

The problem with the sophisticated-purchaser claim lies in its reliance on the assumption that the minority of sophisticated consumers
are as desirable to sellers as the boundedly rational majority or, more
specifically, that an MCO has the same incentive to seek the business
of the sophisticated consumer as it has to seek the business of the
unsophisticated consumer. In the market for managed care, this assumption is likely to be false. Consumers who search the fine print of
MCO statements of benefits and devote significant amounts of time to
a close and careful comparison of competing plans are likely to share,
on average, two characteristics that differentiate them from the
broader pool of managed care consumers. First, they are likely to be
sicker than the average consumer, or more likely than the average
consumer to become sick. Second, they are therefore more likely
than the average consumer to be willing to pay the marginal cost of
higher-quality care.
The risk of adverse selection is a common problem in insurance
markets.

243

The insurer must determine the actuarially sound price of

insurance, which depends on the risk that the insured will suffer a
covered event and the likely severity of that event. But the consumer
often possesses private information about the level of risk he poses.
Insurance companies must always fear that if they determine a price
for insurance based on the risk characteristics of a group, the higher242

See, e.g., Steven Salop &Joseph Stiglitz, Bargainsand Ripoffs: A Model of Monopolisti-

cally Competitive PriceDispersion, 44 REv. EcoN. STUD. 493, 494, 501 (1977).
243 Adverse selection characterizes the problem that the highest-risk people create in a
given pool choosing to purchase insurance; their presence leads to higher claims activity
than the pool, as a whole and on average, would produce. See ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I.

WIDISS, INsuRANcE LAW 14-15 (1988) (describing generally the concept of adverse selection

in insurance).
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risk individuals in the group will purchase coverage while the lower244
risk members of the group will not.

In theory, the adverse selection problem can lead to extreme consequences. If only consumers who face a higher-than-average risk of
loss purchase insurance, the cost of providing that insurance will increase, forcing insurers to increase premiums to cover these costs.
This price increase, in turn, could cause the healthiest consumers in
the market to drop out, raising average costs even higher. The logical
endpoint of what is commonly called the insurance "death spiral" is
the exit from the insurance market of all but the highest-risk consumers. For all other consumers, the ever-increasing price of insurance
will exceed their probable health care costs.
The problem of adverse selection is particularly troubling in the
health insurance market because consumers are more likely to have
private information about their risk level-i.e., their family history or
diet-than consumers in, for example, the market for fire insurance.
The notoriously high cost of health care insurance in the individual
market illustrates the problem. Individuals at low risk of suffering
large medical costs forgo coverage to avoid paying premiums set at the
average cost of insuring individual insurance purchasers. This absence by relatively healthy consumers drives up the average cost of
coverage and, in turn, causes more consumers of below-average risk to
exit the market.
The provision of medical insurance as a fringe benefit of employment, common since World War II, has limited this problem somewhat in the group insurance market. Even young, healthy individuals
who work for employers that provide health care insurance rarely opt
out of coverage, keeping the average health of managed care consum2 45
ers relatively constant and preventing the onset of the death spiral.
But the problem remains, albeit in a less severe form, when different
MCOs offer a group of employees different benefits packages. Sicker
consumers are likely to differentially prefer more substantial and
higher-priced benefits packages, driving prices for the more substantial packages even higher, and thereby driving an ever larger number
2
of healthy customers away from the plan.

46

244
See, e.g., Esther B. Fein, Calling Infertility a Disease, Couples Battle with Insurers, N.Y.
TiNfs, Feb. 22, 1998, at Al (reporting that one large insurance company had discontinued
benefits for infertility because infertile women were disproportionately choosing the company's plan, thereby driving up costs).
245
A rational basis exists for the tax breaks provided only for employer-sponsored
health insurance-a tax policy that policy analysts routinely criticize. See, e.g., Carrie J.
Gavora, Congresss Wrong Prescription for the HMO Headache, HERrrAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, July 21, 1998, at 1.
246
See, e.g., Hoy et al., supra note 136, at 25-26 (claiming that Wisconsin's Employee
Trust Fund moved to offering its state employee members standardized benefits packages
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The adverse-selection problem is likely to emerge in a slightly different guise within the context of consumers' approaches to selecting
among managed care plans. Consider a simple classification of all
managed care consumers into two categories: (1) "healthy" consumers, who reasonably believe that their chances of suffering expensive
illnesses are below average and (2) "unhealthy" consumers, who reasonably believe that their chances of suffering the same illnesses are
higher than average. Unhealthy consumers have a higher than average incentive to purchase health insurance; they also have a stronger
incentive to incur the search and analysis costs involved in making the
optimal choice among competing managed care plans. Viewed from
the opposite perspective, healthy consumers have a weaker incentive
to bear the costs of studying the full array of benefits that MCOs offer
because they have a lower probability of finding themselves in a situation in which they would need these benefits. Similar to the adverse
selection problem, the least-healthy purchasers of managed care are
most likely to spend the time and effort to ensure that their purchase
2 47
decisions maximize their utility.

As a result, MCOs lack the incentive that sellers usually have to
compete for the business of the more sophisticated, thorough consumers most likely to equate the marginal cost of coverage with its
marginal benefit. MCOs generally cannot charge their most unhealthy consumers the full marginal cost of their coverage even when,
as is not always the case, MCOs can charge them a somewhat higher
price. Consequently, all other things being equal, MCOs would prefer
to enroll consumers who are less thoroughly informed about the full
range of benefits offered. This circumstance would lead them to pursue the strategy they would follow if all consumers were boundedly
rational, rather than the strategy that they would follow if all consumers were ruthless optimizers of utility.
IV
AVENUES OF CoLLECTivE ACTION

When an MCO cannot credibly commit to providing certain benefits prior to a consumer's decision to enroll, it will have an incentive
to provide less extensive or lower-quality care than is efficient unless
the reputational costs it will suffer outweigh the savings it can reap by
following such a strategy. In short, even if consumers would both prefrom competing MCOs to avoid adverse selection against plans offering better benefits
packages).
247 One focus-group study of what information health care consumers wanted from
managed care plans revealed that the chronically ill and retired participants were more
concerned about access to information concerning benefits packages than other participants. See Edgman-Levitan & Cleary, supra note 221, at 49.
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fer and be willing to pay higher monthly premiums for the promise of
more extensive or higher-quality service if they become ill, the market
will not respond to these preferences because individual consumers
lack the necessary information to back them up through their
purchasing decisions. Furthermore, if those consumers whom MCOs
desire are boundedly rational decision makers, attuned to price but
not to benefit subtleties, MCOs will have a market incentive to provide
an inefficiently low level of all benefits-even those they can commit
to provide prior to contracting. For these two reasons, an unregulated market for managed care is likely to provide less than the efficient amount of care.
To solve, or more likely reduce, the problem of MCOs inefficiently underproviding services, consumers must take collective action to improve the collection and processing of information. There
are two potentially fruitful avenues by which they may accomplish this
goal. First, consumers can use government to mandate benefits that
consumers with complete information and unbounded rationality
would purchase in a perfect market. Second, consumers can use sophisticated agents-be they government entities or private organizations-to provide more complete and digestible information about
benefits options, thereby supplying MCOs with an incentive to offer
the efficient balance of price and service.
Students of law and economics will recognize that these approaches reflect the common dichotomy of legal solutions to market
imperfections: the former approach requires that government act to
mimic efficient market outcomes, while the latter approach requires
government (or private entities) to facilitate efficient private ordering. 248 This Part considers each possibility's potential.
A.

Mimicking the Market with Mandated Benefits

As highlighted above, one way to reduce the inefficient underprovision of managed care is for government to act on behalf of consumers collectively, identifying particular benefits or types of care that
MCOs are likely to underprovide, relative to their efficient level, and
then mandating their provision. This approach has two obvious drawbacks: (1) the risk of error in the government's analysis is high, and
(2) the solution is necessarily a second-best one, even if the analysis is
error free.
248
See, e.g., MARK KELuiAN, A GuIDE TO CRIcAL LEGAL STUDIES 123-24 (1987) (identifying market mimicking and market facilitation as the twin policy prescriptions of law and
economics, but noting that no consensus exists within the law and economics community
as to which approach is preferred); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Efficiency and
Equity: What Can Be Gained by Combining Coase and Rawls?, 73 WASH. L. Rxv. 329, 336-37
(1998) (summarizing the traditional law-and-economics dichotomy).
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With respect to the first point, benefits mandates in the pursuit of
the efficient allocation of resources require the government to engage
in the tricky business of identifying those services that are not provided by the market, but for which consumers would be willing to pay
the marginal cost.2 49 Objective evidence is notoriously difficult to col-

lect on these types of questions. Government actors could identify
managed care benefits that an unregulated market might underprovide, such as (1) experience or credence goods that MCOs cannot
realistically promise by contract prior to consumer selection of an
MCO, or (2) benefits of relatively low importance or salience to
boundedly rational consumers that they are likely to ignore when
making purchasing decisions. But the mere fact that a benefit fits
either description does not prove that the unregulated market provides an inefficiently low amount of the benefit. On any given issue of
quality, consumers might well prefer to pay less and consequently receive less. 250 Managed care arose precisely because of the widespread
belief that fee-for-service medicine was providing gold-plated service
to a society that did not wish to pay its marginal cost.2 51 Government
mandates of all benefits that the market might underprovide would
trade the problem of inefficient underprovision of care with the old
problem of its inefficient overprovision.
Second, even when the government correctly identifies high-cost
services for which most consumers would be willing to pay the cost of
insurance, mandated benefits can never result in the provision of the
optimally efficient level of medical care. By limiting choice, mandates
violate the principle of welfare economics that more options can lead
to increased utility for a group of individuals with heterogeneous preferences. 25 2 Consider the following hypothetical example: eighty percent of consumers would be willing to pay the marginal cost of
providing autologous bone marrow transplants for those who might
benefit from them or of providing longer postpartum hospital stays,
while twenty percent of consumers would prefer not to pay for these
249
See Epstein, Why, supranote 39, at 312 (noting that the problem of imperfect information which plagues the private market for health care will also plague public actors); cf.
Fred S. McChesney, Economics, Law, and Science in the CorporateFwd: A Critique of Eisenberg,

89 COLUM. L. REv. 1530, 1548 (1989) (noting, in the corporate law context, that lawyers

must compare the disadvantages of "real-world markets" with the disadvantages of "realworld government" action rather than with an unrealistic utopian view thereof).
250
Proving the inefficiently low amount of a consumer good provided in the real
world is nearly impossible because tastes are impossible to measure. Cf Thomas Russell &
Richard Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi Rationality in Competitive Markets, 75 AM. EcoN. REv.
1071, 1073 (1985) ("[I]t is virtually impossible to classify an act as nonrational in practice
because of the difficulty in controlling for differences in tastes... or in information ... ").
251
See supra Part IA
252
See Bellante & Porter, supra note 120, at 665 (noting that the "potential for...
social welfare optimization is greatest when the range of options open to workers and the
flexibility of employers to adjust is greatest").
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benefits. In these scenarios, universally mandating the benefits would
be more efficient than permitting the market to underprovide them,
but mandates would be inefficient for fully twenty percent of consumers. In a system of mandated benefits, one size must fit all. 2 53 The

twenty percent who would not prefer the mandates are faced with two
consumption choices, both of which are inefficient. They can overconsume the benefit in question, or they can opt out of the health
2
insurance system entirely.

54

The latter possibility, which illustrates the counterintuitive point
that the costs of mandated benefits will not necessarily be borne in the
form of overconsumption of health care, is particularly noteworthy.
Benefits mandates will cause the cost of health care coverage to increase. This increase will inevitably cause some consumers who would
prefer low-cost, low-quality care over the gold-plated, mandated version, to drop out of the private insurance system entirely, 255 either
because their employer decides not to provide health insurance or
256
they decide not to accept the insurance their employer does offer.

This effect has the consequence of either burdening the public health
care safety net or causing the consumers who opt out to underconsume medical care, relative to a world in which they could purchase
any level of insurance. 257 These are the precise problems that mandates seek to solve. Opponents of mandated benefits are quick to

253

Cf. Colantoni et al., supra note 140, at 611 ("The requirement that all cars be

equipped with seatbelts entails the nonavailability of cars without seatbelts, and those consumers for whom the optimal choice would not include seatbelts are penalized.").
254 See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that mandated benefits will force marginal consumers out of the managed care system, resulting in
less care for this group rather than more).
255 Although the rate of increase in health insurance costs has diminished in the
1990s, benefits mandates undoubtedly make current costs higher than they otherwise
would be. This could explain, at least in part, the fact that the percentage of Americans
with private insurance is decreasing despite high rates of employment. See U.S. GEN. AcCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE: COSTS INCREASE AND FAMILY
COVERAGE DECREASES (1997) (providing statistics on decreasing rates of private insurance);

see also Barbara Markham Smith, Trends in Health Care Coverage and Financing and Their
Implicationsfor Policy, 337 Nav ENG.J. MED. 1000, 1000 (1997) (noting the irony of decreasing rates of employer-provided insurance in a healthy economy of increasing
employment).
256 Between 1987 and 1996, the percentage of employees who accepted employmentbased health insurance decreased. See Cooper & Schone, supranote 138, at 144. In other
words, employees eligible for coverage are choosing to go without, presumably because
they have decided that coverage is not worth the employee contribution to the premium
which the insurance policy requires.
257 See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan & ChristopherJ. Conover, Effects of State Reforms on Health
InsuranceCoverage of Adults, 35 INQUIRY 280, 288 (1998) (reporting the results of a national
study showing that the addition of each mandated benefit decreases the likelihood of an
individual having private health insurance by .004%).
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point out the irony in the fact that legislation designed to guarantee
2
more care can actually result in less care for some.

58

To concede that mandated benefits are not a panacea for failures
of the private health insurance market, however, is merely to recognize that mandated benefits are a second-best solution to the inefficiency of the unregulated market. This concession is far from fatal to
the argument for mandates. As long as the efficiency gains of guaranteeing a majority of consumers an efficient level of care exceed the
attendant costs of forcing a minority of consumers to overconsume or
underconsume health care, government mandates can be efficiencyenhancing overall. The critical question from a policy perspective is
not whether mandated benefits can have some net positive benefitthey can under the plausible assumptions made in this Article-but
whether other forms of collective action are likely to be even more
desirable.
B. Facilitating Efficient Private Ordering
Of course, the second-best solution of government mandates
could be avoided altogether if consumers had accurate information
about MCO features ex ante and the ability to decide optimally
among their choices, considering all features of each offering. Armed
with this information, market incentives would force MCOs to provide
the benefits for which consumers were willing to pay and would prevent MCOs from providing benefits that consumers did not value at
their marginal cost. The one-size-fits-all problem of government mandates would be avoided, because different MCOs could offer different
benefits packages, allowing consumers with varying preferences to
gravitate to the plans that provided the balance of cost and service
that they preferred (as long as healthy and unhealthy consumers did
not have divergent preferences).
An obvious way to encourage such an ideal, market-driven system
would be for government to provide (or mandate that MCOs disclose)
more detailed information to consumers about the level of service and
range of benefits that MCOs provide. Many commentators favor this
258
See, e.g.,JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN HEALTH
INsURANCE 20 (National Ctr. for Policy Analysis Policy Report No. 134, 1988) (arguing that
state regulation of health insurance prices millions out of the health insurance market in
the United States); JOHN C. GOODMAN & GERALD L. MUSGRAVE, PATIENT PowER 47 (1992)

(asserting that state health-benefits mandates price 25% of the uninsured population out
of the market for health insurance); Beth Mandel Rosenthal, Note, Drive-ThroughDeliveries,
and the Newborns' and Mothers'HealthProtectionAct of 1996,28 RUTGERS LJ. 753, 773 (1997)

("[F]ederal meddling in the private health care market will ultimately limit access to affordable, quality care."). This problem is particularly salient in an era in which the American economy is strong, but the number of Americans without health insurance continues
to increase-to more than 43 million, by recent estimates. See Robert Pear, Americans Lacking InsurancePut at 16 Percent, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 26, 1998, at Al.
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approach, 259 and some states have enacted legislation designed to implement it 2 60 But because managed care contracts cannot be fully
specified, and because consumers are unlikely to maximize their utility when choosing between complicated options with multiple attributes, merely providing more detailed information to consumers is
261
unlikely to lead to the efficient provision of health care coverage.
The limited available evidence suggests that consumers make surprisingly little use of the currently available information concerning quality of health care.2 62 For a market-facilitating approach to have any

hope of leading to an efficient allocation of resources to health care,
information must be organized in a way that permits consumers to
behave as if they could make optimal cost-benefit trade offs among
fully specified managed care contracts.
In theory, there are two ways the market might accomplish this.
Under what can be called the ex post approach, the MCO may provide consumers with information about its reputation for quality,
which could then enable those consumers to select a preferred costquality balance. Under what can be called the ex ante approach, the
MCO might contract to follow a predetermined set of medical practice guidelines when providing care, thus binding itself to a level of
quality without having to fully specify a precise list of coverages or
treatments it will offer. Both approaches have significant shortcom259 See, e.g., ZELMAN & BERENSON, supranote 14, at 14-15 (advocating government policies that encourage competition and ensure that those making the purchasing decisions
have the necessary information to facilitate that competition); id. at 165-66 (arguing for
disclosure of information about plans and delivery systems that is essential to consumer
protection); Lynn Etheredge, PromarketRegulation:An SEC-FASB Model HEALTH Arr., Nov.Dec. 1997, at 22, 22-24 (proposing mandated information disclosure similar to what the
Securities and Exchange Commission requires of publicly traded corporations); Greely,
supra note 19, at 81-82 (supporting legislation mandating disclosure, but noting that detailed disclosures may have little value); John K. Iglehart, State Regulation of Managed Care:
NAIC PresidentJosephine Musser, HEA.T Ar., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 36, 36 (interviewing the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners president, who notes that her organization's "primary concern is one of information disclosure for consumers").
260 For example, New York has enacted a complex disclosure law that requires managed care plans to inform prospective customers of, among other things, the drugs that are
included in and excluded from the plan's formulary, the utilization review policies for
specific diseases and treatments, performance measures of the plan's grievance procedures, and rules concerning how the plan will evaluate requests for experimental and investigational treatments. See N.Y. INs. LAw § 3217 (McKinney, WESTLAW through L. 1999,
chs. 5-24, 26-30, 32-39, 41-49, 56-59, and 61-63); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 11,
§ 52.65 (WESTLAW through May 31, 1999) (providing an example); FA~uaES USA
FOUND., supra note 1, at 25.
261
Apparently recognizing the latter problem, one notable pair of proponents of increased disclosure as an alternative to government mandates concedes that "[s]ome standardization of benefits, so that consumers can more easily compare plan offerings, would
also be valuable." ZELMuA & BERENSON, supra note 14, at 199.
262 See, e.g., Bailit, supra note 130, at 87 (citing an unpublished Pennsylvania study
showing that cardiac patients rarely consulted available data on bypass mortality rates
before undergoing bypass surgery).
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ings that render them inferior to the market-mimicking approach of
mandated benefits, at least in the current environment.
1. EnhancingReputationalEffects
The most likely way to reduce the difficulty and cost to individual
consumers of information collection and processing would be to increase the reputational effect of the benefits packages MCOs actually
offer. Easy consumer access to information about an MCO's reputation that accurately reflects the quality level of offered benefits packages could serve as an ex post check on an MCO's ex ante incentive to
offer an inefficiently low level of care. The evolving movement to develop "report cards" for managed care provides a notion of how this
might work.
To date, efforts to develop report cards as a means of informing
consumers' managed care purchasing decisions have primarily focused on measuring the quality of care MCOs provide.2 63 This is usually accomplished by comparing the incidence of procedures
provided by an MCO, such as coronary artery bypass operations per
member or childhood immunizations per member, or by comparing
patient's health outcomes, rather than by analyzing the range and extent of benefits that competing plans offer. 2

4

A number of imple-

mentation problems have stalled these efforts.
First, comparative quality ratings require that MCOs share proprietary health care records and report this information in a uniform
way. Not surprisingly, MCOs are often reticent to share the necessary
information with rivals or the public, and even when they are willing
to do so, it is difficult for them to reach an agreement on standards
for the type of information reported and the form in which it is
2 65
reported.
See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
The most notable attempt to devise a type of quality report card is the Health Plan
Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), which the independent National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) developed. The goal of the HEDIS is to provide comparative statistics on how well MCOs provide care along a number of different dimensions.
See generallyAlain C. Enthoven & Carol B. Vorhaus, A Vision of Quality in Health CareDelivery,
HEALTH Ari., May-June 1997, at 44, 49-50 (describing HEDIS and other attempts to compare quality of care).
265
Paul Starr has analyzed in detail the slow development in the health care industry
of the type of computer systems that would allow for the efficient compilation of outcomes
data. See Paul Starr, Smart Technology, Stunted Policy: Developing Health Information Networks,
HEALTH Arr., May-June 1997, at 91. When health plans report information that can be used
to measure quality, they have an obvious incentive to manipulate the data to their advantage. As one author explains, "plans will turn themselves inside out to be able to report
'good' HEDIS data." Alice G. Gosfield, Wo Is Holding Wom Accountable for Quality,
HEALTH Arr., May-June 1997, at 26, 36. The federal government is attempting to ameliorate this problem by requiring MCOs that provide service to Medicare patients to submit
HEDIS data. See John K. Iglehart, Changing with the Times: The Vzews of Bruce C. Vladeck,
263
264
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Second, outcome comparisons require that MCOs adjust data for
differences in the ex ante condition of patients across MCOs. Because
a multitude of factors concerning a patient's initial conditions, many
of which are unknown, influence how she will respond to treatment,
adequate adjustment methods have proven elusive.2 66 Without adequate risk adjustment, report cards not only might be misleading, but
they might also discourage providers from treating the more severely
267
ill patients in any given illness category.
Third, the quality comparisons that have emerged are often so
complicated for consumers to understand and evaluate that they fail
to solve the bounded-rationality problem. As one analyst recently described the problem, "[w] e could . . .bury consumers in a pile of
descriptive information about health plans, their provider networks,
and their performance[,] .

.

. [but] [elven if consumers were willing

to wade through the pile,... the vast majority would find the information ambiguous at best." 268 In recent years, a group of large employers and health care providers has developed a standardized data
collection system, known as the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS), in an effort to provide health care consumers
with a standardized set of quality measures by which they can compare
providers. 269 Currently, HEDIS tracks fourteen measures of clinical
quality, from the prevalence of colorectal cancer screening to the
number of flu shots given to high-risk adults. 270 It would seem unlikely, however, that the average consumer could translate an MCO's
performance on such measures into an informed opinion about the
2 71
MCO's quality of care, even if she could understand the data.
HEAL.TH A.,May-June 1997, at 58, 60 (interviewing the administrator of the federal

Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA)).
266
See, e.g., Enthoven & Vorhaus, supranote 264, at 45 (noting that the ability to compare quality across MCOs "is seriously impaired by the regrettable absence of broadly
based, valid, reliable, and risk-adjusted outcomes data"); Newhouse, supra note 175, at 123
(concluding that "there is almost universal agreement that we do not know how to do [risk
adjustment] well").
267 For example, after Pennsylvania began to issue report cards on the performance of
coronary artery bypass grafts by hospitals and individual surgeons, cardiac surgeons reported they were less likely to operate on severely ill patients for fear that doing so might
harm their performance rating. See Arnold M. Epstein, Rolling Down the Runway: The Challenges Ahead for Quality Report Cards, 279 JAMA 1691, 1694 (1998).
268 Moran, supra note 45, at 20.
269
See generally Chemew & Scanlon, supra note 234, at 9-10 (evaluating the impact of
report cards such as HEDIS); Enthoven & Vorhaus, supra note 264, at 49-50 (describing
HEDIS and other attempts to compare quality of care); Epstein, supra note 267, at 1691-92
(documenting the expansions to the indicators used in HEDIS).
270
See Epstein, supra note 267, at 1692 & tbl.1.
271
See id. at 1696 (noting that detailed comparison data can confuse patients and concluding that "we need to find better ways to use quality reporting to empower purchasers
and improve quality of care").
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A recent survey of some of the most sophisticated consumershealth insurance purchasing agents for thirty-three large corporations-revealed that only about half of them used HEDIS data when
choosing from among competing health plans. 2 72 Given this woefully

low number, it is hardly surprising to learn, as more than one recent
study has reported, that most consumers who have comparative plan
performance information do not use that information in making their
enrollment decisions, although most say that plan quality is very im273
portant to them.

At least the first two of the aforementioned problems could be
largely avoided if MCO report cards measured the range of benefits
the MCO provides rather than the quality of care it delivers. 274 Public
or private intermediaries between health plans and consumers could
compare benefits packages offered by competing MCOs and provide
each with a single "grade," or perhaps several grades. In theory, this
grading could effectively condense complicated information in a way
that even boundedly rational consumers could digest and balance
against salient plan attributes such as price and physician availability.
Experimental findings support the prediction that consumers would
welcome such predigested information. These findings indicate that
even when actors use simple, noncompensatory decision-making approaches, they are likely to favor the use of compensatory approaches,
which presumably underlie report cards, when an agent is making the
same decision for them.275

Benefits report cards would be superior to benefits mandates in
an important respect: unlike mandates, the report card approach
would allow MCOs to offer various combinations of price and benefits
that would appeal to different consumers. Two drawbacks, however,
suggest that report cards are not a viable alternative to benefits mandates. The first and more pedestrian problem is that private entities
have yet to provide consumers with report cards measuring MCO benefits packages, rendering report cards an insufficient alternative to
mandates at the present time. Report cards could become more prey272 See Hibbard et al., supra note 222, at 174 & exhibit 1. The health-insurance
purchasing agents who were surveyed were only half as likely to use hospital outcomes data
than HEDIS data. See id. at 175 & exhibit 2.
273 See Chernew & Scanlon, supra note 234, at 19 (finding that "employees do not

appear to respond strongly to plan performance measures"); see also S. Robinson & M.
Brodie, Understandingthe Quality Challengefor Health Consumers: The KaiserAHCPR Survey, 23
J. QuA=nr IMPROVEMENT 239 (1997) (finding that only 34% of consumers with comparative
plan performance information reported using it in making plan enrollment decisions).
274 This assertion does not mean to suggest that reliable comparisons of the quality of
care MCOs provide would not significantly enhance the ability of consumers to demand an
efficient level of health care from the market.
275 See Kahn & Baron, supra note 187, at 318-22 (reporting experimental data on the
role of compensatory rules in a rational actor's decision-making process).
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alent, however, as the market for managed care matures, or alternatively, if the government produced the report cards. 276 For example,
Vermont state government has pledged to issue report cards on managed care plans beginning in 1999, although its approach, which will
rate plans on their compliance with state regulations, is offered as a
2 77
complement to, rather than as a substitute for, mandates.
The second and more significant problem is that the extent to
which consumers would find ratings of benefits packages, even in a
condensed report-card format, salient enough to factor into purchasing decisions is unclear. It is highly probable that sicker consumers
would be systematically more likely than healthier consumers to factor
benefits ratings into their purchasing decisions, thereby creating a
perverse incentive for MCOs to attempt to earn bad grades. In this
case, report cards might mitigate against the problem of consumers'
bounded rationality to some extent, but they would be unlikely to stop
MCOs from offering an inefficiently narrow range of benefits.
2.

CreatingLess Complex Managed Care Contracts

If report cards are viewed as efforts to motivate MCOs to provide
an efficient level of care through ex post evaluation, the concept of
contracting into medical practice guidelines attempts to constrain
MCOs ex ante to provide the efficient level of care. Rather than
threatening to punish MCOs reputationally for providing an inefficiently low level of care after the fact, this approach attempts to simplify the amount and complexity of information consumers must
assimilate in order to contract with MCOs for the efficient level of
care before they require health care services.
Recognizing the impossibility of specifying all the contractual obligations of an MCO ex ante and the difficulty consumers have in evaluating a plethora of benefits, Clark Havighurst suggests that
consumers should enter into simpler contracts with MCOs that merely
specify a general level of care.2 78 Consumers who prefer "Cadillac"quality care and are willing to pay for it may purchase high-benefit,
high-quality plans; those who prefer to pay a lower price and receive
"Chevrolet"-quality care-a group Havighurst predicts is the majority-can contract for a level of care at which they acknowledge that
the MCO may not take every scientifically possible step to fight all
illnesses that could develop. 279 But how does an MCO fully specify the
276 Alternatively, the government could promulgate data-reporting requirements for
all MCOs, which would hopefully make the production of report cards easier and more
cost effective for private entities.
277 See Pfeiffer, supra note 4, at 1.
278 See HAVIGHURST, supra note 46, at 162. Havighurst also provided models of what
these contract clauses might look like. See id. at 187-93.
279
See id. at 104.
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benefits provided in a Chevrolet-quality plan? Without this specification, MCOs will have the incentive to charge a Chevrolet premium,
but provide consumers with a 'Yugo" level of treatment. 280 Without
specific quality-of-care guarantees, it would be exceedingly difficult for
a Chevrolet consumer to prove that an MCO that refuses to provide a
desired service or treatment has breached its contract. The MCO
would certainly argue that the consumer knew she was only purchasing a cost-effective level of care and that the desired benefit is not cost
effective.
Havighurst proposes that the specificity problem be solved by the
MCO pledging to provide care in accordance with a set of clinical
practice guidelines created by a third party. 28 1 The third party-a

government entity or consumer organization-could design various
practice guidelines for physicians who desire to treat each potential
condition either (1) as aggressively as possible or (2) in accordance
with various levels of cost-quality trade offs. By contracting to follow
one set of guidelines, the MCO could effectively fully specify its obligations ex ante. 28 2 Mark Hall and Gerard Anderson have offered a simi-

lar recommendation. 28 3 They suggest that MCOs describe the level of
medical effectiveness that they promise to supply to a consumer in the
same terms used by medical researchers who report on the effectiveness of treatments, thus making the promise to provide a certain level
28 4
of medically effective treatment enforceable.
These proposals are commendable for several reasons. By requiring MCOs to commit to following a complex set of practice guidelines
or specific research findings prior to consumers' enrollment, the approach would counteract the incentives for MCOs to provide a low
level of care created by obligationally incomplete contracts. By collapsing a multitude of benefits and services into a single package that
can be identified as, for example, "high-level benefits," "medium-level
benefits," or "low-level benefits," this approach could both reduce the
complexity of the decision consumers face and mitigate the problem
of boundedly rational choice. If MCOs offer a potentially different
benefit level for chiropractic care, dental care, mental health care, or
maternity care, for example, most consumers likely will not find any
individual type of benefit salient enough to play a role in their choice
process. In contrast, if all of these benefits are grouped, consumers
might find it easier to adopt a compensatory decision-making approach, trading off the value of high-level benefits against other sali280
281

282

See supra Part II.
See HAvWGHURST, supra note 46, at 227-29; Havighurst, supra note 39, at 1795-98.
See HAVIGHURSr, supra note 46, at 230.

283 See Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637 (1992).
284 See id. at 1686-87, 1691-94.
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ent product attributes, such as price or the participation of a favorite
physician.
That said, this approach does have serious drawbacks. First,
whether it would ever be possible, in practice, to develop a set of practice guidelines detailed enough so that an MCO could even come
close to fully specifying its contractual obligations by pledging to follow those guidelines is unclear. According to one team of experts, a
set of guidelines that would provide a treatment protocol for every
disease, while taking account of even a modest array of clinical differences, complications, and combinations of conditions, would require
28 5
ten billion entries.
Second, consumer choice would only be simplified if a third
party, either private or governmental, rated the set of practice guidelines an MCO pledged to follow as Cadillac or Chevrolet quality. The
fewer the number of categories or levels that the rating sources recognized, the less likely that plans would provide the efficient level of all
types of benefits. For example, if a set of guidelines could achieve a
Cadillac rating by providing a certain level of mental health benefits,
MCOs would have an incentive to contract for guidelines that specified just that amount of coverage and no more, even if many consumers would value expanded coverage. This would allow a plan to
maximize its quality ranking (in this example, its Cadillac rating),
while minimizing its price. In other words, health plans would tend to
follow practice guidelines that required the lowest level of benefits
within each quality classification. The more categories of quality that
a rating system recognized, the less of a problem it would be if health
plans gravitated to the bottom of each category. Unfortunately, the
more categories that are recognized, the less the Havighurst approach
would mitigate the bounded-rationality problem that the complexity
of health care choices causes.
Finally, neither the Havighurst nor the Hall-Anderson approach
would solve the adverse-selection problem that creates an incentive
for MCOs to offer an inefficiently low quality of care. Plans that promised to follow Cadillac-level practice guidelines would likely find themselves with patients who are sicker than average, forcing those MCOs
to raise their prices, consequently causing their healthier patients to
choose Chevrolet-quality plans, and so on.28 6 Cadillac plans could

well enter into death spirals that leave only Chevrolet plans viable in
the market. If only Chevrolet options were available, or if Cadillac
285
See Robert W. Dubois & Robert H. Brook, Assessing ClinicalDecision Making: Is the
Ideal System Feasible, 25 INQUIRY 59, 63 (1988).
286
Cf HALL, supra note 39, at 52-53 (pointing out the same destabilization effect of
offering medical savings accounts in combination with catastrophic insurance in a market
in which comprehensive coverage is also offered).
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options were available but at a price that only the wealthiest could
afford, consumers would find themselves in much the same situation
that they are in today: facing a market that offers a single level of
benefits likely to be inefficiently low in many areas. This fear is not
entirely theoretical. Several large insurance pools have had trouble
maintaining a range of high-quality insurance options for members.
For example, insurers in the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program, which covers federal employees, found that offering "high option" and "low option" versions of their plans resulted in extreme
adverse selection against the "high option" versions, and a number of
insurers left the program altogether after attracting too high a per7
centage of unattractive risks.28

V
GovERNMENT INSTTUTIONS AS SOURCES OF
MANDATED BENEFITS

By mandating that MCOs provide certain coverages and treatments as part of their benefits packages, government can potentially
improve, in terms of efficiency, the allocation of resources to the provision of health care. At the present time, this market-mimicking approach offers more promise than competing market-facilitating
approaches. This Part considers which government institutions-judicial, legislative, or administrative-are best suited to the task of mandating benefits.

When one fears that benefit levels will be inefficiently low because MCOs are unable to credibly commit to providing high benefit
levels prior to contracting with consumers, courts, with their ex post
perspective, are the only institution able to enforce market-mimicking
mandates. But because courts must view cost-quality decisions in the
context of a single patient who has already become ill, they are poorly
positioned to evaluate those instances when high benefit levels would
be efficient, and when they would be inefficient. When benefits at
issue are search goods-MCOs can specify their level to consumers
prior to contracting-but it is feared that MCOs provide these benefits at an inefficiently low level because of consumers' bounded rationality, legislatures are preferable to courts as decision-making bodies
because they can view difficult allocation decisions from the more appropriate ex ante perspective.
Legislative decision making, however, is troubling for a different
reason: public choice theory suggests that benefits with enough political support to win a legislative mandate are likely to be precisely those
benefits that are salient to consumers and, consequently, do not re287

See id. at 53.

1999]

MANAGED CARE REGULATION

quire government mandates. Independent decision-making bodies
that can view benefit mandate decisions from an ex ante perspective
while remaining at least partially insulated from the political process
are those most likely to impose an efficient level of mandated benefits.
Consequently, rather than mandating specific benefits, legislatures
should establish expert commissions with the power to mandate benefits when they believe that the market for managed care provides an
inefficiently low level of those benefits.
A.

The Trouble with Courts: Ex Post Decision Making

Although the 1990s have witnessed an explosion of mandates emanating from state legislatures and occasionally from the federal government, court adjudication of suits filed by consumers against their
MCOs for refusal to provide desired benefits can be seen as implicitly
having the same effect. By interpreting contract language strictly and
harshly against MCOs that refuse to provide benefits that their customers desire, judicial decisions can have an effect on the provision of
managed care that is nearly identical to that of a legislative mandate.
Courts impose mandates in the context of a single patient after
that patient has become ill. This ex post perspective has a distinct
benefit: it makes it possible for a court to enforce a mandate that cannot be adequately specified ex ante. As Part II explained, MCOs have
a strategic incentive to provide "cheap" benefits at a "cheap"-benefit
price when the precise contours of a benefit are so highly contingent
upon a patient's specific situation that an MCO cannot describe it
with specificity prior to the consumer's enrollment in the MCO's
health plan. 288 In such situations, the ex post perspective of courts is

necessary to even begin to evaluate the level of the benefit provided.
It is impossible, for example, to specify ex ante what an "expensive"
benefit for a severe headache would be.2 8 9 Consequently, only after

the patient has suffered a headache and receives treatment is it possible to determine whether the MCO provided an "expensive" benefit.
The unique perspective of courts, however, makes it profoundly
difficult for judges to evaluate whether a benefit provided by an MCO
is, in fact, inefficiently low. Courts must evaluate benefits provided by
an MCO in the context of a single patient, whose preferences for a
certain level of benefits may not reflect that of the majority of consumers. Furthermore, they must do so after the patient has become ill, at
which time she has an incentive to exaggerate her preference for a

288

289

See supra Part IIA-C.
See supra Part HI.C.2.
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high-quality, high-priced benefits package.2 90 As a result, courts are
likely to establish inefficiently high benefit levels.
A wave of lawsuits in the early 1990s 29 1 over health plans' denials

of coverage for certain treatments, which coincided with an explosion
of legislative benefits mandates, aptly illustrates the problem. The
plotline of adjudicated claims is often similar. The customer's doctor
recommends a treatment for a life threatening illness that is either
extremely costly, of disputed effectiveness, or both. The health plan
denies coverage on the grounds that the treatment is excluded from
the terms of the customer's coverage. The customer then files suit
seeking coverage for the disputed treatment.
Because of the problem of incomplete managed care contracts,
however, the terms of the insurance contract fail to address explicitly
whether the MCO is obligated to provide the benefit sought. In general, the MCO usually promises to provide all "medically necessary"
treatment, but includes in the contract a blanket exclusion for treatments that are "experimental."2 92 The term "experimental," along
with the standard by which plan administrators will determine
whether the treatment is experimental, are rarely defined with any
degree of specificity in the managed care contract.
This scenario presents the court with a Hobson's choice: either it
must deny coverage that the customer claims she implicitly assumed
she was paying for when she or her employer purchased her insurance
policy, or it must force the plan to underwrite a service it claims it
assumed it would not be liable for when it priced and marketed its
plan. Most of the time (although not always) the courts rule for the
customer. 293 Most typically, courts have resolved these disputes by invoking a basic principle of contract law that ambiguities in a contract
are interpreted against the drafter. 294 In Dahl-Eimers v. Mutual of
Omaha Life Insurance Co., 295 for example, the Eleventh Circuit ruled

that a blanket exclusion of treatments "'considered experimental"'
290 See David M. Eddy, Rationingby Patient Choice 265JAMA 105, 108 (noting that yielding to patient demands for treatment that the patient was not willing to pay for when she
was healthy would "disconnect value and cost," and violate the maxim that "[y]ou can't
change your bet after the wheel is spun" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
291 From 1960 to 1994, the number of insurance coverage lawsuits concerning issues of
medical appropriateness that led to reported court opinions rose from only 5 in the 1960s,
36 in the 1970s, and 71 in the 1980s, to 200 within the first four years of the 1990s. See
Mark A. Hall et al., JudicialProtection of Managed Care Consumers:An EmpiricalStudy of Insurance CoverageDisputes, 26 SETON HALL L. Ray. 1055, 1060 (1996).
292 See id. at 1055-56.
293 See id. at 1062 (reporting an overall patient success rate of 57% in private health
insurance cases).
294 See Havighurst, supra note 39, at 1766.

295

986 F.2d 1379 (11th Cir. 1993).
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was ambiguous as a matter of law and could not, without more evi2 96
dence, support the insurer's denial of coverage.
Although the opinion is a sound application of the standard
black letter law of insurance contracts, the rule is problematic in the
context of health insurance coverage, in which the vision of a completely specified contract is entirely unrealistic. The multitude of conditions a customer could develop, multiplied by the number of
potential treatments for each condition, creates an enormous number
of contingencies. Even the most conscientious health plan could not
hope to explicitly include or exclude each treatment possibility prior
to a customer's enrollment in the plan. If health insurance contracts
are interpreted against the insurer on the grounds of ambiguity even
when an insurer exercising the highest degree of care in drafting
could not have avoided the ambiguity, the result is, as Havighurst has
argued, a judicially imposed requirement that insurers provide Cadillac-quality coverage to all customers-even when this is inefficient because many customers would undoubtedly prefer to accept Chevrolet2 97
quality coverage at lower price.
As a case in point, consider the fallout from Fox v. HealthNet of
Calfomia,298 in which ajury awarded $89 million in compensatory and
punitive damages to a plaintiff who was denied coverage for a bone
marrow transplant to treat breast cancer on the grounds that it fell
into the plan's exclusion of "investigational" treatments. 29 9 Commentators have claimed that, largely as a result of that verdict, nearly all
MCOs now provide coverage for this treatment.3 00 Presumably, their
prices reflect the cost of this coverage. This outcome might be the
most efficient second-best solution to the problem, but only if the
Cadillac version of breast cancer treatment is the majoritarian option:
most customers would have opted ex ante for broader coverage at an
actuarially determined price had they been given the explicit choice
between it and a smaller but cheaper bundle of coverages and services. If this description of consumer preferences is not accurate,
296
Id.at 1381-83 (citing policy language); see also Pirozzi v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield, 741
F. Supp. 586, 589-90 (E.D. Va. 1990) (citing the Ninth Circuit and asserting that "[i]n the
context of modern medicine, the term experimental seems clearly ambiguous on its face"
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). But see Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life
Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the term "'in connection with
medical research' is unambiguous" and refusing "to artificially create ambiguity where
none exists" (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
297
See HAVIGHURST, supra note 46, at 181-82; cf HALL, supranote 39, at 66 (concluding
that insurers are reluctant to deny care "because, historically, courts have been unreceptive
or outright hostile to insurers' attempts to interfere in clinical discretion for any reason").
298
No. 219692 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1993) (LEXIS, Cal. File).
299
See id.
300 See David P. Maslen, EmployerManaged CareLiability: Defining and Managing the Risk,
J. COMPENSATION BENE~rrs, July-Aug. 1995, at 5; see also Danzon, supra note 14, at 505

(same).
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court-ordered bone marrow transplants to treat breast cancer, imposed on the managed care industry and its consumers via the interpretive device of contra proferentem, are suboptimal.
To efficiently resolve coverage litigation ex post, then, a court
must determine not merely whether the health insurance contract is
ambiguous as to whether the plan covers the claimed service, but also
whether the majority of customers would have agreed to pay the marginal cost of such coverage ex ante if the choice was specified and the
consumer was a thorough and careful optimizer of his managed care
choices.3 0 ' In the context of a general liability insurance policy, this is
precisely what the Supreme Court of New Jersey sought to do in
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co. 30 2 Explicitly seeking an "efficient"30 3 resolution of the coverage dispute, the court assigned a Special Master to determine whether similarly situated policy holders
would have purchased broad protection against asbestos-related liability at market prices if they could have foreseen the then-unknown risk
of asbestos liability. 30 4 The case is notable because it is unusual for a
court to undertake the task of attempting to determine ex post what
litigants would have done ex ante in counterfactual situations in an
effort to achieve an efficient outcome, rather than blindly applying
the rule of contra proferentem without regard to the possible resulting
inefficiencies. 305

To suggest that this type of endeavor stretches the institutional
competence of the judicial branch of government past the breaking
point would be an understatement. 30 6 First, a court would have to
make speculative predictions about the preferences of thousands of
consumers who are not parties to the litigation and have no advocate
in the process. In addition, judges would sometimes have to favor an
unidentified, generalized mass of health insurance consumers, represented by a large insurance provider, 30 7 over an identifiable, ill, and
301
Cf Danzon, supra note 14, at 508 (noting that, "[viiewing a coverage dispute as a
contract issue, the relevant question is [whether] consumers [would] have been willing to
pay for insurance coverage of this service, given their ex ante probability distributions of
illness and expected outcomes from treatment, the cost of treatment, and iatrogenic risks,"
and concluding that, "[f]or private health plans, the relevant measure is the ex ante willingness-to-pay of plan enrollees").
302 650 A.2d 974 (NJ. 1994).
303
Id. at 993.
304 See id. at 988-96.
305 Insurance law scholar Kenneth Abraham notes that the "degree of candor" exhibited by the Owens-Illinois court "is unusual." Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance
Polity Interpretation,95 MICH. L. REv. 531, 552 (1996).
306 See HALL, supra note 39, at 71 (concluding that "courts are institutionally ill-suited
to apply this insurability perspective to coverage disputes").
307 Cf. Havighurst, supra note 39, at 1765 (observing that in litigation an insurance
company "appears as a corporate deep pocket" that is "a powerful player in an unequal
game").
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sympathetic plaintiff,30 8 often with his life hanging in the balance 3 093 10
a difficult task even for the most coldly analytical legal mind.
Applying standard contract interpretation principles to health insurance policies does not always expand coverage. It can, and sometimes does, have the opposite effect of limiting coverage, with equally
questionable consequences from an efficiency perspective. When insurers explicitly list excluded services and treatments, or provide a
specific definition of what falls under the exclusion for experimental
treatments, courts often approve subsequent denials of coverage. In
Bechtold v. PhysiciansHealth Plan,3 1 ' the Seventh Circuit ruled in favor
of a health plan's denial of coverage for autologous bone marrow
transplants as treatment for solid tumors, including breast cancer, because the plan had explicitly excluded such coverage.3 12 In Harris v.
Mutual of Omaha Cos., 313 the same court found in favor of a health
plan that excluded coverage for Phase I, II or III clinical trials as experimental, and subsequently refused to pay for a "phase II trial" treatment requested by its insured.3 14 In Fuja v. Benefit Trust Life Insurance
Co.,3 1 5 the same court again allowed an insurer that excluded treatments administered "in connection with medical or other research" to
refuse to provide a treatment currently being investigated in research
3 16
studies.
While these cases present competent judicial applications of the
contra proferentem doctrine, which holds that unambiguous contracts
will be enforced according to their terms, whether they promote the
efficient allocation of resources to health care is far from clear. If the
majority of policyholders would have preferred ex ante to pay the
marginal cost of coverage for the experimental treatments that the
insurer denied ex post, enforcing the plain language of the insurance
308
See Einer Elhauge, Allocating Health CareMorally, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1449, 1464 (1994)
(reflecting on the judicial resolution of health care claims and concluding that "human
beings, forced to make actual decisions framed as health versus money, find themselves
seeming and feeling inhumane" and "resort to just about any mechanism... to avoid or
postpone facing the reality of scarcity").
309
Plaintiff success rate in health insurance coverage disputes is lowerwhen the patient
is highly likely to die without the requested treatment than if the patient faces only a small
risk of death. This finding suggests insurers are reluctant to deny coverage to a dying
patient without an extremely strong contractual basis for doing so, probably because they
fear a court will treat them harshly. See Hall et al., supra note 291, at 1065.
310
Cf David C. Hadorn, Setting Health CarePriorities in Oregon, 265 JAMA 2218, 2219
(1991) (describing how public policy is often based on the Rule of Rescue-rescuing identified individuals at all costs, but not expressing the same commitment when the individual

is merely a statistic).
311
312
313

314
315
316

19 F.3d 322 (7th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 328-29.
992 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 712-13.
18 F.3d 1405 (7th Cir. 1994).
I& at 1410 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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contracts is inefficient. Because of the problems of adverse selection
and consumers' bounded rationality, the fact that coverage for experimental treatments was not included and priced in the contracts litigated in those cases is hardly proof that the provision of such coverage
would have been inefficient. The range of facts and the ex ante perspective necessary to determine whether the provision of a specific
benefit is efficient make the legislature more institutionally competent than the judiciary to make such determinations, at least when an
ex post perspective is not necessitated by the impracticality of fully
specifying benefits ex ante.
B.

The Trouble with Legislatures: Public Choice

Mandated benefits legislation can be viewed as the legislature deciding what benefits a majority of policy holders would have selected
at the actuarially determined price, assuming complete information,
unbounded rationality, and no market imperfections caused by adverse selection. Legislatures surely fall short of perfection when they
attempt to make such assessments. But facts about the health insurance market and the preferences of a majority of consumers-facts
about a broad population rather than about a specific litigant-are far
more available to legislatures ex ante than to courts ex post.
That legislatures have an institutional advantage relative to courts
in determining whether mandating benefits will enhance efficiency
does not mean that delegating this task to legislatures is without
problems. There are two primary drawbacks to legislative implementation of mandated benefits. The first problem stems from the observation that small but well-organized interest groups are likely to have
too great an influence on the legislative process.3 17 The consequence
is that legislatures might enact benefits mandates, not because enactment promotes efficiency in the allocation of social resources, but because it benefits a particular group that wields a disproportionate
amount of political power. Substantial danger exists that benefit mandates will be "simply concessions by state legislators to special interests
to force consumers into buying insurance coverage for specific dis317 This problem, which the "public choice" literature thoroughly describes, is not
unique to the mandated benefits context. See Einer R Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory
Justify More IntrusiveJudicialReview 2, 101 YALE LJ. 31, 38-39 (1991) (explaining how interest
group theory posits that collective action problems, which make it difficult for groups to
assert their influence on the political process, are more pronounced for large groups with
diffuse interests than for smaller groups with intense interests); see alsoDaniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tax. L. REv. 873, 890-901 (1987)
(describing the influence of special interests on legislation); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 223, 229-33 (1986) (asserting that concentrated interest groups have a
greater incentive than members of the general public to promote legislation).
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eases or medical practices whether or not it is needed or wanted."318
Proponents of the free market often criticize the regulation of MCOs
3 19
on this ground.
Every mandated benefit undoubtedly serves one or more interest
groups with a financial or ideological stake in the provision of the
benefit. 320 Groups of health care providers have a strong financial

interest in the mandating of benefits that they provide. Psychiatrists
and psychologists, for example, have an obvious interest in lobbying
on behalf of mental health benefits mandates regardless of their cost.
Women's rights advocates might see mandated maternity benefits as
desirable from a gender-equality perspective, also without concern for
costs involved. Consumers who believe such benefits are too costly are
likely to be relatively diffuse, with less lobbying clout than their more
organized counterparts3 21-if they realize at all that benefits mandates take money from their pockets. 3 22 This power imbalance might

be offset if insurance companies oppose inefficient benefits mandates
out of fear that marginal purchasers will exit the market, but there is
no guarantee that this would have the effect of limiting enacted benefits mandates to those that are socially efficient. In any event, at the
very least, legislative consideration of benefits mandates ensures that
an untold amount of resources will be unnecessarily wasted in the lob318 Henry N. Butler, The PoliticalMarketfor Mandated Health Care Benefits Under the Proposed National Health Security Ac4 3 KAN.J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 113, 115 (1994); see also HAu,
supra note 39, at 22 (claiming that state mandates are often imposed "as the result of
lobbying by special interest groups representing medical professionals"); Enthoven &
Singer, supranote 2, at 30 (warning that "one should be sure that what is being proposed is
consumer protection and not provider protection masquerading as consumer protection"); Hyman, supranote 28, at 425 ("IT]he drafting of consumer protection initiatives is
readily hijacked by providers, who have their own interests at heart.").
319 See, e.g., EPSimn, MORTAL PERIL, supra note 39, at 426 (claiming that the losers of
"major institutional change" have led the legislative attack on managed care in an attempt
to "recapture some of their gains through politics"); Hyman, supra note 28, at 451 ("[T]he
government is not a neutral party when it comes to these matters-especially when it is
enlisted by providers [of health care] to create or enforce a cartel, in which event most of
the surplus is likely to be captured by those same providers.").
320 See Moran, supra note 45, at 18 (predicting that "[i]f we purport to regulate the
terms of all salable health insurance in the United States, then all parties whose economic
existence hinges on continued insurance coverage will fight savagely for inclusion").
321
SeeJohn F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay Initiatives: A Callfor HeightenedJudicialScrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153, 169 & n.91 (1993) ("[D]iscrete and insular groups possess
certain political advantages, such as solidarity, organization and lobbying power, that more
diffuse and anonymous groups, such as lesbians and gays, lack." (citing Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. Rxv. 713, 745 (1985))).
322
Cf Bellante & Porter, supra note 120, at 685 ("The politician realizes little opposition to proposed mandated benefits because the cost of the benefit is hidden ... and these
costs are spread.... ."); Butler, supra note 318, at 116 (arguing that politicians like to spend
money from sources other than tax revenue "because the adverse economic impacts are
more difficult to trace back to [the legislature], making the political costs lower, yet the
potential political benefits arejust as great as they would have been had [the legislature]
paid for the program on budget").
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bying efforts of those with personal interests in which benefits are
imposed.
Even if legislatures resist the pressure of concentrated interest
groups and enact benefit mandates in response to consumer demands, the second, and extremely ironic, problem remains. Publicspirited legislatures are likely to mistakenly enact precisely the wrong
benefit mandates. Vocal consumer support is a necessary precondition for a public-spirited legislature to mandate a particular benefit.
But if a benefit is important and salient enough to consumers for
them to petition their representatives for legislation, the unregulated
market will most likely provide the benefit anyway, assuming that most
consumers are willing to pay its marginal actuarial cost. Government
action, in such cases, is either unnecessary or inefficient. The market
is most likely to underprovide benefits of relatively lesser importance
to consumers-ones that are little noticed by the public. By definition, less important benefits will not be the subject of significant consumer lobbying. Without public pressure, busy legislatures are
unlikely to identify benefits that the market underprovides and thus
should be mandated.
Postpartum maternity benefits may illustrate this irony. As stories
of hospitals involuntarily discharging mothers and their newborn infants from the hospital within twelve hours of birth because their
MCOs refused to pay for additional hospitalization proliferated and
created a public outcry, two responses occurred roughly simultaneously. More than half of the states,3 23 followed by the federal government,3 24 mandated minimum postpartum hospitalization benefits. At

approximately the same time, a substantial number of MCOs began to
compete for customers on the basis of their generous maternity benefits. 3 25 Other health care providers began to see a market opportunity

in postpartum maternity benefits as well; a number of hospitals attempted to lure customers by advertising free "extra!' days of postpar3 26
tum hospitalization.
323 See Kuper, supra note 77, at 667-68 (reporting that 28 states had passed mandated
benefits bills, and legislation was pending in others when the federal government passed its
version of the same law).

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
325 See Moran, supra note 45, at 14 ("Within days after the [news became public), a
substantial number of health plans had revised or clarified their policies regarding maternity length-of-stay and were actively advertising that fact. [The fruits of] the various legislative efforts... [thus) appeared well after the problem had disappeared from the market.");
see also Stuart Auerbach, Doctor'sAlliance Has a Remedy for Managed CareLimits,WAsH. POsr,
Dec. 30, 1996, at F12 (reporting on an MCO advertisement that it did not provide "drivethrough deliveries").
326 See Kuper, supra note 77, at 685-86 (reporting that hospitals in Washington, Michigan, New York, and Illinois have offered newborn infants and their mothers free postpartum stays of 48 hours, even if their insurance would not pay for the full stay).
324
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These market responses suggest that a benefits mandate was
probably not necessary to ensure the efficient provision of postpartum
hospitalization coverage. Postpartum maternity benefits may not have
always been of sufficient importance and salience to boundedly rational consumers to insure their efficient provision by the free market.
But the publicity surrounding "drive-through deliveries" in the mid1990s apparently made these benefits salient to a critical mass of attractive consumers and thus assured the market's efficient provision
of them. The same publicity that led to a market response also led to
a legislative response that was, by that time, rendered unnecessary.
C.

Expert Commissions

Because courts must resolve the cases of individual litigants, they
are in a poor position to make the type of cost-benefit trade offs that
the provision of efficient benefits mandates requires. Legislatures can
focus on the ex ante costs and benefits to broad populations of mandated benefits, rendering them better suited institutionally than
courts to determine which mandates would be efficient. Unfortunately, benefits with enough political support to win a legislative mandate are likely to be either those that the unregulated market would
provide or those that are inefficient but championed by unduly influential interest groups or irate consumers who do not, in fact, desire
the benefit in question at its actuarial cost.
In light of the shortcomings of courts and legislatures as decision
makers, states (or the federal government) should place the power of
determining which benefits should be mandated and which should be
left to the market in the hands of specially created, independent expert commissions. Legislation of specific benefit mandates (or "body
part" bills, as they are sometimes called) should be replaced by legislation delegating to independent expert bodies the responsibility of
evaluating such proposals.3 27 These bodies should be explicitly
charged with performing a market mimicking function, mandating
only those benefits estimated to be inefficiently underprovided by the
health insurance market.
There are reasons to believe that expert commissions would be
superior to legislatures at the task of mandating the "right" (efficiency
enhancing) benefits and avoiding mandating the "wrong" (efficiency
decreasing) benefits. First, they should be composed of scientists and
economists with the technical ability to determine which benefits not
provided by the market would improve the efficient allocation of re327 At least one analyst, following a market-facilitating rather than a market-mimicking
regulatory model, has recently proposed the formation of a federal agency, modeled after
the Securities and Exchange Commission, that would mandate uniform information disclosure requirements for MCOs. See Etheredge, supra note 259, at 23.
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sources to health care and should be mandated; few legislators are
likely to possess these technical abilities. 328 Second, whereas busy legislators with wide-ranging responsibilities are not likely to independently attempt to mandate a benefit prior to a lobbying effort on its
behalf, an independent commission can be charged with the task of
proposing mandated benefits that have not yet spawned such lobbying
efforts.
Perhaps most importantly, expert commissions are less likely than
legislatures to mandate inefficient benefits as a result of pressure
lodged by rent-seeking interest groups. To be sure, concentrated interest groups can sway commissions, as well as legislatures. 329 But by
staffing such commissions with professionals who have specific technical expertise and who are not career politicians or bureaucrats, and by
making the terms of commission members sufficiently lengthy to protect them from political retribution for their decisions, the commissions can be substantially insulated from the political process. 33 0 As
one example, witness the notable success of the Presidential Base
Closing Commission in neutralizing the power of interest groups that
had succeeded for many years in blocking congressional attempts to
close inefficient military bases. 33 1 As another example, consider the
ability of independent central banks, such as the United States Federal Reserve, to conduct monetary policy largely free from political
3 32
influences.
328 Even staunch opponents of legislative delegation of responsibility to administrative
agencies believe that, once a legislature specifies the' normative standards by which agencies are to make decisions, the technical application of those standards is a proper subject
of delegation. See Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CoRNELL L.
REv. 1, 24 (1982) ("No one who argues for requiring greater specificity in legislative delegations supposes that the members of Congress could or should specify within narrow
limits... [the scope of technical legislation]. But one might imagine that legislators would
at least address the basic framework ... within which power levels would be set.").
329
Cf id. at 26 (claiming that delegation of decision making to administrative agencies
will not eliminate the influence of interest groups, but merely lead to the presence of
interest groups in the agencies).
330
In addition, if the executive appoints expert committees, they may be more insulated from the political process than are legislators. The executive-be it a governor or
the President-is accountable to a broader constituency than legislators, and thus might
be more responsive to the general public interest. For an elaboration of this argument, see
JERRY L. MASHAw, GREED, CHAos, AND GOVERNANCE 152-53 (1997).
331
See, e.g, Alan S. Blinder, Americans Versus Their Government: Is Government Too Political?, CuRRENT, Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 16, 20 (noting that the base-closing commission is "now
viewed as a noteworthy success"); Carolyn Lochhead, Armey of the Righ& REASoN, July 1997,
at 30, 32 (calling the commission "one of the great political successes of modern
government").
332
See Geoffrey P. Miller, An Interest-Group Theory of Central Bank Independence, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 433, 446-47 (1998) (arguing that independent central banks are far more
insulated from political forces than they would be if they were under the direction of the
government's treasury department).
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Although legislatures in the 1990s have tended to mandate health
care benefits directly, a few have delegated some decision making authority to independent commissions. Although none of these efforts
has maximized the efficiency of health care benefits provided by
MCOs and other insurers, they can be seen as initial steps in the right
direction. Pennsylvania has enacted legislation that created a healthcare cost containment council responsible for evaluating the efficacy
of proposed health care benefits mandates and providing recommendations to the legislature. 33 3 By statute, the council's twenty-one members consist of an assortment of public officials and competing
interest-group representatives 3 4-not exactly a recipe for insulating
mandate decisions from the pressures of interest group politics. One
of the council's charges, however, is to establish mandated benefits
review panels to independently assess legislative proposals.3 3 5 These
panels are to consist of four researchers: one in health insurance, one
in biostatistics, one in economics, and one physician with knowledge
33 6
of the proposed mandate's subject matter.
In theory, this type of expert commission could help depoliticize
and rationalize the promulgation of benefits mandates. Problems
with the structure of the Pennsylvania legislation, however, have prevented mandated benefits review panels in that state from serving this
function. First, the panels are only advisory; they have no actual
337
power to either mandate benefits or block legislative mandates.
Second, the Health Care Cost Containment Council convenes the
panel only if the council decides that data submitted by parties who
support and oppose a proposed mandate are sufficient for a full analysis of the issue. 338 Although the council has received a large number
of requests from the legislature to present recommendations on proposed mandates (eleven in 1998 alone), it has convened review panels
3 39
only rarely since the data sufficiency provision was enacted in 1993.

In response to a model act created by the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners in 1991,340 a number of states have created

administrative bodies charged with specifying a minimum level of insurance benefits, which any MCO or insurance company doing busi333

See

PA. STAT.

ANN. tit. 35, § 449.5 (West, WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg.

Sess.).
334
335
336
337

See id. § 449.4(b).
See id. § 449.9(1).
See id. § 449.9(2).
See idL § 449.9(3).

338 See id. § 449.9(1).
339 See Email correspondence between Tricia Fanone and Flossie Wolf, Director of Policy and Legislative Affairs, Pennsylvania Health Care Cost Containment Council (Nov. 2,
1998) (on file with author).
340
See I NATIONAL ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, OFFIcIAL N.A.I.C. MODEL INSURANCE LAWS,
REGULATIONS, AND GUIDELINES at 35-1 (1984 & Supp. 1996).
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ness in that market3 41 must offer to small employers. Maryland is a
representative example. The Maryland Health Care Access and Cost
Commission has statutory authority to promulgate, by regulation, the
minimum benefit levels that any insurance carrier may provide to
firms with two to fifty employees. 342 The enabling legislation permits
the governor, with the advice and consent of the state senate, to appoint the nine commission members, with the only restriction being
that six of the nine must not be connected to a health care provider
or payer.3 43 In 1994, with the input of a governor-appointed Standard
Benefit Plan Task Force, 3 44 the commission mandated a set of minimum benefits for the small-employer insurance market, taking into
account the efficacy of proposed benefits and the overall affordability
3 45
of the package.
The Maryland legislation, like the Pennsylvania legislation, is a
step, albeit an incomplete one, in the direction of rationalizing the
process of mandating health care benefits. On the positive side, Maryland's commission was partially insulated from the political process,
attempted to balance the costs and benefits of mandates, and had authority to promulgate mandates. On the negative side, the commission's power extended only to the small-employer insurance market,
and its enabling legislation did not specify the qualifications of its appointees sufficiently enough to insure that the commission was truly
expert rather than political.
Mandates can improve the efficiency of society's allocation of resources between health care and other goods when used to require
benefits that will otherwise be systematically underprovided by the
341 See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 21.56.060 (Michie, WESTLAW through end of 1998 2d Sp.
Sess.); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-8-606 (West, WESTLAW through end of 1998 2d Ex.
Sess.); DEL_ CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 7211 (WESTLAW through end of 1999 Reg. Sess.); MD.
CODE AN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 19-1502 (WESTLAW through end of 1999 Reg. Sess.); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 26.1-36.3-08 (WESTLAW through end of 1999 Reg. Sess.); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 26-19-308 (Michie, WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg. Sess.).
342 See MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1203 (WESTLAW through end of 1998 Reg. Sess.).
343 See Mb. CODE AN., HEALTH-GEN. I § 19-1503 (WESTLAW through end of 1998
Reg. Sess.).
344 See id. § 19-1501. The Editor's Note states:
Section 4, ch. 9, Acts 1993, provides that 'the Governor shall appoint the
Maryland Standard Benefit Plan Task Force to advise the Medical Care Data
Review Commission on the initial development of the standard comprehensive health benefit plan to be adopted in accordance with § 700 of Subtitle
55 of Article 48A .

.

. and Title 19, Subtitle 15 of the Health-General

Article.'
Id. § 19-1501 note. The note goes on to say that "the Governor shall, to the extent practicable, ensure that the Task Force is comprised of an appropriate and balanced mix of representatives of practitioners, hospitals, carriers, employers, labor, and consumers." Id.
345
See MD. INs. REGs. § 09.31.05 (1998); Don S. Miller & Thomas P. Barbera, Report of
the Maryland Standard Benefits Plan Task Force to the Health CareAccess and Cost Commission,
Nov. 4, 1993, at 24-25.
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market. On the other hand, mandates can cause an inefficiently high
level of resources to be devoted to health care when they require benefits that the majority of consumers would rather not purchase at the
amount of money they cost to provide. Government is most likely to
use mandates efficiently (and not inefficiently) in the following
circumstances:
(1) A commission is created to evaluate the efficacy of benefits
mandates;
(2) The commission is made an expert rather than a political
entity by specifying membership qualifications to insure that members are well-qualified to evaluate the efficiency consequences of
mandates;
(3) The enabling legislation specifies that the commission's
goal is to mandate only efficiency-enhancing benefits;
(4) The commission is given authority to promulgate mandates
that it believes will be efficiency enhancing. At a minimum, the
commission should have the authority to call for a vote of the legislature to approve or disapprove (without amendment) its proposed
mandates;
(5) The commission is given authority to block legislative mandates that it believes will increase inefficiency in the allocation of
resources. At a minimum, the commission should be able to require a supermajority of the legislature to override its opposition to
a proposed mandate;
(6) The commission's authority extends to all MCOs and insurance companies doing business in the jurisdiction, except to the
extent that ERISA or other federal legislation preempts the mandates of a state body.
CONCLUSION

The public backlash against the perceived excesses of managed
care has made "patient protection" or "mandated benefits" legislation
ubiquitous in the 1990s at the state level and an issue of emerging
salience at the federal level. Opponents of the legislation contend
that it is inefficient; it causes consumers to spend more money on
health care than they wish to spend. Proponents generally contend
that notions of economic efficiency do not belong in discussions of
the provision of health care.
This Article has contended that policymakers need not naively
believe that they can legislate away the problem of scarcity in order to
support benefit mandates in some circumstances. For two primary
reasons, market incentives are likely to encourage MCOs and other
providers of health insurance to offer an inefficiently low level of benefits. First, a simple game theoretic model suggests that, because it is
impossible to completely specify the terms of a health insurance con-
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tract, MCOs have an incentive to provide a lower level of coverage
than consumers might wish to purchase. Second, psychological research on consumer decision making suggests that purchasers of a
product as complicated as health care coverage are likely to adopt selective, noncompensatory choice strategies. Such strategies will systematically reward suppliers that provide a low-priced rather than a
high-quality insurance product. Because of these market imperfections, mandated benefits can be efficiency enhancing rather than efficiency reducing.
The economic argument for mandated benefits depends, of
course, on the assumption that government actors can successfully
identify which mandates will be efficiency enhancing and which will
not. This determination would be difficult under the best of circumstances, but courts and legislatures face institutional impediments to
successfully making such complicated determinations. Appropriate
mandated benefits decisions are most likely to be made by expert
commissions that can find shelter from the influence of interest-group
politics that is likely to affect legislative determinations.
The bad news about health care mandates is that consumers must
pay for them. Contrary to the promises of populist clamoring for increased regulation of managed care, the public cannot expect an increased number of benefits free of charge. The good news about
mandates is that, in some circumstances, consumers might prefer to
pay for benefits that the market for health insurance does not provide
rather than enjoy a reduced level of benefits at a somewhat lower
price. In order to rationalize the amount of money devoted to health
care, the debate over patient protection laws must take seriously both
of these points. We have to pay for all the benefits that we wish to
receive. But we can use government mandates to insure that we receive all the benefits for which we are willing to pay.

